Thursday, December 22, 2011

The Mimamsa Philosophy


Jaimini (400 B.C.) was the author of the Mimamsa Sutra, and the founder of the Mimamsa system. Savarasvamin (300 A.D.) wrote a commentary called, Savara-Bhasya, in which he criticized the views of the different schools of Buddhism. He started his views on the principle philosophical topics, and raised the purva Mimamsa to the status of an independent system. Kumarila Bhatta (700 A.D.), the founder of the Bhatta school of Mimamsa wrote Slokavartika, Tantravartika and Tuptika. Slokavartika has great philosophical importance. Sucarita Misra (900 A.D.) wrote a commentary known as Nyayaratnakara on it, Nyayartnamala, Tantratana, and Sastradipika. Vacaspati Misra's (680-750 A.D.) Vidhiviveka, and Tattvabindu. Prabhakara Misra (700 A.D.), the founder of the Prabhakara school of Mimamsa, wrote a commentary entitled Bharat on Savara-Bhasya. Salikanatha Misra (800 A.D.), wrote a commentary known as Rjuvimalapancika on Bharat and Prakaranapancika. The third school of Mimamsa was founded by Murari whose works are lost.

The Mimamsa is called the Purva Mimamsa, while the Vedanta is called the Uttara Mimamsa. The former is earlier than the latter in the sense that it deals with rituals, while the latter is concerned with knowledge. The performance of rituals leads to the knowledge of the reality. So the purva Mimamsa, called the Mimamsa, is logically prior to the Uttara Mimamsa or the Vedanta, the former being concerned with Dharma, and the latter, with Brahman.

The Mimamsa is called Karma Mimamsa. It mainly deals with the Vedic injunctions about rtuals, the rules of interpretation of the texts, which remove the apparent contradictions among them, and harmonize them with one another, and the philosophical justification of the beliefs ritualism. It believes in the reality of the external world, the reality of the individual souls, and the Law of Karma. It believes in transmigration, heaven and hell, and liberation. It believes in many gods, who are worshipped through sacrifies, and rejects the notion of one God, who creates, preserves and dissolves the world. It frankly advocates atheism, and emphasizes the importance of ritualism. It believes in the eternality and infallibility of the Vedas and rejects their divine authorship.


Intrinsic Validity (Svatahpramanya) of Knowledge, and Extrinsic Invalidity (Paratah Apramanya) of Knowledge
Kumarila regards cognition as a means of valid knowledge (pramana) because it is apprehension. Prabhakara also regards apprehension, which is distinct from recollection, as a means of valid knowledge. Kumarila regards cogniizedness (jnatata) produced by a cognitive act as its result. But prabhakara identifies pramana with the valid knowledge (prama), and regards cognition as manifesting itself, and not as inferable from cognizedness of its object. According to him, all cognition as cognitions are valid, and there invalidity is due to their dusagreement with the real nature of their objects, so that wrongness does not belong to the cognitions themselves, but to the objects cognized. Kumarila also regards apprehension as valids knowledge, which can be set aside by its disagreement with the real nature of its object. He regards novelty, non-contradiction and correspondence with the object as the tests of truth. He regards recollection as invalid, because it apprehends what was apprehends already by perception. Prabhakara is in the nature of apprehension.

Kumarila recognizes the intrinsic validity and the extrinsic invalidity of knowledge. The validity of knowledge arises from the essential natures of its causes untainted by defects, and is known by the knowledge itself. It does not arise from any special excellence in the cause of knowledge, and is not known by any other subsequent knowledge of fruitful action, or of the absence of a contradicting knowledge. Knowledge is valid in itself, and is not validated by any other knowledge. Intrinsic validity of knowledge consists in its being generated by the complement of causal conditions besides them. The knowledge of validity also is generated by the same aggregate of causal conditions which make the knowledge known. But the invalidity of knowledge arises from defects in the causal conditions of the knowledge of a contradicting knowledge.

The Nyaya regards both validity and invalidity of knowledge as extrinsic due to excellence and defects of the causes, of knowledge, and determined by the knowledge of a fruitful action and a fruitless action respectively. Kumarila criticizes this view. If validity and invalidity of knowledge would be nutral and devoid of any logical value. But we never experience neutral and devoid of any logical value. But we never experience neutral knowledge, but only valid knowledge or invalid knowledge. If the validity of a knowledge of its agreement with its object, or the knowledge of a fruitful action, then the validity of the second knowledge, and so on to infinity. If the second knowledge is valid in itself, the first knowledge also is intrinsically valid. The Nyaya regards the validity of knowledge as due to the excellence of its causes. But the so-called excellence of the sense-organs and the like is not known through any means of valid knowledge, and invalid knowledge, and defects of its causes respectively. But, in fact, we experience only valid knowledge and invalid knowledge. Invalid knowledge arises from causes tainted with defects. So valid knowledge must be held to arises from the essential nature of its called causes untainted by defects. The invalidity of knowledge is produced by a deficiency in its causes. It is held by some to be due to the knowledge of its deficiency, and not to its nature.

The validity of knowledge cannot be determined by the knowledge of any special excellence in its cause, or the knowledge of its harmony with the real nature of its object, or the knowledge of a fruitful action. It is determined by the knowledge itself. No special excellence of the causes of knowledge except their essential nature is perceived. Nor can the validity of knowledge be determined by the knowledge of its harmony with the real nature of its object. Validity or truth is harmony of a knowledge of a harmony to manifest its object, because it does not differ from the first knowledge. Nor can the validity of knowledge be determined by the knowledge of a fruitful action, for unless its validity is determined, it cannot determine the validity of the first knowledge is determined by the first knowledge is determined by the first. If the latter is determined by itself, the former also should be regarded as determined by itself. Nor can the validity of knowledge be determined by the knowledge of the absence of a contradicting knowledge, since it cannot be exhaustively known by us, because we are not omniscient. Further, it is known either at the time of ascertaining of it cannot determine the validity of an antecedent knowledge. Hence valid knowledge is produced by the essential nature of its causes untainted by defects, and known by itself. Invalid knowledge is produced by causes tainted with defects, and known by the knowledge of the defects or the knowledge of a contradicting knowledge.


Perception (Pratyaksa)
Kumarila recognizes six pramansas, viz., perception, inference, comparison, testimony, presumption, and non apprehendion. Pranhakara rejects negation as an independet category, and non-apprehension as the means of knowledge it.

Jaimini defines perception as the knowledge produced in the self by the right intercourse of the sense-organs with the self existing objects. It is produced by real objects existing at present and acting upon the sense-organs. When there is a right intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects, valid perception is produced. Kumarila says, "Right intercourse is the intercourse of the sense-organs untainted by defects with real objects." Illusion are produced by wrong intercourse. The Mimamsa theory of perception is similar to the Nyaya theory. Only the latter regards the auditory organs as ether limited by the ear-hole, while the former regards it as space limited by the ear-hole.

The prabhakara defines perception as direct apprehension, which relates to an object, the self, and cognition. In every perception of an object, the self, and the object are perceived. ThisPrabhakara'sdoctrine of triple perception. In regard to objects, there is the perception of substances, qualities, and universals due to the intercourse of the tances, qualities, and universals due to the intercourse of the sense-organs with them. Cognitions are self-manifest. But the self and an object are not self-manifest, but are manifested by a cognition, which is self-aware and which is not manifested by any other cognitions.

Kumarila and Prabhakara both recognizes two stages of percepton, viz., indetermine perception and determinate perception. Kumarila defines indeterminate perception as simple apprehension of an object, pure and simple, similar to the apprehension of a baby or a dumb person. It apprehends neither the speceific characters nor the generice characters, but an individual object only, which is their substrate. It cannot apprehend the generice characters as generice and the specific characters as specific.

Prabhakara defines indeterminate perception as a simple apprehension of the bare nature of an object. It apprehend a substance, a quality, and a genus as bare existence unrelated to each other just after the sense object-intercourse. It existence is proved by its self-awareness. It apprehends generice characters and specific characters, but it cannot cognize them as generic and specific, since it is devoid of recollection of other similar and disisimilar objects.

Kumarila defines determinate perception as apprehension of the generic characters of an object as generic, and of its specific characters as specific. It contains an element of recollection of similar and dissimilar objects, and apprehends the community of its object with other similar objects and its distinction from other dissimllar objects. It apprehends an object and its genric and specific properties in a subject predicate relation. Prabhakara also regards determinate perception as the apprehension of the generic characters and the specific characters of an object and its properties in a subject-predicate relation. Prabhakara also regards determinate perception as the apprehension of the generic and specific respectively. It apprehends its object and its object as a substance endued with particualar qualities and belonging to a certain genus. It conatins an elements of recollection produced by subconscious impression. It is immediate apprehension produced by the sense-objects-intercourese aided by subconscious impression.

Kumarila recognizes the validity og indeterminate and determinate perception both. Indeterminate perception reveals the bare nature of an object. It is direct apprehension or distinct cogniton of an object in itself, unrelated to other objects. Its validity consists in its directness and immediacy; it yields new knowledge not acquired already. Though it is devoid of subject-predicate relation, it is valid. Determinate perception also is valid, since it is direct and immediate knowledge of an object and its properties as related to each other, which is produced by the sense-object-intercourse aided by subconscious impressions. Prabhakara also regards indeterminate perception as valid, since it is sensuous apprehension of an object unrelated to other objects and devoid of recollection, and since its validity is proved by self-awareness. He regards determinate perception also as valid, because it apprehends the subject-predicate relation between its object and its properties, substance, quality and genus which is not apprehended by indeterminate perception.

Inference (Anumana)
Savara defines inference as the knowledge of an unperceived object, which is not present to a sense-organs, from the perception of another object, when a uniform relation has been known to subsist between them. Kumarila explains the relation as invariable concomitance of a sign or reason with a predicate, the former being pervaded by the latter, which is indicate. The sign is called vyapa because it is coextensive with, or wider than, the sign in time and place. The unperceived predicate is inferred from the sign perceived in the subject on the ground of the uniform relation between them known already in similar instances. Smoke was perceived to be accompanied by fire in a kitchen and other similar instances at certain times and in certain places. Smoke is subsequently perceived in a hill exactly in the same form. So the existence of a fire in the same form in a hill is inferred from it. 

The invariable concomitance, according to Kumarila, is known by repeated observations of concomitance of the two general properties of the reason and the predicate, and some-times of two particular objects denoted by them, strengthened by the non-observation of countrary instances of their non-concomitance. The observations of concomitances of the rreason and the predicate in numerous instances of their non-by the induction by simple enumeration.

Does inference involve the fallacy of petitio principal ? Kumarila regards novelty as an essential characteristics of valid knowledge. It consists in not being apprehended already. It is objected that inference contains the recollection of invariable concomitance, which apprehends what has already been apprehended, and thus invalidates inference. Kumarila argues that though the concomitance of smoke and fire in a kitchen and the like is certainly known in a general way, yet the relation between the present subject (e.g., a hill) and the predicate (e.g. a fire) is not already known. The hill was not already known, farless its fieriness. What is the novel factor, which was not already known.  The hill was not already known, farless its fieriness. What is the novel factor, which was not already apprehended, in the inference? The fieriness of smoky objects is already known in a general way. The generic character of fire is already known. The hill is perceived. But the hill as qualified by a fire was not already known by any means of valid knowledge.

Prabhakara slightly amends Savara's definition of the inference. He defines it as the knowledge of a predicate in a subject from the perception of a sign or reason on the ground of the knowledge of a uniform relation between them, if the knowledge is not contradicted by another knowledge. The uniform relation  may express inherence, coinherence in the same substance, causality, and the like. The causal relation between smoke and fire is invariable. The relation between smell and earth is invariable. The relation between taste and colour, which inhere in the same substance is invariable. Whenever there is taste, there is colour, there is no taste, for instance, in light. An invariable relation is the ground of inference. Prabhakara also regards induction by   simple enumeration as the ground of invariable concomitance. He considers inference to be valid, since the knowledge of the predicate existing in the subject is in the nature of apprehension, though it is produced by the perception of the sign and the recollection of the invariable concomitance. 

Prabhakara admits inference for oneself and inference for others. Both consits of three members viz., 1) the thesis or proposition, 2) the minor premise which states the reason and 3) universal major premise which states the uniform relation illustrated by an example. The preposition should be stated first, but the major premise may be stated first, but the major be stated in any order. Either the reason or the application may be stated. The conclusion follows necessarily from the gerneral principle of relation between the sign and the predicate.

A hetergenous example is neddles, since a homegenous example is enough to illustrate the gerneral principle. Savara admits two kinds of inference, viz., pratyaksatodrstasambandha and samanyatodrstasambhandha. Kumarila calls them drstasvalaksana and adrstasvalaksanavisaya. Prabhakara calls them drastasvalakasna and arstasvalaksana. In the former there is the invariable concomitance between objects which are perceptible, as smoke and fire. In the latter there is the invariable concomitance between a perceptible objects and an imperceptible objects, as motion of the sun is infereed from its change of position in the sky. Prabhakara regards motion as imperceptible.

Comparison (Upamana)
Savara defines comparison as the knowledge of similarity subsitng in an unperceived object (e.g. a cow) on the perception of a similar objects (e.g. a wild cow) perceived. The cow which was perceived by me in the past in a town is similar to this wild cow perceived in a forest at present. This is an example of comparison. The prbhakara also defines comparison as the knowledge of similarity subsiting in a remembered object, which arises from the perception of similarity. A person, who perceived  a cow in a town in the past, perceives its similarity with the cow, and then knows the similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow. The knowledge of similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow is comparison. Prabhakara's view of comparison identical with that of kumarila. Both regard similarity as an object of comparison. Both similarity of a remembered object with a perceived object as known by comparison.

Comparison is not perception, since its object known to be similar (e.g. a cow) is not in contact with a sense-organ. Nor is comparison inference, since it does not depend upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the two objects, which are similar to each other. It may be reduced to an inference in the following manner. The cow is similar to the wild cow, because it is the substrate of similarity with the wild cow, and whatever is the substrate of similarity with another object is found to be similar to it, as one of the twine is similar to the other. This is wrong, because the cow and the wild cow, which are similar to each other, were never perceived together in the past. So comparison is not inference. Nor is it testimony, since it does not depend upon verbal authority. So it is an independent means of valid knowledge.

Presumption (Arthapatti)
Savara defines presumption  as the assumption of an unperceived fact without which inconsistency among perperceived facts cannot be reconciled. If we know that Devadatta is alive, and perceive that he is absent from his house, we cannot reconcile his being alive with his non-existence in his house, unless we assume his existence outside his house. The assumption of this unperceived fact which reconciles two apparently inconsistent well-known facts is presumption. It is also called postulation of implication. Kumarila and Prabhakara differ from each other in their views on presumption. Prabhakara maintains that there is an element of doubt in presumption while Kumarila denies its existence in it. There is doubt, according to Prabhkara, as to the truth of the two perceived fact which cannot be reconciled with each other. The the apparently inconsistent facts. We know that Decadatta is living, and perceive his absence from his house.

The element of doubt, according to Prabhakara, distinguishes presumption from inference. There is no elements of doubt in inference. From the undoubted perception of smoke we can infer the existence of fire. The sign is free from doubt. But the perceived absence of Devadatta from his house leads to the presumption of his living outside his house only when it has made the fact of his living doubtful. Thus there is doubt in presumption, while there is no doubt in inference. Presumption removes doubt, and reconciles two apparently inconsistent facts, and cannot be regarded as inference.

There is no element of doubt, according to Kumarila, in presumption. We perceive the absence of Devadatta from his house. We know for certain that he is alive. In order to reconcile these two well-known and undoubted facts we assume that he has gone out of his house. Without this assumption the apparent inconsistency between his being alive and his absence from his house cannot be reconciled. If the knowledge of his living were doubtful, it could not be the sound basis of presumption. It removes the mutual inconsistency of two well-ascertaint facts. The presumption of a third fact reconciles the two well-known facts perceived, which appear to be inconsistent with each other.

Non-Apprehension (Anupalabdhi)
Kumarila regards non-apprehension as the means of knowing the non-existence of an object, which cannot be known by perception, inference, comparison, testimony and presumption. Non-existence is real and apprehended by non-apprehension. The non-exitence of curd in milk is prior non-existence. The non-existence of a horse in a cow is mutual non-existence. The non-existence of horns in a here is absolute non-existence. If non-apprehension were not recognized as an independent mean of knowledge, there would be the existence of curd in milk, of milk in curd, of a jar in a piece of cloth, and of horns in a hare. Non-apprehension is non-production of perception and the like, but it is cognition or a modification of the self. It is a means of valid knowledge, since it cognizes non-existence which cannot be known by any other means of valid knowledge. How is the non-existence of a jar on the ground cognized? First, the ground, which is the locus of the non-existence of a jar, is perceived. Then the jar, the counterpositive entity of the non-existencem, is remembered. Then a purely mental cognition of the non-existence of the jar, which is independent of the sense-object-intercourse, produced. A person first perceivces the bare ground, then remembers a jar, which existed on it. Then he cognizes the non-existence of the jar on the ground by means of non-apprehension.

Non-apprehension being negative in character cannot cognize positive exitence. Perception, inference, comparison, testimony and presumption being positive in character, cannot cognizes non-existence of their objects. Non-existence is cognized by a means of knowledge similar to itself, of negative in character. It is an object of appropriate non-apprehension.

But Prabhakara does not recognize non-apprehension as an independent means of valid knowledge. Nor does he recognize the category of non-existence as an ontological reality, and non-apprehension as a distinct mode of knowing it. When we perceive the existence of a jar on the ground, we perceive the existence of the ground as related to the existence of the jar. But when the jar is absent, we perceive the bare existence of the jar. But when the jar is absent, we perceive the bare ground only. The non-existence of the jar is nothing but does not recognize non-apprehension as an independent means of valid knowledge.

Non-existence is not cognized by perception, since there is no intercourse of a sense-organ with it. No can it be said to be cognized by indeterminate perception at first, and then rememberd by determine perception. The non-existence of an object can never be cognized by indeterminate perception, since it is non-relational apprehension. So it cannot be remember bered by determinate perception. Nor can non-existence be inferred from the knowledge of a sign, because the invariable concomitance between them is not known. Nor is non-existence known by testimony, comparison and presumption, because in a verbal statement, nor knowledge of similarity, nor knowledge of inconsistency between two perceived facts which may be reconciled by presumption. It is known by appropriate non-apprehension, which is a distinct means of valid knowledge.

Testimony (Sabda)
Kumarila defines testimony as the knowledge of objects, which are supersensible, derived from sentences by comprehending the meanings of the constituent words. Testimony is verbal authority. He divides testimony into human and superhuman. The former is the testimony into human and superhuman. The former is the testimony of trustworthy person, while the latter is the testimony of trustworthy character, while the latter is valid in itself. Again, testimony may either give us knowledge of existing objects, as 'a jar exists'; or, it may direct us to perform an action, as 'bring a jar'. The former gives us the knowledge of existential propositions, while the latter gives us the knowledge of injunctive propositions. Vedic testimony gives us the knowledge of duties. Dharma is supersensible, and cannot be perceived through the sense-organ. Inference, comparison, presumption and non-apprehension also cannot yield the knowledge  of Dharma, since they preuppose perception. The knowledge that the performer of the Agnistoma sacrifies will go to heaven cannot be given by them. Vedic testimony is the only source of our knowledge of duties relating to supersensible entities. The vedic texts which enjoins us to perform certain actions which lead to beneficial results are authoritative, and prohibitions are injunctions in disguise. The other Vedic texts are authoritative in so far as they help persons perform their duties.

Kumarila maintains that human testimony is valid, if the sentence is uttered by a person of trustworthy character, and that it is invalid, if it is spoken by a person of untrustworthy character. Human testimony has no intrinsic validity. It may be vititiated by carelessness, deliberate desire to cheat, and other defects of the speakers. But Vedic testimony has intrinsic validity, since the Vedas are impersonal and the eternal, and not human compositions tainted with the defects of the speakers. Non-contradiction is a test of truth. A knowledge, which is contradicted by a subsequent valid knowledge, is invalid. But the Vedic injunctions are never contradicted by any subsequent valid knowledge. Hence Vedic testimony is valid in itself.

A word consits of letters which are eternal. It denotes a class or genus, and not an individual. It denotes an individual indirectly through a class denoted by it. A word has a permanent relation to an object, which is impersonal. It is neither created by God nor by persons. It is only learnt from the speech and actions of the elders acquainted with the meaning of words.

 Prabhkara regards testimony as the knowledge of supersensible objects depeding on the knowledge of words. There is no other testimony than scriptural testimony. The supersensible objects is Apurva, supersensuous Ought,categorical Imperative, or Duty. Apurva or the moral commands is the object of Vedic testimony, which cannot be known by any other maens of valid knowledge . the Vedas are not composed by any person, human or divine. The sentence in the Vedas manifest their  meanings by their inherent powers. They manifest their meaning by their inherent powers. They enlighten us on Apurva, which is incomprehensible by the human reason. Vedic sentence are intrinsically valid, and always yield valid cognitions, since they are impersonal and devoid of human origin. The entire Vedas which prescribe the Moral Law are intrinsically valid. The Moral Law is Ought or Duty, which is realizes by human volition.

Prabhakara includes human testimony in inference. Sentences uttered by persons cannot by themselves guarantee the real existence of objects which they mean. They often contain great falsehood and are not in harmony with real objects. The validity or the invalidity of a sentences spoken by a person is inferred from the trustworthy or untrustworthy character of the person who utters it. The knowledge of the person is the cause, and the sentence uttered by the person is the effect. The effect is inferred from the cause. So human testimony is includes in inference. 

Words denote their objects by nature. Their denotative power is natural and permanent, and not determined by convention, human or divine. The Nyaya maintains that God fixes the meanings of words by convention. But the Mimamsa does not believe in the conventional meanings of words. They have natural and eternal relations to the objects denoted by them. Prabhakara regards the meanings of proper names as fixed by convention, but does not consider the meanings of common words to be determined by convention, which are independent of human agency are not distinguished from each other owing to lapse of memory. When a nacre is perceived as silver, only the common quality of them, viz., brightness, is perceived, since it predominates over the peculiar qualities of the nacre. Then the perception of brightness revives the subconscious impression of silver owing to similarity. But the recollection impression does not appear to be recollection owing to obscuration of memory due to a defect of the mind. Though silver is remembered, it is not remembered as 'that' something perceived in the past owing to lapse of memory. The illusion is not experienced as ' this is that silver', but as ' this is silver. Nondisction prompts the self to put forth an effort to appropriate the illusory silver. When the illusion is said to be contradicted by a sublating cognition, the disction between the two elements is apprehended, and consequently the self does not put forth any effort to appropriate the silver.

Prabhakara defines valid knowledge as apprehension, and regards all apprehension as valid. In the illusion 'this is silver' the perfection of 'this' is valid, since it is does not contradicetes and the recollection of silver' is invalid, because it is recollection and contradicted by a sublating cogniton. But a cognition, which is found to disagree with the real nature of its objects, as cognition, is valid. Prabhakara does not recognize

Prabhakara defines valid knowledge as apprehension, and regards all apprehension as valid. In the illusion 'this is silver' the perfection of 'this' is valid, since it is does not contradicetes and the recollection of silver' is invalid, because it is recollection and contradicted by a sublating cogniton. But a cognition, which is found to disagree with the real nature of its objects, as cognition, is valid. Prabhakara does not recognize error as error. He does not distinguish between truth and error from the logical point of view. But he distinguishes between them from the practical point of view. Knowledge is subservient to practical action. The knowledge that leads to successful action is true, and that which leads to unsuccessful action is false. We cannot speak of truth or falsity of knowledge prior to action promoted by it. We cannot brand a knowledge as false until it leads to unsuccessful action. True knowledge as false until it leads to unsuccessful action. True knowledge is not the knowledge that apprehends the real nature of its objects, but it is the knowledge which is capable of a fruitful action. When the objects that is manifested to consciousness is attained by an action promoted by it, it is regareded as true. Thus Prabhakara distinguishes between truth and error from the standpoint of practical utility.

Kumarila: The Categories
Kumarila divides categories into positive and negative. He recognizes four positive categories, viz., substance, quality, action, and community. He admits four kinds of non-existence, viz., prior non-existence, posterior non-existence, mutual non-existence, and absolute non-existence. He rejects the Vaisesika categories of particularity and inherence.

A substance us the substratum of dimension and quality. A substance and a quality are produced at the same moment, and non-different from each other, since both of them are produced by the same causal conditions taken together. They are produced at the same moment and found to be related to each other as cause and effects.

Kumarila admits eleven substances, viz., earth, water, fire, air, ether, self, mind (manas), time, space, darkness, and sound. Earth has smell . the sense of smell is made of earth. The body is made of earth.  Water has natural fluidity. The sense of taste is made of water. Fire has touch. The visual organ is made of fire. Air has touch, but no colour. Darkness has colour, but not touch. It has black colour, which is manifested in the absence of light. It can be apprehended by the visual organ only. Ether is one, eternal, partless, and ubiquitous. Time and space also are eternal, partless and indivisible. Time, space, and ether are perceptible, because they are ubiquitous, like the self, while they are not manas. Futher, if they were not perceptible, then their existence would be disproved, because it cannot be proved by any other means of valid knowledge. Time is perceived by the six sense-organs. It is morning. It is evening. These notions are produced by the visual organ assisted by the sight of the sunrise. Space too is perceptible, because the notions of east, west, up, down, forward, backward, etc., are produced by the visual organ, and have space as their content. Time and space are perceptible as qualifications of other substances. Space is one and ubiquitous. It appears to be many and limiting adjuncts. It is perceptible. The Nyaya view that darkness is the absence of light is wrong, because darkness has qualities and motions, and because it is perceived as existent. So it is certainly a positive entity.

Earth, water, fire, air, and darkness are composed of atoms. The whole is distinct from the parts. The perception 'this jar is one and gross'. Which is valid and uncontradicted proves the existence of the whole distinct from the parts. The whole does not inhere in the parts, since there is no inherence. It is different and non-different from them. There is identity in-difference between them. The whole is not a different substance from its parts. It is a different condition of them. Owing to a particular conjunctions, they become one substance of a large dimension. As parts they are many, and as a whole it is one. A cloth is one, while they yarns are many.

The Bhatta Mimamsaka maintins that composite things are made of atoms, which are of the diemensions of motes in a sub-beam. They correspond to the traids of the Nyaya Vaisesika, which are perceptible. The minuter primary atoms of the Nyaya- Vaisesika are non-existent, since there is no means of valid knowledge by which they can be known. Atoms of smaller size than motes in a sun-beam are not perceived.

Sound is an eternal and ubiquitous substance, which is perceived by the auditory organ, and which has the genus of sound. It is self-existent and devoid of a substratum. It is directly perceived by the auditoryorgan through a direct relation. It is ubiquitous, because it is an intangibe, partless substance, which is not a cause; it has a large dimension, since the same sound is simultaneously perceived by many persons in different places. It is not contradicted by any sublating valid knowledge. So sound is all-pervading. Sound is made manifest and unmanfiest by the proximity and remoteness of a manifesting condition. It is external, for it is not produced. The vocal organs do not produce it, but only manifest it. Their activity is its manifesting agent. The audible sound manfiest sound which is eternal. It has different degrees of loudness, and transfers these attributes to the sound manifest it. Their activity is its manifesting agent. The audible sound manifests sound which is eternal. It has different  degrees of loudness, and transfer these attributes to the sound manifested by it. Sound is an eternal and ubiquitous substance. There are two kinds of sounds, significant and non-significant. Audible sounds produced by beating a drum are non-significant. Audible sounds produced by beating a drum are non-significant. Letters manifested by the audible sound produced by the activity of the vocal organs are significant. A word is a collection of sounds, which signifies a single object. It denotes a genus directly, and an individual by implication. If sounds were not eternal, the Vedas, which consits of sentences, would not be eternal.

The mind (manas) is the eternal organ through which cognitions, pleasure and other qualities of the self are perceived. It is all-pervasive and motionless. It is not atomic in dimension as the Nyaya-Vaiseka maint ains. It is not atomic in dimesion as the Nyaya-Vaisesika maintains. It is all-pervasive, because it is an intangle substance, which is neither a cause nor an effect, and because it is the substratum of a conjunction, which is the non-inherent cause of knowledge, like the self. It is all-pervading, and consequently, motionless, like ether. Though it is all-pervading, it is limited by the entire body, and serves as the organ of internal perception. Both self and manas are all-pervading, and their conjunction is natural and not produced by an action.

A quality is distinct from action, has the genus of quality, and is not a material cause. There are twenty-four qualities: colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, viscidity, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, audible sound (dhvani), manifestness (prakatya), and potency. Audible souns is a quality of air, which manifests sound. An object is the substrate of manifestnss, which is its qualification called manifestation. It determines what becomes an object of knowledge. It is known by percption through the relation of identiy with what is in conjunction. Though it abides in substances only, it abides indirectly in genus, quality and action owing to the relation of identity with them, and also in non-existence of which they are counter-positive entities. They become objects of knowledge through the manifestness of substances. Distinctness exists in all substances, eternal and non-eternal.

Potency abides in substances, quality and action, and has the genus of potency. It is known by presumption and from Vedic testimony. It is empirical and scriptural. The first, e.g. the power of burning in fire is known by presumption. The second, e.g. the potency of a sacrifies to produce happiness in heaven is known from injunctions of the Vedas only. The potency of burning abides in a substance. (e.g. fire). Potency is a quality which is known by presumption. It is not a distinct category.

Action or motion abides in non-pervasive substances only, is perceptible, and the cause of conjunction and disjunction. It is of five kinds, viz., upward motion, downward motion, contraction, expansion, and locomotion. Kumarila recognizes also action in the self. Physical motion is not the only form of action. Motion in a substance, which brings about conjunction and disjunction in space, is perceived.
Kumarila admits the existence of generality which is the cause of the knowledge of non-difference among different individuals. 'This is a cow. 'That also is a cow'. There is the genus of cow in different individuals cows, which is common to them. Community is the ground of assimilation, while individuals are the ground of discrimination. There would be no assimilation, if there were no community in the individuals. A single community subsits in many individuals. It cannot be said to subsits in them either in its entirely or in its parts, since it is devoid of parts. But we perceive it to subsits in them. There is no inherence between a universal and an individual, since there is no inherence. Further, inherence is said to be a relation between two inseperable entities, which is the cause of the notion 'this is a cow', and not as ' the genus of cow' subsists in this cow. There is identity-in-difference between the universal ans the individual. The universal is not entirely different from the individual. Nor is it entirely identical with it. It is partly different from, and partly identical with it. It is partly different from, and partly identical with, the individual. Generality and individuality subsits in the same locus the individual: this proves their non-difference or identity. The genus of cow' and the cow are not synonymos: this proves their differecnce. Hence there is no contradiction between difference and non-differnence between the universal and the individual.

Kumarila denies the category of inherence. It is said to be a relation between two inseperable entities, substance and quality, substance and action, the whole and the parts and the universal and the individual, which is the cause of the notion ' this sunsits in it. Kumarila regards inherence as essential identiy (tadatmya). If it is different from the reata such as the universal and the individual, it cannot substis as a relation between them. If on the other hand, it is identical with them, they cannot be different from each other. Inherence is identity between two insperable entities and a particular phase of them. If it were an external relation between substance and quality, or the like, which related them to each other, then it would require another inherence to relate it to each of the two relata, and so on to infinity. This infinite regress can be avoided, if inherence is regarded as identity in essence. Further, inhernce is regarded as identity in essence. Further, inherence is said to be inseperable relation which is the absence of separable relation. Seperable relation is either having separate movements or subsiting in different substrates. Parts of a whole can have movements, though the whole is motionless. The whole subsits in its parts, which subsits in their parts. They subsits in different substates. The genus subsits in an individual, which subsits in its parts. So there is a separable relation between the whole and its parts, and the genus and the individual. There is no inherence between them. Kumarila rejects the categories of potency, number and similarity recognized by Prabkara. Potency is an unperceived quality in a substance, which is inferred from its effect. It is generated along with the substance. Number is a quality. Similarity is a quality which consits in the possession of the same arrangement of many parts by two subatances. It is not a distinct category, since it admits of degrees. Thus potency, number and similarity are not distinct categories.

Prabhakara : The Categories
Prabhkara recognizes the eight categories of substance, quality, action, community, inherence, potency, number and similarity. Substance is the substrate of qualities. There are nine substances: earth, water, fire, air ether, self, manas, time, and space. Earth, water, fire and air are visible and tangible. Ether is not visible, since it is colourless. It appears to be white owing to the particles of fire in it, and appears to be white owing to the absence of light. It is imperceptible, but inferred as the substratum of sound. Air is perceptible. It is neither hot nor cold, but it appears to be cool owing to the particles of fire in it, and appears to be hot owing to the particles of fire in it, and appears to be cool owing to the particles of water in it. Earth, water, fire and air are perceptible in the non-atomic state. But ether, time, space, and manas are only inferable. Darkness is not a substance but mere absence of light. There are twenty-two qualities, colour, taste, smell, touch, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, viscidity, impression, sound, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, and merit. Action or motion is imperceptible; it is inferred from a series of conjunction and disjunction. 

Generality subsits in the individuals entirely, and is distinct from them. It is perceived by the sense-organs. It is common to many individuals which are different from one another. It is the ground of our conception of non-differnce among different individuals. It is the basis of their assimilation. The genus is different from the individuals in which it inheres. There is a relation of subsistence (pratantrata) or inherence between them. When an individual is born, a new relation of inherence is generated, which relates it to the genus which subsits in the other individuals of the same class. When an individual dies, the relation of inherence between it and the genus is destroyed. Prabhkara admits the generalities of substance, quality and action. But the denies the reality of the highest genus or beinghood, which is recognizes by the Vaisesika. An individual thing has its specific existence, but no mere existence or beinghood. So Prabhkara denies the existence of the highest genus or being hood.

Prabhakra admits the reality of subsistence of inherence which is the relation between two insperable entities. It is eternal in eternal substance, and non-eternal in non-eternal substance. There are many inferences. Inherence is produced, when an effect is produced, which inheres its material cause. It is not perceptible, but always inferred.

Prabhakara recognizes the category of potency of power. It is the imperceptible energy which produces an effect and inferred from its effect. Fire has the power of burning, which either overpowered or destroyed by a fire-extinguishinig gem, a charm, or anunguent, when it does not burn. When the effect is never destroyed, the causal power is destroyed. When it is produced on removal of these counteracting agents, the causal power is overpowered. It is eternal in eternal substance and non-eternal in non eternal substance. It is generated along with the transient substances in which it subsits potency differs from the velocity in that the latter is transient in eternal things also, and dependent on other causes in transient things.

Number is not a substance, since it subsits in qualities; there are two odours, three touches and the like. The substsistsnce of number in qualities cannot be said to be figurative. Since its subsistence in them in a primary sense is not contradicted. The arguments that it cannot abide in them because it is a quality is wrong, since its being a quality cannot be proved. It is not a quality  of substance, since it abides in it is perceptible, unlike a movement. Nor is it a movement, since it is perceptible, unlike a movement. Nor it is generality, since it is non-eternal. Hence number is a distinct category.

Similarity is not a substance, since it abides in qualities and motions. An odour is perceived as similar to another odour, and a motion is inferred as similar to another motion. So it is not the cause of the experience of being common to many entities. It subsits in generalities, but a generality does not exist in gernalities. We know similarity between the genus of  a cow and that of a buffalo. So similarity is different from the generality.

Inherence is a kind of relation between a substance and its quality or motion, the genus and the individual and a material cause and its effect. So similarity is not inherence. It is a distinct category which is perceived in perceptible things through the perception of the qualities, actions, and parts as common to two or more things. It is inferred in imperceptible things from many common features.

Prabhakara rejects the Vaisesika category of particularity, which is said to abide in an eternal substance that distinguishes it from another eternal substance possessing common qualities and actions. But distinctness can distinguish an eternal substance from another eternal substance having similar qualities and actions. So particuality is not different from distinctness, and so not a distinct category.

Both kumarila and Prabhkara recognize the reality of the external world independent of our cognitions. The Mimamsa does not believe in the periodic creation and dissolution of the world by God. Production and destruction of things are constant. The parts of the world have an origin and an end, but the world, as a whole has no origin and an end in time. There is no creator or destroyer of the world.   

Kumarila: The Nature And Knowledge Of The Self
Kumarila regards the self as different from the body, the sense-organs, and cognitions. It is ubiquitous, eternal, incorporeal, immaterial and transmigrating. It is a knower, enjoyer, and active agent. It is the substrate of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, merit and demerit, which are its modes. It undergoes modifications, and is yet eternal. Its modal change do not compromise its eternal nature. Cognition is an action or a modal change of the self, which is not perceptible, but inferable from cognizedness (jnatata) or manifestness (prakatya) of the object. In deep sleep there is no cognition, but there is potency of cognition. There is no pleasure in deep sleep. The so-called recollection of pleasure during deep sleep on waking from it is due to the absence of pain. The self is of the nature of potency of cognition. Kumarila sometimes speaks of the self as self-illumined. It is cognixed by itself, and not by others. Sometimes he speaks of it as an object of I consciousness. When it is spoken of as imperceptible, it means that it is apprehended by itself, and cannot be perceived by others. Thus kumarila regards the self as both self-illumined and an object of I consciousness, which always points to the mere existence of the self, which is of the nature of pure consciousness. But Parthasarathi Misra a follower of kumarila, regards the self as a an object of 'I'-consciousness or mental perception. He denies its self-luminosity on the ground that it is not manifested in dreamless sleep. So it is an object of mental perception. I' consciousness is mental perception.

But how can the self be subject and object at the same time? The self, according to Kumarila, is a conscious substance; as conscious, it is the knower through the conscious part, and the object. It is the knower through the unconscious part, and the object of knowledge through the unconscious part. And the object of knowledge through the unconscious part. It is transformed into cognition, pleasure and the like through it.

The self is distinct from the body, which is its organ of experience. It is material and unconscious, and cannot act by itself. It can act only when it is supervised by the conscious self, and realizes its ends. The self is immaterial and devoid of physical motion. It assumes a particular body in accordance with its merits and demerits acquired in the past birth, and directs its actions. When the unseen potencies are exhausted, it ceases to have any body and directs its actions, and attains liberation. Though the self is devoid of physical motion, it can trasmigrate into another body, since it is ubiquitous. It can produce physical motion through its body.

Kumarila cites the Samkhya arguments for the distinction of the self from the body. The former is pure, simple, incorporeal, immaterial, and disembodied, while the latter is impure, complex, copreal, material and embodied. The body is an aggregate and an disembodied, while the latter is impure, complex, corporeal, material, and emnodied. The body is an aggregate and an arrangement of parts, which  exits for conscious self, and realize its purpose. The self is a conscious knower, which has experience through its body with a particualar arrangement of parts to realize its ends. It is ubiquitous, eternal, conscious and active, while its body is limited, perishable, unconscious and inactive. The former is the knower, while the latter is a known object. The former is imperceptible to others, while the latter is perceptible to them. So the self is distinct from the body. Its identification with the body is due to false knowledge.

Pleasure is inferred from a beaming face, which may be said to be a quality of the body. But it is not its quality, since it is not perceivd inside the body when it is dissected.  We can perceive the colour of its interior, but we cannot perceive pleasure. But pleasure is a quality, which must abide in a substance, and the substance in which it abides is the self. Similarily, cognition, desire, volition and the like are the qualification of the self, which is their substrate. Further, consciousness cannot be a quality of the material elements of the body either distributively or collectively. Earth, water, and the other elements separately do not posses consciousness, and consequently, cannot posses it collectively. If consciousness belonged to all the elements seperatly do not posssess consciousness, and consequently, cannot posses it collectively. If consciousness belonged to all the elements of the body, then all being equal could not be related to one another. If it belonged to one of them, the other elements would be subordinate to it, which is contradicted by experience. Hence consciousness cannot be a quality of the body, which cannot be a knower. Life is not a quality of the body, since it is destroyed when the body is not destroyed, or a contradictory quality is not produced in it. So life must be due to an effort of the self which guides the body. It has life so long as it is animated by the soul.

The self is distinct from the sense-organs. It is the conscious agent of them, which are its unconscious instruments. They cannot function without its guidance. Even on the destruction of a sense-organs, the self can remember objects perceived in the past through it. It can rememeber objects perceived in the past through the different sense-organs. It is eternal and all-pervading, while they are perishable and of limited magnitude. The mind (manas) cannot be the knower, since it is the internal organ by which the self can perceive its qualities. It is an unconscious instruments of the self can perceive its qualities. It is an unconscious instruments of the self which is its agent. So the self is distinct from the manas and the external sense-organs.

Prabhkara : The Nature And Knowledge Of The Self.
Prabhkara regards the self as distinct from the body, the sense-organs and cognitions. It is eternal, ubiquitous and manifold. There is a distinct self in each body. It is manifested in all cognition of objects. It is unconscious, since consciousness does not constiute its essence. It is known as the substrate of the cognition 'I know', but not as of the nature of consciousness. The self is a substance, which is not of the nature of consciousness, but a substrate of consciousness. Cognition is not a modification of the self, as kumarila maintains, but its quality. The self is manifested as the knower of all cognition of objects. It is knower or subject, and apprehended as such and never apprehended as an object.

The self has nine special qualities, viz., cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and impression, which are produced by its conjunction with manas, the internal organ. Cognition is self-aware. It is apprehension and recollection. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are apprehended by mental perception. Pleasure is a positive feeling, and not a mere negation of pain. Impression is a peculiar quality of the soul, which is the cause of recollection. Unseen power is merit and demerit, which are known from Vedic testimony. The self is the substrate of these nine specific qualities. Prabhkara's conception of the self resembles the Nyaya Vaisesika view.

Prabhakara regards the self as the inherent cause of cognitions, which depend upon the conjunction of the self with manas as the non-inherent cause. This mind-soul-contact is generated by a movement of the mind (manas) due to the effort of the soul or its merit and demerit produeced by its previous actions. These efforts and merits and demerits are the effects of previous mind-soul-contacts and so on without a beginning. The action of the mind is not the inherent cause of cognitions, since it will require another action of the mind as its non-inherent cause. The manas is the internal organ of the self, which is of atomic dimension. It is the organ of the perception of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition. It is eternal and capable of quick movements. It conjunction with a soul depends upon its begnningless merits and demerits.
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The self is the enjoyer; the body is the vehicle of enjoyment; the sense-organs are the instruments of experience; the external objects and pleasure, etc are the objects of experience; enjoyments is a feeling of pleasure, and suffering is a feeling of pain. These five kinds of entities exhausts the reality. The self is neither atomic nor coextensive with the body, but ubiquitous. It is the inherent cause of all its qualities, while the  mind soul-contact is their non-inherent cuase. This conjunction subsits in the soul and the manas which is animated by it. The body is capable of movements, but the soul is motionless, and comes into contact with all thing without movements. So it is all-pervading. But though it is ubiquitious, it can experience its qualities in connection with its own body which it has acquired by its merits and demerits. The sense-organs are parts of the body. The soul can have experience through its own body and sense-organs only, which are the fit media of its experience. It cannot have experience through others' bodies and sense-organs. Though it is ubiquitous, it comes into contact with the atomic manas and produces cognitions. If the manas were ubiquitous like the soul, there would be no contact between them. Two ubiquitous substances devoid of parts cannot come into contact with each other. The atomic manas comes into contact with the different sense-organs by its quick sucession. They are never simultaneous, but appear to be so owing to the quick movements of the manas and its rapid contacts with the soul and different sense-organs. The mind soul contact are due to the soul's merits and demerits acquired by its past actions.

There are many souls. Their experiences are different. They acquire different merits and demerits by their different voluntary actions. Their different lots and pleasure and pains are due to the variety of their merits and demerits. If there were one soul only, there would be no variety of merits and demerits. If there were one soul only, there would be no varitety of merits and demerits. If there were no variety of them, there would be no variety of enjoyments and suffering, which is a fact of experience. So there are many souls, one in each body. Oneness of the souls would lead to oneness of experience, which is contradicted by experience. There is an irreducible plurality of souls with unique experiences. They are moral agents experiencing diverse objects in accordance with their moral deserts. The Advaita Vedanta doctrine of oneness of the soul flately contradicts the testimony of consciousness and undermines morality. Just as the actions of my body are due to the volitions of my soul, so the actions of other bodies are due to the volitions of my soul producing actions of my body. But I never experience the volition of my soul producing actions of other bodies. So I infer that they must be due to the volition of other bodies. So I infer that they must be due to the volitions of other souls. I have inferential knowledge of other souls. I infer them from the actions of their bodies produed by their volitions. One souls cannot be perceived by another souls.

The soul is neither produeced nor destroyed. It is devoid of origin and end. It is uncaused and indestructible. It is immotal and eternal. It achieves its non-empirical, pure and transcendental condition by exhausting its merits and demerits. This is the state of liberation.

The self is not self-luminous, and does not apprehended itself. But a cognition is self-luminous, and apprehends itself. The self is known as the subject or knower in all cognitions of objects. Objects are not apprehended, unless the self apprehending them is apprehended. It is not apprehended in the absence of cognition of objects. Cognitions manifest themselves, the objects which produce them, and the self in which they exist. The self is apprehended as the knower of objects and manifested as the subject in all cognitions of objects. It cannot be the subject as well as the object of a cognition, since it is self-contradictory. The self is always  the agent of knowledge and never its objects.

The self cannot be an object of mental perception as kumarila maintains. It is self-contradictory to hold that the same self is the knowing subject and the known object. In the cognition. I know the jar' the self-luminious cognitions manifest the jar as an object, and the self as its substrates. The self is apprehended as the knower of objects; it is always manifested as the subject or knower of object-cognitions; it is never known as an object.

Kumarila's Theory of Knowledge or Inference Of Cognition From Cognizedness. Its Object (Jnatata)
Kumarila regards cognition as an act of the self, which is inferred from the cognizedness (jnatata) of its object. A cognitive act produces cognizedness or manifestness (prakatya) in its object. If there were no cognitions, then we could not, in its object. If there were no cognitions, then we could not, in any other way, account for the cognition, then we could not, in  any other way, account for the cognizedness of an existing object; so after the object has been cognized, we know the existence of the cognition as a means of knowing the object. 1. The act of cognition is the cause; cognizedness is the effect. The object of knowledge are either perceptible or inferable from cognizedness. 2)  A cognition is imperceptible but inferable from cognizedness as the effect. The objects of knowledge are either perceptible or inferable. Perceptibility and inferability are produced by sense-perception and inference respectively in their objcts. A cognitions is imperceptible but inferable from cognizedness . A cognition is inferred from the relation between the self and the object, which is apprehended by mental perception. The self is the knower, and the object is known. The self can know the object when it is related to it; and the relation between them is brought about by a cognition, which relates them to each other. From the specific relation between the self and the object brought about by the cognition which is an adventiotous condition we infer the existence of the cognition. The relation is known by mental perception. Hence a cognition is inferred from the specific relation between the self and an object. 3. A cognition is inferred from the peculiarity produced by it in its object. Manifestation is produced in the object by the cognition. It is cognizedness from which the cognitions is inferred. A  perceptual cognition produces cognizedness is a present object. An inferential cognition produces cognition is inferred. A perceptual cognition produces cognizedness in a present object. An inferential cognitions produces manifestation of objects . hence a cognitions is inferred from the manifestation or cognizedness of its object, which is a peculiar property produced by it in its object, or the specific relation between the self and the object.

Prabhkara's Theory of Knowledge: Theory of Triple Perception (Triputupratyaksavada)
Prabhakara holds that perception apprehends the self, its object, and itself. Perception is direct apprhension, which cognizes these three factors. This view is called the doctrine of triple perception. Cognition is self-luminous, and manifests itself. It is not manifested by any other cognition. But the self and the object are not self-luminous, and manifests itself. It is not manifested by any other cognition. But the self and the object are not self-luminous, and do not manifest themselves. They are manifested by a cogniton. In walking condition both the self and the object are manifested. But in dreamless sleep both are unmanifest, though they continue to exist during the period, since they are recognized on walking from sleep. If they were self-luminous, they could be manifested during the period, since they are recognized on walking from sleep. If they were self-luminous, they would be manifested during deep sleep. They arenot manifested at the time, because there is no cognition to manifest them. So they are not self-luminous, but they are manifested at the time, because there is no cognition to manifest them. So they are not self-luminous, but they are manifested by a cognition which is self-luminous. The self is directly manifested by every cognition presentative or represntative. There can be no cognition of an object apart from that of the self. In every cognition of an object there are a consciousness of the self, a consciousness of an object, and a consciousness of the cognition. In the cognition 'I know the jar' there is a triple consciousness, cognition of the jar, a cognition of 'I' or the self, and a self-conscious cognition.

According to prabhkara, the self is always cognized as the knower, a cognition, as a cognition, and an object, as a known object. The self is a knower, and can never be known as an object. A cognition can never be known as an object, but as a cognition. It is the self-manifest or self-aware. If it were cognized as an object of another cognition, it would require another cognition, it would not be self-luminous. If it were cognized as an object of another cognition, it would require another cognition to cognizes it, and so on to infinity. So a cognition is self-conscious awareness and apprehends an object. But, though a cognition is apprehended by itself, its existence is inferred from the apprehended by itself, its existence is inferred from the apprehension of its object. We infer the existence of the cognition from the apprehension of its object.

Prabhkara refutes Kumarila's doctrine of inferability of a cognition. There is no reason or mark which it may be inferred. The existence of an object cannot serve as the mark of inference, since it is not invariably accompanied by a cognition. The cognition of an object cannot be mark of inference. It cannot be a mark as soon as it is produced; but it can be so only when it is manifested to consciousness. If it is not manifested, it cannot be distinguished from an object cognition which has not yet come into existence. A cognitive act cannot be inferred from non-manifestation of the object cognition. The manifestation of the object-cognition does not depend upon any other cognition, since it is not cognition can be inferred. Hence the cognition of an object is self-illumined. The so-called cognizedness or manifestness of an object is nothing but the cognition of the object, which is self-luminous. A self-cognized cognition manifests an object.

Dharma
Jaimini defines Dharma as a good which is of the nature of a command. Savra defines it as an utterance which prompts the self to act and carry it out. It is a command which leads it to the attainment of the highest good. It is a prescription of the Vedas, which indicates the nature of good and evil, and impels the self to realize the highest good. Dharma can be releaved by the Vedic prescription only; it is not apprehended by perception, inference, comparison or any other means of knowledge. Dharma is non-temporal and supresenuous Duty or Moral Law, which is revealed by the Vedas, and impels the self to obey it. Kumarila regards the Moral Law as a Vedic prescription or command which impels the self to act. What leads to the attainment of the good is dharma. The good is the happiness of the self. The performance of sacrifies and other rites and ceremonies prescribed by the Vedas is conducieve to its happiness. Certain substances, qualities and actions are the material of these rites. So kumarila regards the acts enjoined by the Vedas and all the ingredients necessary for them as dharma. External acts prescribed by the Vedas and the substance, qualities, and actions which are required for them constitute dharma. The latter are regareded as dharma, because they are means to the performance of duties, though they are perceptible. The conducieveness of the acts and the auxiliary substances, qualities and actions to the highest good is always known from the Vedas. Kumarila regards the external acts prescribed by the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions as dharma. He propounds an external and legalistic view of morality. The Moral Law is of the nature of an impersonal commad, and not the command kumarila recognizes two kinds of duties, secular and scriptural or non-temporal. The secular duties fulfil perceptible secular ends. The scriptural duties fulfill imperceptible supersensuous ends. They are of two kinds, viz., conditional duties and unconditional duties. The former are empirical duties for the realization of desired ends. The latter are obligatory daily duties e.g. morning and evening prayers, and obligatory occasional duties e.g. bath in the Gange on the ocassion of the solar eclipse and the lunar eclipse. The performance of conditional duties leads to happiness; the performance of Jyotistoma sacrifies produces happiness in heaven. The non-performance of unconditional duties produces sins of omission and consequent suffering. But te performance of them does not produces merits and consequent suffering. It purifies the mind, generates the knowledge of the self, wipes off past sins, and prevents sins which would accrue to the self from the omission of unconditional duties are unconditionally obligatory. The scriptural duties are positive or negative; they are either injunctions or prohibitions. The former enjoin the performance of right actions, while the latter prohibit the commission of wrong actions.

Prabhkara holds that Apurva or the supersensible Moral Imperative is conducieve to the highest good, which is indicated by the Vedic injunctions. A moral law is of the nature of duty. A duty is apurva because it is incomprehensible by any other means of knowledge than Vedic testimony. It is a command or Imperative because it impels a person to accomplish it: it is realizable by an action, which is its means. The supersensible ought is the end of our moral actions: there is a permanent relation between Apurva and its accomplishment by a voluntary action. When there is a volition, there is the accomplishment of ought; and when there is no volition, there is the absence of its accomplishment. Volition is an effort of the self, which aims at the realization of ought through a voluntary action. Thus Dharma is Apurva or supersensible ought reveal by the authoritative suggestion produced in the self by the Moral Imperative. It is an objective category. But it is not an external act enjoined by the Vedas as Kumarila holds. A person who performs sacrifies enjoined by the Vedas is said to be Virtuous because he executes the Moral Imperative. He cannot be said to be virtouous, if he does not excute it. The accomplishment of the moral Imperative is inferred from the performance of the sacrifies enjoined by the Vedas. The ceremonial acts are the contens of duty in that they fulfill the Moral Imperative which is a transcendental verity revealed by the Vedic injunctions. They do not derive their authoritativeness from their intrinsic validity as self-revealing, transcendental Moral Imperative which is a transcendental verity revealed by the Vedic injunctions. They do not derive their authoritativeness from their conduciveness to any ulterior end or good, but from their intrinsic validity as self-revealing, transcenedental Moral Law. It is revelaed by moral obligation which is different from the physical compulsion and psychical impulsion. Moral obligation is self-revealing experience. The prescribed duties do not derive their authority from the Vedas, as Kumarila thinks, but from Apurva or the moral imperative which is indicated by the Vedic injunctions. It is an impersonal Law which has intrinsic validity- a transcendental verity of the moral has intrinsic validity-a transcendental verity of the moral order, which is self-revealing and self-authoritative.

Prabhkara recognizes two kinds of duties, viz., conditional duties for the fulfillment of ends, and unconditiona duties which are obligatory in themselves. Unconditional duties are obligatory daliy duties and obligatory occasional duties. Both of them ought to be done out of the sense of duty. They are authoritative because they embody Moral Imperative indicated by Vedic Injunctions. Their Authoritativeness is not due to their conduciveness to any ulterior end or consequences. They ought to be performed for their own sake.

The acts enjoned by the Vedas produce their fruits. The performance of the Jyotistoma sacrifies produces happiness in heaven. The enjoined action is performed at one time and the fruition of the act follows much latter. The performace of prescribed acts generates an unseen agency (apurva) which produces their fruition of the act follws much latter. The performance of prescribed acts generates an unseen agency (apurva) which produces their fruition at a later time. The deferred fruition of the performance of duties is due to the mediation of apurva. Kumarila posits Apurva as a third entily between the prescribed acts and their deffered fruition. It is an imperceptible potency in the principle action, or in the self, which do not exist before the performance of duties is due to the mediation of Apurva. Kumarila posits Apurva as a third entily between the prescribed acts and their deffered fruition. It is an imperceptible potency in the principle action, or the self, which do not exist before the performance of the action. Before the prescribed acts are performed, there is an incapability in them for producing happiness in heaven, and there is an incapability in the self for attining heaven. Both thses incapabilites are removed by the performance of sacrifies, which creates a positive power (apurva) by virtue of which heaven is attained. The imperceptible power called Apurva is known by presumption. The hypothesis of Apurva removes the apparent inconsistency between the performance of the prescribed sacrifies at one time and the attainment of heaven at a later time. The performance of the act produces directly certain potency in the agent, which persits in him, and produces happiness in heaven after the death of his body. The causal relation between the prescribed act and its fruition cannot be explained without such an interventing potency, which is generated by the act in the self, and is the immediate cause of the final result. Kumarila regards Apurva also as an objective potency of the prescribed act itself.

Prabhkara rejects Kumarila's view. A prescribed act, which is transient, cannot bring about its final result, the attainment of heaven, at a subsequent time. The Apurva, or ought, or Duty, which is different from the transient act, which is indicated by a Vedic prescription, and which is aimed at by a volition, generates the fruit. The volition is called bhavana, because it generates a voluntary action, which excutes the ought. The Moral Imperative (Niyoga) prompts the agent to put forth volition and exertion to accomplish the act. But it is difficult to explain how the Niyoga or Apurva can lead the self to attain the final result of the prescribed act done by it without producing a potency or disposition in the permanent self. Salikanatha, a Prabhakara, thinks that the Niyoga produces an effect in the self in the form of a disposition which inheres in it, and cannot be known by any other means of knowledge expect moral obligation. The act is not permanent, but the self's disposition is permanent, which can bring about the accomplishment of the final result. 

Liberation (Moksa) And Its Means
Kumarila and Prabhkara the nature of liberaion and the means of its attainment. Kumarila regards liberation as negative in character, and consequently, eternal. If it be a state of positive happiness in heaven, it cannot be eternal. It is of the nature of negation, and therefore eternal. But negation cannot be the result of any action. Liberation is due to absolute extinction of merits and demerits. When they are completely destroyed, the body, which is the vehicle of experience, is destroyed. When no traces of them are left, no cause is left for the production of the body. The self attains liberation on the destruction of the present body and the non-production of any future body. The self attains liberation on the destruction of the present body and the non-production of any future body. It is a state of a absolute negation of all experience of cognition, plesure, pain, desire, aversion, impression, merit and demerit. It is the natural transcendental condition of the self free from empirical contents. It does not consits in enjoyment of happiness. If it did, it would be synonymous with heaven, and therefore perishable. Heavenly happiness is not eternal. When merit is worn off, it is succeeded by rebirth and bondage due to merits and demerits and connection with a body. Liberation is negation of this connection due to extinction of merits and demerits.

Kumarila regards action and knowledge both as necessary for the attainment of release. An aspirant for release should refrain from forbidden acts which produces suffering, and prescribed acts which generate happiness here and hereafter. But he should continue to perform daily obligatory and occasional duties in order to avoid sins which accrue from their non-performance. Prescribed acts for the realization of selfish ends generate sins and sufferings. They lead to transmigration and rebirth for the experience of the resulting enjoyments and sufferings. The knowledge of the self wipes off all traces of merits and demerits with the aid of the performance of obligation of them. But mere knowledge of the self is not adequate to effect final release. It impels the self to perform enjoined duties, and must be accompanied by the performance of obligatory duties. Thus action and knowledge both are necessary duties. Thus action and knowledge both are necessary for release.

Prabhkara describes heaven as unalloyed bliss free from pain. He defines release as the absolute cessation of merits and demerits and the consequent total destruction of the body. It is absolute cessation of the sufferings of empirical life consequent on the complete  destruction of the self's contact with the body and the sense-organs, which are destroyed by the complete disappearnce of merits and demerits. Consciousness is an accidental quality of the self, due its conjunction with the manas and a body. When manas, the body and the sense-organs are completely destroyed on the destruction of merits and demrits, the self is divested of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, and impression, and become unconscious. Release is absoulute cessation of merits and demrits and the consequent pleasure and pain. It is neagative in character, and consits in the complete destruction of the specific qualities of the self. It is the natural transcendental condition of the self free from empirical contents as an eternal and ubiquitous substance; it is not a state of positive bliss, but a negative state of absolute extinceiton of pain. The nature of release is the same according to prabhkara and Kumairla.

Prabhakra, like Kumarila, regards action and knowledge both as necessary for release. Abstention from all prescribe acts for the avoidence of sins, and the performance of obligatory duties together with rigid moral discipline are the means to release. But action alone is not suffceint for the attainment of release. It must be supplemented by the knowledge of the self, which stops further accumulation of merits and demerits, and completely destroyes the body, which is the vehicle of experience. Knowledge of the self is not subservient to    action. Aided by the sense-restraint, control of mind, sex-restraint, and other auxiliaries, it leads to release.

Atheism
The Mimamsa teaches ritualistic morality and religion, and enjoins the performance of sacrifies to gods. But they are not objects of worship, and donot give the rewards of the offerings. The deities are only beings to whom offering are to be made, and who have existence beyond the spatiotemporal world. At the time of making an offering to a deity, a person has to think of his form. So the Mimamsa believes in polytheism. But its belief in many gods is not serious, since they have no function. The latter mimamsa denies their existence except in the manras, and regards the references to them as mere praises of sacrifies. The performance of sacrifies generates an unseen potency (apurva) in the self, which generates their fruits without the intervention of gods. The Apurva is the intermediate agency between the performance of sacrifies and the attainment of heaven. Heaven is unalloyed happiness for a long duration, which is terminated by the exhaustion of merits.
Prabhkara believes in polytheism deny the existence of God. The Mimamsa belives in polytheism but not in theism. It does not belive in the existence of God as creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world, or the appotioner of rewards and punishment or the author or the Vedas. Its belief in many gods does not serve any useful purpose. They have no relation to the world ans the finite souls. They are not organically connected with the Mimamsa system. Hence this system is as atheistic.

Kumarila and Prabhkara have a realistic and naturalistic view of the world, and regards it as composed of atoms which are perceptible. External objects are real and permanent substances, which are not mere aggregates of qualities. A substance is permanent, though its qualities  change. Kumarila rejects the notion of a substance as a self-identical unit devoid of differnce. He advocates the doctrine of parinmavda or satkaryavda, which regards an effect as a real modification of a cause. He regards the relation between cause and effect as identity-in-differnce. He rejects the relation of inherence between them. Kumarila and Prabhkara deny the periodical creation and destruction of the world, the supervisor of merits and demerits of the indivdual souls, the apportioner of rewards and punishment, and the author of the Vedas and moral laws.

Kumarila offers the following arguments against the reality of God. If God is the creator of the world, he must have a body. He cannot have desire to create without a body, since desire is produced by the contact of the souls with its manas and sense organs. If God had a body before creation, it could not be created by Him, but by another God, whose body was created by another, and so on to infinity. If the body of God were eternal, it could not be material, since there were no earth and the like prior to creation. Again, if His body were material, it could not be eternal. If it were eternal, our bodies also must be eternal, since both are material. His body must have been produeced by a cause, since it was composed of parts like our bodies. If God were the creator of His own body, then he created it without a body. But bodiless God, like a released soul, could not excerise any control over his body. Just as a jar is found to be made by an intelligent potter, who is perishable, so the body of God was made by an intelligent maker, who was perishable. If God has no body, he could not exert his will on the atoms. If God has no body, he could not exert his will on the atoms. If he did not act on the unconscious atoms, they could not follow his will. The insentient atoms, they could not follow his will. The insentient atoms could not combine with one another, and from various substances under the guidance of the will of God. Similarity, they cannot separate from one another, and bring about destruction of the world under the guidance of the divine will.

The Nyaya holds that God creates the world out of the atoms with the aid of the individual souls' merits and demerits, keeps them in abeyance during dissolution, activities them again at the time of creation, and creates the world in accordance with them for the souls' enjoyments and sufferings. Kumarila criticize this view. All actions are destroyed with their effects, merits and demerits, when the world is destroyed. God cannot activate the souls' merits and demerits at the time of the next creation. If he is omniscient and omnipotent, he can create the world by His will without the aid of their merits and demerits. If he depends upon them for creation, he is not independent and omnipotent. If they are subject to the will of God, they are needless. Kumarila does not deny that the diversity of the world is due to the diversity of the souls' merits and demerits. If he depends upon them for creation, he is not independent and omnipotent. If they are subject to the will of God, they are needless. Kumarila does not deny that the diversity of the world is due to the diversity of the souls' merits and demerits. But he denies the reality of God as the creator of the world.

Kumarila argues that there is no evidence for God's creative activity. No one can testify to the creation of the world by God. The first creatures could not know how they were born. Nor could they know the state of things prior to the creation of the world by God. If they relied on the assertion of the creator, they might be deceived. God might not create the world and yet tell them that he did not so in order to show off His powers. So God cannot be regarded as the creator of the world. Similarity, there is no evidence to prove that God is the destroyer of the world. There is none to testify to the fact that he destroys the world. So God is neither the creator nor the destroyer of the world.

Further, God has no motive for crating the world. Compassion for living creatures could not be His motive, since there were no living creatures before creation, for whom he could feel compassion. Moreover, if he were moved by compassion to create the world is full of suffering and misery. God, who is benevolent, cannot create so much suffering in the world. If he cannot creates a world free from evil, he is not omnipotent. If he is omnipotent, he can certainly create a world free from evil. If he depended on moral laws and natural laws and instruments, His independence would be compromised. If he created the world without a motive, then he is not intelligent. Even a fool does not act without a motive. If God created the world for amusement, he would not be perfectly happy and contented, and creation would involve him in wearisome toil. God is completely fulfilled and cannot, therefore, realize any end in creation. If compassion in the motive for creation and destruction. Hence God is not the creator or destroyer of the world.
     
God is not the author of the Vedas. Even if they were created by Him, they are doubtful. They are not a sure proof for his existence. If they are doubtful. They are not a sure proof for his existence. If they existed before creation, they could not be connected with the objects created. If they speak of creation as made by God, they are mere praises of certain injunctions about sacrifices. The Vedas are self-revealing, authoritative and eternal. They contain injunctions and prohibitions which embody positive and negative duties. God is not the author of the Vedas and the permulgator of moral laws. We can know dharma from the Vedas. Both prabhkara and kumarila regard the Vedas as eternal and self-revealing.

Prabhkara argues that there is no evidence for the creation and destruction of the whole world at the same moment, though its parts are produced by the conjunctions of their constituent atoms, and destroyed by their disjunction. All animals and men are born of their parents, and do not owe their existence to the intervention of God. Similarity, all things in the world are produced by their causes, and do not owe their existence to God. All effects are produced by their natural existence to God. All effects are produced by their natural causes, and no supernatural causes are necessary for them.

The Nyaya argues that God is the supervisor of the individual souls' merits and demerits. They are unconscious and so cannot produce their results without the guidance of a Being possessed of supreme intelligence. Omniscient God is the supervisor of the souls' merits and demerits. They are unconscious and so cannot produce their results without the guidance of a Being possessed of supreme intelligence. Omniscient God is the supervisor of the souls' merits and demrits. Prabhkara urges that the finite souls may supervise their own merits and demerits. If they cannot supervise them because they have no knowledge of them, then God also cannot supervise them because he has no knowledge of them. He has no sense-organs through which he can perceive them. He cannot perceive them through which he can perceive them. He cannot perceive them through manas, since it cannot perceive external objects without the aid of the external sense-organs. He has no merit and demerit which are the cause of a body, the sense-organs through which he can perceive them. He cannot perceive them through which he can perceive them. He cannot perceive them through manas, since it cannot perceive external objects without the aid of the external sense-organs. He has no merit and demerit which are cause of a body, the sense-organs, and the contact of manas with the sense-organs. So he can not perceive the souls' merits and demerits through the sense-mind-contact, and consequently, cannot supervise them. His knowledge is not uncaused and eternal, since knowledge is always found to be caused and trasient. So God's supervision of the souls' merits and demerits is unintelligible. He cannot supervise them without being related to them. His relation to them is either conjunctions or inherence. It is not conjunction, since it holds between two substance only. God is a substance it holds between two substance only. God is a substance; but merits and demerits are the souls' qualities. There can be no conjunction between a substance and a quality. So there can be no conjunction between God and merits and demerits. Nor can there be inhernce between them, Merits and demerits inhere in the individual souls, and cannot inhere in God, who is distinct from them. A carpenter's supervision of his tools consits in his contact with them. He cannot act upon their merits and demerits, because they are qualities, and so cannot supervise them. Hence God cannot create the world out of the atoms with the aid of the souls' merits and demerits.

It cannot be argued that God act upon the atoms, even as the souls acts upon its own body by virtue of merits and demrits, because the atoms are not the body of God, on which he may act create the world out of them. Even if God is supposed to have a body, His action on the body is due to volition. But there is no cause of His volition. If the divine volition. But there no cause of His volition. If the divine volition were eternal, creation would be unceasing. Further, God cannot supervise the unconscious atoms, because he has no motive in doing so. There is no need of a supramundance creator of the world. The existence of God is an unwarranted hypothesis.

The earlier Mimamsaka did not believe in the reality of God, and regarded the world as self-existent and self-evolving. They looked upon effects as modifications of their causes under the influence of the souls' merits and demerits, which are the supernatural agents in their production. They are otherwise due to purely natural cause. But the later Mimamsakas smuggled the concept of God into the Mimamsa system, and conceived Him as the supervisor of the Law of Karma, the appointer of rewards and punishments, and the Moral Governor of the world. Laugaksi Bhaskara recognized the reality of God as the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world, the inner guide of the souls, and the Moral Governor. Vedanta Desika brought the theistic tendency to the fullest development.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

1 comments:

kuntimaddi sadananda on August 21, 2015 at 3:44 AM said...

Interesting article - I was studying how the perception is analyzed by different darshanikas. I am still puzzled by indeterminate and determinate perceptions - the distinction between the two is not clear. In Nyaaya - the indeterminate perception is devoid of genus where genus is that which differentiate cow by cow-ness from horse by horse-ness. These inhere with the objects. How the indeterminate perception of say cow, horse, pot and a cat differ is not explained clearly since in the indeterminate perceptions one can not determine or differentiate each of the above. There cannot be an object perception without differentiation of one from the other. Hari Om!

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