interaction with philosopy

The Philosophy of the Bhagavad-Gita

2011-12-22T09:36:00.000-08:00

The Bhagavad-Gita is a part of the Mahabharat, which is attributed to Vyasa. It is regarded as one of the most sacred books of the Hindus. It is more a book on ethics than one on metaphysics. Even as a treatise on ethics it is not a compact philosophical work. It is an inspired poetical work with a philosophical theme. It is rightly called the Song Divine.

Ontology

The Gita teaches theism, and regards God (isvara) as the supreme reality. He is higher than Brahman. God is the foundation of the immortal infinite Absolute. He is holy and the ground of the eternal moral order. He is the fountain of the ground of the eternal moral order. He is the fountain of eternal bliss. He is the Supreme Reality. He is unequalled, unexcelled, infinite, eternal, and immutable. He is unborn, immortal, omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent. He knows the past, the present, and the future. He is ancient and without beginning, middle, and end. He is ancient and the ultimate ground of the universe. He is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the universe. He is their lord and moral Governor. He is one in many. He is existent and non-existent. He is both transcendental existence and empirical existence. He is the Supreme person. This is theism.

God is the supreme Brahman (Para Brahma), which is unborn and eternal, neither existent nor non-existent. It is not existent as an empirical being, nor non-existent as a transcendental reality. It pervades the world, but it is not exhausted in it. It is immanent in it, and transcends it. It is devoid of sattva, rajas, and conscious of the empirical world composed of the gunas. It is detached and sustains the relative world. It is devoid of all external and internal sense organs, and yet it knows all sensible and intelligible objects. Brahman is moving and unmoving remote and near, inside and outside the creatures. It is non-spatial, and yet extended in space. It is the immobile spirit and the moving universe. It is the transcendent and immanent. It is subtle and unknowable by the senses, mind, and intellect. It is the supreme light of the lights and illumines all objects. It is the indwelling spirit in the hearts of all beings. Brahman is the impersonal Absolute. It is not equal to God, the ultimate Reality.

The Gita lays stress on the immanence of God in the universe in some verses. He is the indwelling spirit in all creatures. He is their origin, middle, and end. He is the best of all things, beings and qualities. He is the source of good and evil. But the Gita does not teach pantheism. It teaches pane theism. The god is not the world. The world is not God. But the world exits in god. All creatures exist in him. He pervades them all as their inner guide. He is the eternal and imperishable essence abiding in perishing creatures. He is the immanent essence in all finite things and spirits as a thread running through beads. He is the seed and life of all creatures. All creatures exist in him. But he is not identical with them. He pervades the universe by his umanifest form. He is the invisible spirit in the visible world. He is not affected by empirical objects and finite spirits entangled in them. He is the creator, sustainer, and destroyer of all creatures. They issue from Him, are maintained by him, and reabsorbed in him. He supports the entire universe by pervading it with his single fragment. He is incorporeal, part less, undivided, infinite spirit. The entire universe is a manifestation of a single fraction of him. He transcends it to infinite beyond, and exists in immeasurable perfection. He is immanent in the universe and transcendent of it. This is panentheism.

There are two purusas in the universe, the perishable (ksara) purusa and the imperishable (aksara) purusa. All created things and beings constitute the ksara purusa. The immutable purusa underlying them is the Aksara purusas. The Aksara purusas is the eternal, inactive, immobile, and immutable self of all, yet unmoved and different. It is timeless in time, spaceless in space and non-causal in producing effects. The ksara purusas is the dynamic active mutable immanent universal soul of the world. The Aksara purusas is the transcendent, inactive, immutable self of all, from which proceds mutation of things. The Ksara purusas corresponds to the Ksara Brahman, and the Aksara purusas to the Aksara Brahman of the Upanishads.

The purusottama, supreme person, transcends the totality of mutable universe and the immutable and imperishable self of the world. He transcends the active, dynamic, universal soul of nature, and its eternal, immutable static, inactive, immobile self and integrates them together in his supreme unity. He is immobile in his mutaton and becoming. He is inspires and informs the three worlds, and sustains and maintains them. He transcends the ksara purusas and the aksara purusas. He is the supreme, infinite person. The Ksara purusas is the soul immanent in the universe. The aksara purusas transcendent of it. It is indefinable, inconceivable, immutable, immobile, eternal, and unmanifest. This is the transcendent self of the universe. The purusottama is superior to the immanent soul and the transcendent self, the mutable and the immutable. The divine person is higher than the absolute. This is theism.

Prakriti is the mother of the whole universe. God is the father, who fertilizes her, and produces the entire universe through her. Prakriti is called Maya, which is not a through her. Prakriti is called Maya, which is not an appearance. It is the divine power insparable from God. Prakriti supervised by God produces all animate and inanimate creatures. They are re-absorbed in prakriti in dissolution. Prakriti is unmanifest. All manifest objects, inanimate and animate, spring from unmanifest prakriti and dissolve in it. God produces the world through His power, prakriti or maya. He is the efficient cause, and prakrti is its material cause. The world produced by God through his power or prakriti is real. It is mutable and perishable. The Gita recognize the reality of the world, which is informed by the Divine spirit.

God has higher (para) prakrit and lower(apara) prakriti. The former consitiutes the universe of animate and sentient creatures. It conscious prakriti, which sustains the world of conscious living beings. The latter is unconscious and composed of the five elements of earth, water, fire, air, and ether, and the three internal organs of manas, buddhi, and ahamkara.

Sattva , rajas and tamas are products of prakriti. They delude the individual souls, and bind them to samsara. They blind the incoporal souls to their corporal bodies. Sattva is pure, transparent, and free from pain; it manifests objects. It produces knowledge and pleasures in the infinite souls, and binds them to the world through it. It is the cause of desire and anger. Tamas springs from ignorance, deludes all finite souls, produces carelessness, laziness and sleep in them, and binds them to the world. Sattva attaches them to pleasure; rajas, to actions; and tamas to negligence. Sattva, rajas, and tamas are the primordial elements in the psychical nature. Sometimes sattva overcome rajas and tamas, and becomes predominant. Sometimes rajas and tamas overcome the other two, and become predominant. Sattva is the cause of knowledge. Rajas are the cause of greed, desire for enjoyment, enterprise, action, and continuation of action. An action promoted by sattva produces pure pleasures; that promoted by rajas produces pain; that promoted by tamas produces ignorance. The gunas constitute the internal organs – manas, buddhi and ahamkara. They move the individual selves to action.

Prakriti and the individual self (purusas) both are uncaused and eternal. God is eternal. He is the creator, preserver, and destroyer of the universe through his two-fold nature (prakriti) subjective and objective. Prakriti is the material cause of all physical and psychical phenomena. Puruda, the individual self, is the enjoyer of pleasures and pain, and the experiencer of all physical and psychical objects. It enjoys sttva, rajas and tamas, the products of prakriti, through the psychophysical organism. Its attachmant to the gunas binds it to samaras, and makes it transmigrate from one body to another. The supreme self, immanent in it, is the indifferent spectator, perimeter, sustainer, and witness of all actions of the individual self. The Gita agrees with the Katha Upanisad that the individual self in the body is the enjoyer of fruits of actions, while the Supreme Self is not affected by the gunas, because it transcends them. It is not moved by them. The are the cause of actions. The gunas constitute the empirical nature of the individual self. The universal self-immanent in it transcends them. It is the Supreme Self of all creatures. It is not active. It is not touched by actions of the individual self. It neither acts nor apprehends objects. The sense organs act on their proper objects.

The gunas constitute the sensible objects and the sense organs. Egoism is made of the gunas. The self-determined by egoism wrongly thinks itself to be a free doer. God dwells in the hearts of all creatures. He moves them to action by his Maya, and guides them as His instruments. The individual self (jiva) is an eternal, permanent, ancient, indestructible and immortal. It is inexhaustible, omnipresent, stable immobile, incorporeal, unproduced, indestructible, incorruptible and immutable. It is unthinkable, insensible and umanifest. The self is rational and sentient. The rational self can control, regulate and conquer the sentient self. The lower self is rational and sentient. The rational self can control, regulate, and conquer the sentient self. The lower self should be delivered from samsara by the higher self. The implies the freedom of the will. Every individual acts according to his psychical disposition made of sattva, rajas and tamas. His action springs from his inner nature, and conform to it. But he is not completely determined by his empirical nature. He has the power of counteracting his natural impulses and desires, and realizing his supra organic, supramental, spiritual nature. The sever ethical discipline enjoined by the Gita implies human freedom. It appears to recognize empirical necessity and spiritual freedom of human soul.

Both one and many are real. One is divided into many. The finite souls are real. They are unborn and eternal. They exist in God, and He exists in them. One exists in many. Many are not appearances of one. Both are inseparably related to each other. God and the finite souls are co-eternal with each other. Affinity with God is the highest consummation of man.

Ethics and Religion

The Gita is not a book on metaphysics, but essentially one on ethics and religion. It lays down the different paths of realization of God.

It teaching is universal and intend for all persons of different temperaments. Some are predominantly men of action. They ought to follow the path of action (Karmayoga). Some are predominantly emotional. They ought to follow the devotion (bhaktiyoga). Some are some are predominantly intellectual. They ought to follow the path of knowledge (jinanyoga). Action, devotion, and knowledge lead to union with god. God realization is the highest good. It is the supreme end of human life. No relative good can satisfy the aspiration of a finite soul, which is informed by the divine Spirit.

The Gita uses the term yoga in the sense of union with god. It teaches the paths of union through works, knowledge, and devotion. Voluntary actions are due to five conditions, the active individual self, the organism, the sense organs various conscious efforts and bodily movements, and providence. Man cannot remain inactive for a single moment. He is complled to do actions by sattva, rajas, and tamas, which are products of prakriti. They are primordial psychical impulses. Even the maintenance of the organism depends upon actions. Even the maintence of the organism depends upon actions. So an action is certaintly better than inaction. The Gita doesnot teach inactivism. It regards the performance of duties as better than renunciation of actions, because the latter never leads to liberation. It inclulates selfness, disinterested action (niskama karma) dedicated to God. Works should not be actuated by attachment, aversion and other emotions. They should not be motivated by egoistic desires. They should be devoid of the sense of I and 'mine'. They should be free from prudentical considerations of fruits or consequences. They ought to be performed without consideration of successes or failure, victory or defeat, good or evil, pleasure or pain, which they will bring. Their fruits should be resigned to God. All works should be done as service to God. Disinterested works dedicated to God and enlightened by knowledge do not lead to bondage. The aspirant's will should be surrender to the Divine Will. He should be a perfect instrument of God, and consciously will the divine will. He should aim at the good of the entire sentient creation. The doer of good of mankind never suffers here or hereafter. The path of works is selfless pursuit of the moral good of mankind as service to god.

The Gita doesn't enjoin the performance of ritualistic acts. Prudential duties are intend for the fulfillment of egoistic desires. They aim at enjoyment and prosperity. They are not the means of liberation. The Vedas prescribe duties relating to sattva, rajas, and tamas. But moksa is a state of the soul, which transcends the gunas. It cannot be attained by Vedic rituals. All egoistic desires should be extirpated. Transient pleasures springs from their fulfillment. But realization of the self yields supreme bliss, which is permanent peace. Vedic rituals are not necessary for liberation. The specific duties of an individual ought to be performed without any desire for fruits. When all desires are resigned to god, any desires are performed in a disinterested spirit by an eradicated. It emphasizes the purity of inner life and condemns ritualistic morality. It stresses the performance of duties as service to God. It condemns renunciation of works, and enjoins on us an active life dedicated to God for the moral welfare of humanity. But it is emphatic on the eradication of egoistic desires and evil passions like attachment, aversion, fear, lust, anger, greed, egoism, hypocrisy, pride, self-conceit, sorrow, melancholy and the like. It inculcates the cultivation of the virtues of fearlessness, purity of mind, concentration of the mind on knowledge of the self, charity, sense-control, sacrifice study of the scriptures, penance, straightforwardness, non injury, truthfulness, conquest of anger, renunciation, tranquility, absence of fault-finding, kindness to creatures, greedless ness, softness, modesty, firmness, courage, forgiveness, endurance, cleanliness, non-malevolience non-conceit, steasfastness and self control. Temperance in eating, walking, efforts in activities, sleep and waking leads to happiness. Equanimity or imperturbability in joy and sorrow, gain and loss, victory and defeat, success and failure, is called yoga. Love and hatred, lust and anger, fear and disgust, greed and delusion, pride and envy should be conquered. Enmity should be completely discarded. Good will and amity for all should be cultivated. Reverence for gods, Brahmanas,preceptors, and wise men, cleanliness, straightness, celibacy, non-injury, truthfulness, study of the scriptures, tranquility of mind, contentment, silences, self-control, and purity of heart should be cultivated. .

Self-control is the foundation of moral life. It means restraight of the external cognitive and motor sense organs and the mind. All desires should be directed to the Atman, which is unruffled by them, and thus sublimated and purified. Mere conformity to the moral law in external conduct is not morality. The mind should be purged of evil passions. If the mind meditates on improper sense-objects and enjoys them within, external conformity to the moral law is hypocrisy. The cognitive senses should not be allowed to indulge in improper activities. The external sense organs should be controlled by the mind (manas). The mind is always estless and unsteady. It can be controlled by steadfast practice and steadied like an unflickering flame of light. Then it is cleaned of all unrighteous desires. Duties should be performed with a pure mind free from immoral desires and passions. Persons are divided into four castes according to their qualities. Their vocations are appropriate to their qualities. The members of the society are divided into four castes according to their qualities and functions. The Brahmans, the Ksatriyas, the Vaisyas, and the Sudras ought to perform their specific duties (svadharma) in conformity with their native endowments (svabhava). Their duties are appropriate to their station in society. Their specific duties, which accord with their innate psychical dispositions, constitute their Sahara. They are prescribed for them. They are their natural duties. An individual should never give up his natural and specific duties, and try to perform those of another person. They do not fit in with his natural aptitudes. So they may be pernicious to him. They are not his natural duties, and therefore they will fail to fulfill his mission, and attune him with God. One's own specific duties well done. An individual attains fulfillment of his own specific duties. Dedication of them to God leads to his liberation. He should always do the duties prescribed for him. If he does not perform them, he commits sin.

An aspirant should dedicate all his actions to God. Whatever he does, whatever he eats, whatever he offers in a sacrifice, whatever gifts he makes, and whatever penance he undergoes, he should dedicate to him. They bring him in complete union with God. Divine energy flows into him, and actuates all his actions. He becomes an instrument of divine action.

The Gita teaches the path of knowledge (jinanyoga). The lowest knowledge of one single effect, for instance, an image as God, who is the complete reality. The higher knowledge is the knowledge of different objects as separate from and unconnected with one another. This is popular unscientific knowledge. The highest knowledge of one undivided infinite spirit in the divine existence. One God is immanent in all finite existences. This is the philosophical knowledge of one in many. He who, established in oneness, worships God in all beings, abides in Him, in whatever condition he lives. God is never lost to him, and he is never lost to God. The individual soul with integral knowledge of God in all beings is united with him, and is not lost in him. The aspirants who sees God in all beings, sees them all as equal to himself. He sees them all alike, and treats them all alike. Equality of treatments follows from the mystic vision of God in all beings. The integral knowledge of God in all beings is expressed in universal beneovolence to all without discrimination. It is expressed in love and respect for all human beings.

Janna is knowledge of God derived from the scriptures. It is indirect knowledge. Vijnana is direct and immediate knowledge, mystic vision, or intuition of God. Janna is intellectual knowledge. Vijnana is intuition. Faith is a precondition of knowledge. It can be acquired from the wise, which have a vision of Truth, through humility and reverence, investigation and service. One devoid of faith and knowledge, and tossed in dour perishes. Knowledge dispels doubt, and destroys ignorance and sins. Intuition due to yoga dispels non-discrimination, and fixes the mind on God.

Self –control is the indispensable condition of acquisition of knowledge. Desire and anger are great enemies. They obscure knowledge as smoke covers fire. Knowledge is obscured knowledge is obscured by insatiable desire. Unrighteous desires, which spring from rajas, hinder knowledge. They spring from the external senses, manas, and buddhi. So they must be restained in order to destroy unrighteous desires, which destroy knowledge and intuition. The sense should be controlled by the mind; the mind should be controlled by the intellect; the intellect should be controlled by the self. The lower sentient self should be controlled by the higher rational self. Unrighteous desires can be extirpated by the self by complete sense-restraint and control of mind and intellect. Without absolute self-control knowledge and intuition cannot be acquired.

Constancy in the knowledge of the self and God and insight into the goal of the knowledge of reality constitute true knowledge. The supreme Brahman is the object of true knowledge, which leads to immortality. There is nothing purer than integral knowledge of God in the universe and the infinite beings. It purges all works of impurities and purifies them. It enlightens devotion to God, and unities the devotee with Him forever. It leads to eternal peace. The knower of Brahman abides in Brahman.

The Gita teaches the path of devotion (bhaktiyoga). Devotion is undivided, single-minded, unswerving love of God. It completely unites the individual self with God. There are four kinds of devotees-distressed, inquisitive, selfish and wise. The distressed devotee prays to God for deliverance from distressed, inquisitive, selfish and wise. The distressed devotee prays to God for deliverance from distress. The inquisitive devotee prays to Him for wealth and other objects of pleasures. The wise devotee knows the nature of God, and prays to Him for His sake. He has single-minded devotion to Him, and is always united with Him. He is united with God, and realizes the supreme goal of life. Those who throw themselves at the mercy of God, completely surrender themselves to Him, and take shelter in him, cross the ocean of Maya, made of sattva, rajas, and tamas. They can transcend the gunas, conquer the natural impulses and desires, and acquire transcendental perfction. Those who are deluded by ignorance, are puffed up by egism, and do not take refuge in God. Those who are attached to God, and take refuge in him, and ,make incessant efforts for release from old age and death, know the supreme Brahman. The devotee dedicates all his works to God,m takes refuge in Him, and realize the infinite and eternal status through His grace. He fixes his mind on God, dedicates all his works to Him, makes Him the only end of his life, and overcomes all difficulties through His grace. Complete surrender to God and taking refuge in him are essential to the culture of devotion. The grace of God is its cardinal doctrine. He cannot be attained through the study of the Vedas, performance of sacrifices, charity, rituals and severe austerities. He can be known in his real nature by undivided devotion. The devotee dedicates all his works to God, cleanses his mind of attachment and aversion, makes him the only end of his life, and attains Him.

The devotee of God is always contented. He is unaffected by joy and sorrow, fear and anxiety. He does not cause pain to others. He is not affected by praise and dispraise. He can endure hardships. He is devoid of attachment and aversion. He is pure in body and mind. His mind is always fixed on God. He has undivided and unswerving devotion to him. He conquerors his natural desires, and attains affinity with God. He has compassion and good will for all creatures. He possesses perfect tranquility and equanimity. He is detached from all egoistic works. He gives up works leading to good and evil. His life is suffused with the divine spirit. There is complete union of the loving soul with beloved Lord. They abide in each other. God abides in the loving soul, with the beloved lord. They abide in each other. God abides in the loving soul, and it abides in him after death.

God accepts whatever the pure-hearted devotee offers him with devotion. He is impartial to all creatures. None is dear to him. None is hated by him. But those who worship him with devotion abide in him, and he abides in them. Even if a very vicious worships him with undivided mind, he ought to be regarded as a saint, attains eternal peace. The devotee of God never perishes. The path of devotion is open to all, irrespective of castes or sex. God takes all his devotees into his bosom. His all-embracing love knows no distinction. Only he demands unconditional surrender to him and undivided and unflinching devotion and love for him. God looks after the welfare of his devotees, who worship him with single-minded devotion, and who are always united with him. He destroys their ignorance due to tamas, and illumines their minds with knowledge. He gives them knowledge, which leads to attainment of him.

The threefold path of works, knowledge and devotion imply one another. The aspirant who dedicates all his works to God without attachment and thought of consequence, free from egoism, knows him and love him. He who knows God in all beings and all beings in God, dedicates all his works to Him, and is devotes to him. He who loves God with single-minded devotion, performs all works for his sake, knows him in his real nature. The three paths emphasize the different aspects of spiritual discipline in accordance with the temperaments of the aspirants. An enlightens intellect, a pure heart, and a holy will go together. A man does not live in compartments. His knowledge emotion and will are purified together. His whole beings turns towards God, and is transmuted by his living presence in his soul. He has mystics vision and consuming love of God. His will pulsates with Divine will, and works as a perfect instruments of God. Liberation (moksa) is the supreme goal. It is the supreme abode. It is the highest status beyond good and evil. It is the permanent status. It is the eternal and indestructible status. It is the seat free from all troubles. It is free from birth and death. It is absolutely free from pain. It is supreme perfection. It is transcendental perfection of the individual self, which is not affected by the natural desires due to sattva, rajas and tamas. First rajas and tamas are over come by sattva, which actuates the aspirant's mind. Then the sattva also is transcended by him. He becomes absolutely pure, and rises above virtues and vice, good and evil. Moksa is abiding in Brahman. It is extinction of egoism in Brahman. It is not dissolution of integrity can never be lost. Moksa consits in beings Brahman. Beings Brahman does not mean identity with Brahman. It means attaintment of qualitative similarity with Brahman or God. Moksa is attainment of the nature of God. Moksa is transcendental state of immortality. It is life eternal. It is the highest goal. It is the attainment of God. It is inseperable union with him. God abides in the individual souls devoted to him. They abide in him. Moksa is not extinction of the individual soul in God. It is affinity with him in essential nature.

Moksa is supreme quietude and the highest bliss, which spring from union with God. It is delight in the self, contentment with the self, self-satisfaction, and self-fulfillment. It is free fr om moral obligation; no duties are to be performed in the highest state. It is a state of non-action. The liberation person neither acts nor cause others to act. He may work for the good of humanity without moral obligation. But he has no duties to perform. Moksa is perfect tranquility and desirelessness. It is total destruction of egoism. It is living in God. It is transmulation of the individual soul by God. It is transformation of human life into divine life. It is indissoluble union with God.

The Mimamsa Philosophy

2011-12-22T09:30:00.001-08:00

Jaimini (400 B.C.) was the author of the Mimamsa Sutra, and the founder of the Mimamsa system. Savarasvamin (300 A.D.) wrote a commentary called, Savara-Bhasya, in which he criticized the views of the different schools of Buddhism. He started his views on the principle philosophical topics, and raised the purva Mimamsa to the status of an independent system. Kumarila Bhatta (700 A.D.), the founder of the Bhatta school of Mimamsa wrote Slokavartika, Tantravartika and Tuptika. Slokavartika has great philosophical importance. Sucarita Misra (900 A.D.) wrote a commentary known as Nyayaratnakara on it, Nyayartnamala, Tantratana, and Sastradipika. Vacaspati Misra's (680-750 A.D.) Vidhiviveka, and Tattvabindu. Prabhakara Misra (700 A.D.), the founder of the Prabhakara school of Mimamsa, wrote a commentary entitled Bharat on Savara-Bhasya. Salikanatha Misra (800 A.D.), wrote a commentary known as Rjuvimalapancika on Bharat and Prakaranapancika. The third school of Mimamsa was founded by Murari whose works are lost.

The Mimamsa is called the Purva Mimamsa, while the Vedanta is called the Uttara Mimamsa. The former is earlier than the latter in the sense that it deals with rituals, while the latter is concerned with knowledge. The performance of rituals leads to the knowledge of the reality. So the purva Mimamsa, called the Mimamsa, is logically prior to the Uttara Mimamsa or the Vedanta, the former being concerned with Dharma, and the latter, with Brahman.

The Mimamsa is called Karma Mimamsa. It mainly deals with the Vedic injunctions about rtuals, the rules of interpretation of the texts, which remove the apparent contradictions among them, and harmonize them with one another, and the philosophical justification of the beliefs ritualism. It believes in the reality of the external world, the reality of the individual souls, and the Law of Karma. It believes in transmigration, heaven and hell, and liberation. It believes in many gods, who are worshipped through sacrifies, and rejects the notion of one God, who creates, preserves and dissolves the world. It frankly advocates atheism, and emphasizes the importance of ritualism. It believes in the eternality and infallibility of the Vedas and rejects their divine authorship.

Intrinsic Validity (Svatahpramanya) of Knowledge, and Extrinsic Invalidity (Paratah Apramanya) of Knowledge

Kumarila regards cognition as a means of valid knowledge (pramana) because it is apprehension. Prabhakara also regards apprehension, which is distinct from recollection, as a means of valid knowledge. Kumarila regards cogniizedness (jnatata) produced by a cognitive act as its result. But prabhakara identifies pramana with the valid knowledge (prama), and regards cognition as manifesting itself, and not as inferable from cognizedness of its object. According to him, all cognition as cognitions are valid, and there invalidity is due to their dusagreement with the real nature of their objects, so that wrongness does not belong to the cognitions themselves, but to the objects cognized. Kumarila also regards apprehension as valids knowledge, which can be set aside by its disagreement with the real nature of its object. He regards novelty, non-contradiction and correspondence with the object as the tests of truth. He regards recollection as invalid, because it apprehends what was apprehends already by perception. Prabhakara is in the nature of apprehension.

Kumarila recognizes the intrinsic validity and the extrinsic invalidity of knowledge. The validity of knowledge arises from the essential natures of its causes untainted by defects, and is known by the knowledge itself. It does not arise from any special excellence in the cause of knowledge, and is not known by any other subsequent knowledge of fruitful action, or of the absence of a contradicting knowledge. Knowledge is valid in itself, and is not validated by any other knowledge. Intrinsic validity of knowledge consists in its being generated by the complement of causal conditions besides them. The knowledge of validity also is generated by the same aggregate of causal conditions which make the knowledge known. But the invalidity of knowledge arises from defects in the causal conditions of the knowledge of a contradicting knowledge.

The Nyaya regards both validity and invalidity of knowledge as extrinsic due to excellence and defects of the causes, of knowledge, and determined by the knowledge of a fruitful action and a fruitless action respectively. Kumarila criticizes this view. If validity and invalidity of knowledge would be nutral and devoid of any logical value. But we never experience neutral and devoid of any logical value. But we never experience neutral knowledge, but only valid knowledge or invalid knowledge. If the validity of a knowledge of its agreement with its object, or the knowledge of a fruitful action, then the validity of the second knowledge, and so on to infinity. If the second knowledge is valid in itself, the first knowledge also is intrinsically valid. The Nyaya regards the validity of knowledge as due to the excellence of its causes. But the so-called excellence of the sense-organs and the like is not known through any means of valid knowledge, and invalid knowledge, and defects of its causes respectively. But, in fact, we experience only valid knowledge and invalid knowledge. Invalid knowledge arises from causes tainted with defects. So valid knowledge must be held to arises from the essential nature of its called causes untainted by defects. The invalidity of knowledge is produced by a deficiency in its causes. It is held by some to be due to the knowledge of its deficiency, and not to its nature.

The validity of knowledge cannot be determined by the knowledge of any special excellence in its cause, or the knowledge of its harmony with the real nature of its object, or the knowledge of a fruitful action. It is determined by the knowledge itself. No special excellence of the causes of knowledge except their essential nature is perceived. Nor can the validity of knowledge be determined by the knowledge of its harmony with the real nature of its object. Validity or truth is harmony of a knowledge of a harmony to manifest its object, because it does not differ from the first knowledge. Nor can the validity of knowledge be determined by the knowledge of a fruitful action, for unless its validity is determined, it cannot determine the validity of the first knowledge is determined by the first knowledge is determined by the first. If the latter is determined by itself, the former also should be regarded as determined by itself. Nor can the validity of knowledge be determined by the knowledge of the absence of a contradicting knowledge, since it cannot be exhaustively known by us, because we are not omniscient. Further, it is known either at the time of ascertaining of it cannot determine the validity of an antecedent knowledge. Hence valid knowledge is produced by the essential nature of its causes untainted by defects, and known by itself. Invalid knowledge is produced by causes tainted with defects, and known by the knowledge of the defects or the knowledge of a contradicting knowledge.

Perception (Pratyaksa)

Kumarila recognizes six pramansas, viz., perception, inference, comparison, testimony, presumption, and non apprehendion. Pranhakara rejects negation as an independet category, and non-apprehension as the means of knowledge it.

Jaimini defines perception as the knowledge produced in the self by the right intercourse of the sense-organs with the self existing objects. It is produced by real objects existing at present and acting upon the sense-organs. When there is a right intercourse of the sense-organs with their objects, valid perception is produced. Kumarila says, "Right intercourse is the intercourse of the sense-organs untainted by defects with real objects." Illusion are produced by wrong intercourse. The Mimamsa theory of perception is similar to the Nyaya theory. Only the latter regards the auditory organs as ether limited by the ear-hole, while the former regards it as space limited by the ear-hole.

The prabhakara defines perception as direct apprehension, which relates to an object, the self, and cognition. In every perception of an object, the self, and the object are perceived. ThisPrabhakara'sdoctrine of triple perception. In regard to objects, there is the perception of substances, qualities, and universals due to the intercourse of the tances, qualities, and universals due to the intercourse of the sense-organs with them. Cognitions are self-manifest. But the self and an object are not self-manifest, but are manifested by a cognition, which is self-aware and which is not manifested by any other cognitions.

Kumarila and Prabhakara both recognizes two stages of percepton, viz., indetermine perception and determinate perception. Kumarila defines indeterminate perception as simple apprehension of an object, pure and simple, similar to the apprehension of a baby or a dumb person. It apprehends neither the speceific characters nor the generice characters, but an individual object only, which is their substrate. It cannot apprehend the generice characters as generice and the specific characters as specific.

Prabhakara defines indeterminate perception as a simple apprehension of the bare nature of an object. It apprehend a substance, a quality, and a genus as bare existence unrelated to each other just after the sense object-intercourse. It existence is proved by its self-awareness. It apprehends generice characters and specific characters, but it cannot cognize them as generic and specific, since it is devoid of recollection of other similar and disisimilar objects.

Kumarila defines determinate perception as apprehension of the generic characters of an object as generic, and of its specific characters as specific. It contains an element of recollection of similar and dissimilar objects, and apprehends the community of its object with other similar objects and its distinction from other dissimllar objects. It apprehends an object and its genric and specific properties in a subject predicate relation. Prabhakara also regards determinate perception as the apprehension of the generic characters and the specific characters of an object and its properties in a subject-predicate relation. Prabhakara also regards determinate perception as the apprehension of the generic and specific respectively. It apprehends its object and its object as a substance endued with particualar qualities and belonging to a certain genus. It conatins an elements of recollection produced by subconscious impression. It is immediate apprehension produced by the sense-objects-intercourese aided by subconscious impression.

Kumarila recognizes the validity og indeterminate and determinate perception both. Indeterminate perception reveals the bare nature of an object. It is direct apprehension or distinct cogniton of an object in itself, unrelated to other objects. Its validity consists in its directness and immediacy; it yields new knowledge not acquired already. Though it is devoid of subject-predicate relation, it is valid. Determinate perception also is valid, since it is direct and immediate knowledge of an object and its properties as related to each other, which is produced by the sense-object-intercourse aided by subconscious impressions. Prabhakara also regards indeterminate perception as valid, since it is sensuous apprehension of an object unrelated to other objects and devoid of recollection, and since its validity is proved by self-awareness. He regards determinate perception also as valid, because it apprehends the subject-predicate relation between its object and its properties, substance, quality and genus which is not apprehended by indeterminate perception.

Inference (Anumana)

Savara defines inference as the knowledge of an unperceived object, which is not present to a sense-organs, from the perception of another object, when a uniform relation has been known to subsist between them. Kumarila explains the relation as invariable concomitance of a sign or reason with a predicate, the former being pervaded by the latter, which is indicate. The sign is called vyapa because it is coextensive with, or wider than, the sign in time and place. The unperceived predicate is inferred from the sign perceived in the subject on the ground of the uniform relation between them known already in similar instances. Smoke was perceived to be accompanied by fire in a kitchen and other similar instances at certain times and in certain places. Smoke is subsequently perceived in a hill exactly in the same form. So the existence of a fire in the same form in a hill is inferred from it.

The invariable concomitance, according to Kumarila, is known by repeated observations of concomitance of the two general properties of the reason and the predicate, and some-times of two particular objects denoted by them, strengthened by the non-observation of countrary instances of their non-concomitance. The observations of concomitances of the rreason and the predicate in numerous instances of their non-by the induction by simple enumeration.

Does inference involve the fallacy of petitio principal ? Kumarila regards novelty as an essential characteristics of valid knowledge. It consists in not being apprehended already. It is objected that inference contains the recollection of invariable concomitance, which apprehends what has already been apprehended, and thus invalidates inference. Kumarila argues that though the concomitance of smoke and fire in a kitchen and the like is certainly known in a general way, yet the relation between the present subject (e.g., a hill) and the predicate (e.g. a fire) is not already known. The hill was not already known, farless its fieriness. What is the novel factor, which was not already known. The hill was not already known, farless its fieriness. What is the novel factor, which was not already apprehended, in the inference? The fieriness of smoky objects is already known in a general way. The generic character of fire is already known. The hill is perceived. But the hill as qualified by a fire was not already known by any means of valid knowledge.

Prabhakara slightly amends Savara's definition of the inference. He defines it as the knowledge of a predicate in a subject from the perception of a sign or reason on the ground of the knowledge of a uniform relation between them, if the knowledge is not contradicted by another knowledge. The uniform relation may express inherence, coinherence in the same substance, causality, and the like. The causal relation between smoke and fire is invariable. The relation between smell and earth is invariable. The relation between taste and colour, which inhere in the same substance is invariable. Whenever there is taste, there is colour, there is no taste, for instance, in light. An invariable relation is the ground of inference. Prabhakara also regards induction by simple enumeration as the ground of invariable concomitance. He considers inference to be valid, since the knowledge of the predicate existing in the subject is in the nature of apprehension, though it is produced by the perception of the sign and the recollection of the invariable concomitance.

Prabhakara admits inference for oneself and inference for others. Both consits of three members viz., 1) the thesis or proposition, 2) the minor premise which states the reason and 3) universal major premise which states the uniform relation illustrated by an example. The preposition should be stated first, but the major premise may be stated first, but the major be stated in any order. Either the reason or the application may be stated. The conclusion follows necessarily from the gerneral principle of relation between the sign and the predicate.

A hetergenous example is neddles, since a homegenous example is enough to illustrate the gerneral principle. Savara admits two kinds of inference, viz., pratyaksatodrstasambandha and samanyatodrstasambhandha. Kumarila calls them drstasvalaksana and adrstasvalaksanavisaya. Prabhakara calls them drastasvalakasna and arstasvalaksana. In the former there is the invariable concomitance between objects which are perceptible, as smoke and fire. In the latter there is the invariable concomitance between a perceptible objects and an imperceptible objects, as motion of the sun is infereed from its change of position in the sky. Prabhakara regards motion as imperceptible.

Comparison (Upamana)

Savara defines comparison as the knowledge of similarity subsitng in an unperceived object (e.g. a cow) on the perception of a similar objects (e.g. a wild cow) perceived. The cow which was perceived by me in the past in a town is similar to this wild cow perceived in a forest at present. This is an example of comparison. The prbhakara also defines comparison as the knowledge of similarity subsiting in a remembered object, which arises from the perception of similarity. A person, who perceived a cow in a town in the past, perceives its similarity with the cow, and then knows the similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow. The knowledge of similarity of the remembered cow with the perceived wild cow is comparison. Prabhakara's view of comparison identical with that of kumarila. Both regard similarity as an object of comparison. Both similarity of a remembered object with a perceived object as known by comparison.

Comparison is not perception, since its object known to be similar (e.g. a cow) is not in contact with a sense-organ. Nor is comparison inference, since it does not depend upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the two objects, which are similar to each other. It may be reduced to an inference in the following manner. The cow is similar to the wild cow, because it is the substrate of similarity with the wild cow, and whatever is the substrate of similarity with another object is found to be similar to it, as one of the twine is similar to the other. This is wrong, because the cow and the wild cow, which are similar to each other, were never perceived together in the past. So comparison is not inference. Nor is it testimony, since it does not depend upon verbal authority. So it is an independent means of valid knowledge.

Presumption (Arthapatti)

Savara defines presumption as the assumption of an unperceived fact without which inconsistency among perperceived facts cannot be reconciled. If we know that Devadatta is alive, and perceive that he is absent from his house, we cannot reconcile his being alive with his non-existence in his house, unless we assume his existence outside his house. The assumption of this unperceived fact which reconciles two apparently inconsistent well-known facts is presumption. It is also called postulation of implication. Kumarila and Prabhakara differ from each other in their views on presumption. Prabhakara maintains that there is an element of doubt in presumption while Kumarila denies its existence in it. There is doubt, according to Prabhkara, as to the truth of the two perceived fact which cannot be reconciled with each other. The the apparently inconsistent facts. We know that Decadatta is living, and perceive his absence from his house.

The element of doubt, according to Prabhakara, distinguishes presumption from inference. There is no elements of doubt in inference. From the undoubted perception of smoke we can infer the existence of fire. The sign is free from doubt. But the perceived absence of Devadatta from his house leads to the presumption of his living outside his house only when it has made the fact of his living doubtful. Thus there is doubt in presumption, while there is no doubt in inference. Presumption removes doubt, and reconciles two apparently inconsistent facts, and cannot be regarded as inference.

There is no element of doubt, according to Kumarila, in presumption. We perceive the absence of Devadatta from his house. We know for certain that he is alive. In order to reconcile these two well-known and undoubted facts we assume that he has gone out of his house. Without this assumption the apparent inconsistency between his being alive and his absence from his house cannot be reconciled. If the knowledge of his living were doubtful, it could not be the sound basis of presumption. It removes the mutual inconsistency of two well-ascertaint facts. The presumption of a third fact reconciles the two well-known facts perceived, which appear to be inconsistent with each other.

Non-Apprehension (Anupalabdhi)

Kumarila regards non-apprehension as the means of knowing the non-existence of an object, which cannot be known by perception, inference, comparison, testimony and presumption. Non-existence is real and apprehended by non-apprehension. The non-exitence of curd in milk is prior non-existence. The non-existence of a horse in a cow is mutual non-existence. The non-existence of horns in a here is absolute non-existence. If non-apprehension were not recognized as an independent mean of knowledge, there would be the existence of curd in milk, of milk in curd, of a jar in a piece of cloth, and of horns in a hare. Non-apprehension is non-production of perception and the like, but it is cognition or a modification of the self. It is a means of valid knowledge, since it cognizes non-existence which cannot be known by any other means of valid knowledge. How is the non-existence of a jar on the ground cognized? First, the ground, which is the locus of the non-existence of a jar, is perceived. Then the jar, the counterpositive entity of the non-existencem, is remembered. Then a purely mental cognition of the non-existence of the jar, which is independent of the sense-object-intercourse, produced. A person first perceivces the bare ground, then remembers a jar, which existed on it. Then he cognizes the non-existence of the jar on the ground by means of non-apprehension.

Non-apprehension being negative in character cannot cognize positive exitence. Perception, inference, comparison, testimony and presumption being positive in character, cannot cognizes non-existence of their objects. Non-existence is cognized by a means of knowledge similar to itself, of negative in character. It is an object of appropriate non-apprehension.

But Prabhakara does not recognize non-apprehension as an independent means of valid knowledge. Nor does he recognize the category of non-existence as an ontological reality, and non-apprehension as a distinct mode of knowing it. When we perceive the existence of a jar on the ground, we perceive the existence of the ground as related to the existence of the jar. But when the jar is absent, we perceive the bare existence of the jar. But when the jar is absent, we perceive the bare ground only. The non-existence of the jar is nothing but does not recognize non-apprehension as an independent means of valid knowledge.

Non-existence is not cognized by perception, since there is no intercourse of a sense-organ with it. No can it be said to be cognized by indeterminate perception at first, and then rememberd by determine perception. The non-existence of an object can never be cognized by indeterminate perception, since it is non-relational apprehension. So it cannot be remember bered by determinate perception. Nor can non-existence be inferred from the knowledge of a sign, because the invariable concomitance between them is not known. Nor is non-existence known by testimony, comparison and presumption, because in a verbal statement, nor knowledge of similarity, nor knowledge of inconsistency between two perceived facts which may be reconciled by presumption. It is known by appropriate non-apprehension, which is a distinct means of valid knowledge.

Testimony (Sabda)

Kumarila defines testimony as the knowledge of objects, which are supersensible, derived from sentences by comprehending the meanings of the constituent words. Testimony is verbal authority. He divides testimony into human and superhuman. The former is the testimony into human and superhuman. The former is the testimony of trustworthy person, while the latter is the testimony of trustworthy character, while the latter is valid in itself. Again, testimony may either give us knowledge of existing objects, as 'a jar exists'; or, it may direct us to perform an action, as 'bring a jar'. The former gives us the knowledge of existential propositions, while the latter gives us the knowledge of injunctive propositions. Vedic testimony gives us the knowledge of duties. Dharma is supersensible, and cannot be perceived through the sense-organ. Inference, comparison, presumption and non-apprehension also cannot yield the knowledge of Dharma, since they preuppose perception. The knowledge that the performer of the Agnistoma sacrifies will go to heaven cannot be given by them. Vedic testimony is the only source of our knowledge of duties relating to supersensible entities. The vedic texts which enjoins us to perform certain actions which lead to beneficial results are authoritative, and prohibitions are injunctions in disguise. The other Vedic texts are authoritative in so far as they help persons perform their duties.

Kumarila maintains that human testimony is valid, if the sentence is uttered by a person of trustworthy character, and that it is invalid, if it is spoken by a person of untrustworthy character. Human testimony has no intrinsic validity. It may be vititiated by carelessness, deliberate desire to cheat, and other defects of the speakers. But Vedic testimony has intrinsic validity, since the Vedas are impersonal and the eternal, and not human compositions tainted with the defects of the speakers. Non-contradiction is a test of truth. A knowledge, which is contradicted by a subsequent valid knowledge, is invalid. But the Vedic injunctions are never contradicted by any subsequent valid knowledge. Hence Vedic testimony is valid in itself.

A word consits of letters which are eternal. It denotes a class or genus, and not an individual. It denotes an individual indirectly through a class denoted by it. A word has a permanent relation to an object, which is impersonal. It is neither created by God nor by persons. It is only learnt from the speech and actions of the elders acquainted with the meaning of words.

Prabhkara regards testimony as the knowledge of supersensible objects depeding on the knowledge of words. There is no other testimony than scriptural testimony. The supersensible objects is Apurva, supersensuous Ought,categorical Imperative, or Duty. Apurva or the moral commands is the object of Vedic testimony, which cannot be known by any other maens of valid knowledge . the Vedas are not composed by any person, human or divine. The sentence in the Vedas manifest their meanings by their inherent powers. They manifest their meaning by their inherent powers. They enlighten us on Apurva, which is incomprehensible by the human reason. Vedic sentence are intrinsically valid, and always yield valid cognitions, since they are impersonal and devoid of human origin. The entire Vedas which prescribe the Moral Law are intrinsically valid. The Moral Law is Ought or Duty, which is realizes by human volition.

Prabhakara includes human testimony in inference. Sentences uttered by persons cannot by themselves guarantee the real existence of objects which they mean. They often contain great falsehood and are not in harmony with real objects. The validity or the invalidity of a sentences spoken by a person is inferred from the trustworthy or untrustworthy character of the person who utters it. The knowledge of the person is the cause, and the sentence uttered by the person is the effect. The effect is inferred from the cause. So human testimony is includes in inference.

Words denote their objects by nature. Their denotative power is natural and permanent, and not determined by convention, human or divine. The Nyaya maintains that God fixes the meanings of words by convention. But the Mimamsa does not believe in the conventional meanings of words. They have natural and eternal relations to the objects denoted by them. Prabhakara regards the meanings of proper names as fixed by convention, but does not consider the meanings of common words to be determined by convention, which are independent of human agency are not distinguished from each other owing to lapse of memory. When a nacre is perceived as silver, only the common quality of them, viz., brightness, is perceived, since it predominates over the peculiar qualities of the nacre. Then the perception of brightness revives the subconscious impression of silver owing to similarity. But the recollection impression does not appear to be recollection owing to obscuration of memory due to a defect of the mind. Though silver is remembered, it is not remembered as 'that' something perceived in the past owing to lapse of memory. The illusion is not experienced as ' this is that silver', but as ' this is silver. Nondisction prompts the self to put forth an effort to appropriate the illusory silver. When the illusion is said to be contradicted by a sublating cognition, the disction between the two elements is apprehended, and consequently the self does not put forth any effort to appropriate the silver.

Prabhakara defines valid knowledge as apprehension, and regards all apprehension as valid. In the illusion 'this is silver' the perfection of 'this' is valid, since it is does not contradicetes and the recollection of silver' is invalid, because it is recollection and contradicted by a sublating cogniton. But a cognition, which is found to disagree with the real nature of its objects, as cognition, is valid. Prabhakara does not recognize error as error. He does not distinguish between truth and error from the logical point of view. But he distinguishes between them from the practical point of view. Knowledge is subservient to practical action. The knowledge that leads to successful action is true, and that which leads to unsuccessful action is false. We cannot speak of truth or falsity of knowledge prior to action promoted by it. We cannot brand a knowledge as false until it leads to unsuccessful action. True knowledge as false until it leads to unsuccessful action. True knowledge is not the knowledge that apprehends the real nature of its objects, but it is the knowledge which is capable of a fruitful action. When the objects that is manifested to consciousness is attained by an action promoted by it, it is regareded as true. Thus Prabhakara distinguishes between truth and error from the standpoint of practical utility.

Kumarila: The Categories

Kumarila divides categories into positive and negative. He recognizes four positive categories, viz., substance, quality, action, and community. He admits four kinds of non-existence, viz., prior non-existence, posterior non-existence, mutual non-existence, and absolute non-existence. He rejects the Vaisesika categories of particularity and inherence.

A substance us the substratum of dimension and quality. A substance and a quality are produced at the same moment, and non-different from each other, since both of them are produced by the same causal conditions taken together. They are produced at the same moment and found to be related to each other as cause and effects.

Kumarila admits eleven substances, viz., earth, water, fire, air, ether, self, mind (manas), time, space, darkness, and sound. Earth has smell . the sense of smell is made of earth. The body is made of earth. Water has natural fluidity. The sense of taste is made of water. Fire has touch. The visual organ is made of fire. Air has touch, but no colour. Darkness has colour, but not touch. It has black colour, which is manifested in the absence of light. It can be apprehended by the visual organ only. Ether is one, eternal, partless, and ubiquitous. Time and space also are eternal, partless and indivisible. Time, space, and ether are perceptible, because they are ubiquitous, like the self, while they are not manas. Futher, if they were not perceptible, then their existence would be disproved, because it cannot be proved by any other means of valid knowledge. Time is perceived by the six sense-organs. It is morning. It is evening. These notions are produced by the visual organ assisted by the sight of the sunrise. Space too is perceptible, because the notions of east, west, up, down, forward, backward, etc., are produced by the visual organ, and have space as their content. Time and space are perceptible as qualifications of other substances. Space is one and ubiquitous. It appears to be many and limiting adjuncts. It is perceptible. The Nyaya view that darkness is the absence of light is wrong, because darkness has qualities and motions, and because it is perceived as existent. So it is certainly a positive entity.

Earth, water, fire, air, and darkness are composed of atoms. The whole is distinct from the parts. The perception 'this jar is one and gross'. Which is valid and uncontradicted proves the existence of the whole distinct from the parts. The whole does not inhere in the parts, since there is no inherence. It is different and non-different from them. There is identity in-difference between them. The whole is not a different substance from its parts. It is a different condition of them. Owing to a particular conjunctions, they become one substance of a large dimension. As parts they are many, and as a whole it is one. A cloth is one, while they yarns are many.

The Bhatta Mimamsaka maintins that composite things are made of atoms, which are of the diemensions of motes in a sub-beam. They correspond to the traids of the Nyaya Vaisesika, which are perceptible. The minuter primary atoms of the Nyaya- Vaisesika are non-existent, since there is no means of valid knowledge by which they can be known. Atoms of smaller size than motes in a sun-beam are not perceived.

Sound is an eternal and ubiquitous substance, which is perceived by the auditory organ, and which has the genus of sound. It is self-existent and devoid of a substratum. It is directly perceived by the auditoryorgan through a direct relation. It is ubiquitous, because it is an intangibe, partless substance, which is not a cause; it has a large dimension, since the same sound is simultaneously perceived by many persons in different places. It is not contradicted by any sublating valid knowledge. So sound is all-pervading. Sound is made manifest and unmanfiest by the proximity and remoteness of a manifesting condition. It is external, for it is not produced. The vocal organs do not produce it, but only manifest it. Their activity is its manifesting agent. The audible sound manfiest sound which is eternal. It has different degrees of loudness, and transfers these attributes to the sound manifest it. Their activity is its manifesting agent. The audible sound manifests sound which is eternal. It has different degrees of loudness, and transfer these attributes to the sound manifested by it. Sound is an eternal and ubiquitous substance. There are two kinds of sounds, significant and non-significant. Audible sounds produced by beating a drum are non-significant. Audible sounds produced by beating a drum are non-significant. Letters manifested by the audible sound produced by the activity of the vocal organs are significant. A word is a collection of sounds, which signifies a single object. It denotes a genus directly, and an individual by implication. If sounds were not eternal, the Vedas, which consits of sentences, would not be eternal.

The mind (manas) is the eternal organ through which cognitions, pleasure and other qualities of the self are perceived. It is all-pervasive and motionless. It is not atomic in dimension as the Nyaya-Vaiseka maint ains. It is not atomic in dimesion as the Nyaya-Vaisesika maintains. It is all-pervasive, because it is an intangle substance, which is neither a cause nor an effect, and because it is the substratum of a conjunction, which is the non-inherent cause of knowledge, like the self. It is all-pervading, and consequently, motionless, like ether. Though it is all-pervading, it is limited by the entire body, and serves as the organ of internal perception. Both self and manas are all-pervading, and their conjunction is natural and not produced by an action.

A quality is distinct from action, has the genus of quality, and is not a material cause. There are twenty-four qualities: colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, viscidity, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, audible sound (dhvani), manifestness (prakatya), and potency. Audible souns is a quality of air, which manifests sound. An object is the substrate of manifestnss, which is its qualification called manifestation. It determines what becomes an object of knowledge. It is known by percption through the relation of identiy with what is in conjunction. Though it abides in substances only, it abides indirectly in genus, quality and action owing to the relation of identity with them, and also in non-existence of which they are counter-positive entities. They become objects of knowledge through the manifestness of substances. Distinctness exists in all substances, eternal and non-eternal.

Potency abides in substances, quality and action, and has the genus of potency. It is known by presumption and from Vedic testimony. It is empirical and scriptural. The first, e.g. the power of burning in fire is known by presumption. The second, e.g. the potency of a sacrifies to produce happiness in heaven is known from injunctions of the Vedas only. The potency of burning abides in a substance. (e.g. fire). Potency is a quality which is known by presumption. It is not a distinct category.

Action or motion abides in non-pervasive substances only, is perceptible, and the cause of conjunction and disjunction. It is of five kinds, viz., upward motion, downward motion, contraction, expansion, and locomotion. Kumarila recognizes also action in the self. Physical motion is not the only form of action. Motion in a substance, which brings about conjunction and disjunction in space, is perceived.

Kumarila admits the existence of generality which is the cause of the knowledge of non-difference among different individuals. 'This is a cow. 'That also is a cow'. There is the genus of cow in different individuals cows, which is common to them. Community is the ground of assimilation, while individuals are the ground of discrimination. There would be no assimilation, if there were no community in the individuals. A single community subsits in many individuals. It cannot be said to subsits in them either in its entirely or in its parts, since it is devoid of parts. But we perceive it to subsits in them. There is no inherence between a universal and an individual, since there is no inherence. Further, inherence is said to be a relation between two inseperable entities, which is the cause of the notion 'this is a cow', and not as ' the genus of cow' subsists in this cow. There is identity-in-difference between the universal ans the individual. The universal is not entirely different from the individual. Nor is it entirely identical with it. It is partly different from, and partly identical with it. It is partly different from, and partly identical with, the individual. Generality and individuality subsits in the same locus the individual: this proves their non-difference or identity. The genus of cow' and the cow are not synonymos: this proves their differecnce. Hence there is no contradiction between difference and non-differnence between the universal and the individual.

Kumarila denies the category of inherence. It is said to be a relation between two inseperable entities, substance and quality, substance and action, the whole and the parts and the universal and the individual, which is the cause of the notion ' this sunsits in it. Kumarila regards inherence as essential identiy (tadatmya). If it is different from the reata such as the universal and the individual, it cannot substis as a relation between them. If on the other hand, it is identical with them, they cannot be different from each other. Inherence is identity between two insperable entities and a particular phase of them. If it were an external relation between substance and quality, or the like, which related them to each other, then it would require another inherence to relate it to each of the two relata, and so on to infinity. This infinite regress can be avoided, if inherence is regarded as identity in essence. Further, inhernce is regarded as identity in essence. Further, inherence is said to be inseperable relation which is the absence of separable relation. Seperable relation is either having separate movements or subsiting in different substrates. Parts of a whole can have movements, though the whole is motionless. The whole subsits in its parts, which subsits in their parts. They subsits in different substates. The genus subsits in an individual, which subsits in its parts. So there is a separable relation between the whole and its parts, and the genus and the individual. There is no inherence between them. Kumarila rejects the categories of potency, number and similarity recognized by Prabkara. Potency is an unperceived quality in a substance, which is inferred from its effect. It is generated along with the substance. Number is a quality. Similarity is a quality which consits in the possession of the same arrangement of many parts by two subatances. It is not a distinct category, since it admits of degrees. Thus potency, number and similarity are not distinct categories.

Prabhakara : The Categories

Prabhkara recognizes the eight categories of substance, quality, action, community, inherence, potency, number and similarity. Substance is the substrate of qualities. There are nine substances: earth, water, fire, air ether, self, manas, time, and space. Earth, water, fire and air are visible and tangible. Ether is not visible, since it is colourless. It appears to be white owing to the particles of fire in it, and appears to be white owing to the absence of light. It is imperceptible, but inferred as the substratum of sound. Air is perceptible. It is neither hot nor cold, but it appears to be cool owing to the particles of fire in it, and appears to be hot owing to the particles of fire in it, and appears to be cool owing to the particles of water in it. Earth, water, fire and air are perceptible in the non-atomic state. But ether, time, space, and manas are only inferable. Darkness is not a substance but mere absence of light. There are twenty-two qualities, colour, taste, smell, touch, dimension, distinctness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, proximity, weight, fluidity, viscidity, impression, sound, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, and merit. Action or motion is imperceptible; it is inferred from a series of conjunction and disjunction.

Generality subsits in the individuals entirely, and is distinct from them. It is perceived by the sense-organs. It is common to many individuals which are different from one another. It is the ground of our conception of non-differnce among different individuals. It is the basis of their assimilation. The genus is different from the individuals in which it inheres. There is a relation of subsistence (pratantrata) or inherence between them. When an individual is born, a new relation of inherence is generated, which relates it to the genus which subsits in the other individuals of the same class. When an individual dies, the relation of inherence between it and the genus is destroyed. Prabhkara admits the generalities of substance, quality and action. But the denies the reality of the highest genus or beinghood, which is recognizes by the Vaisesika. An individual thing has its specific existence, but no mere existence or beinghood. So Prabhkara denies the existence of the highest genus or being hood.

Prabhakra admits the reality of subsistence of inherence which is the relation between two insperable entities. It is eternal in eternal substance, and non-eternal in non-eternal substance. There are many inferences. Inherence is produced, when an effect is produced, which inheres its material cause. It is not perceptible, but always inferred.

Prabhakara recognizes the category of potency of power. It is the imperceptible energy which produces an effect and inferred from its effect. Fire has the power of burning, which either overpowered or destroyed by a fire-extinguishinig gem, a charm, or anunguent, when it does not burn. When the effect is never destroyed, the causal power is destroyed. When it is produced on removal of these counteracting agents, the causal power is overpowered. It is eternal in eternal substance and non-eternal in non eternal substance. It is generated along with the transient substances in which it subsits potency differs from the velocity in that the latter is transient in eternal things also, and dependent on other causes in transient things.

Number is not a substance, since it subsits in qualities; there are two odours, three touches and the like. The substsistsnce of number in qualities cannot be said to be figurative. Since its subsistence in them in a primary sense is not contradicted. The arguments that it cannot abide in them because it is a quality is wrong, since its being a quality cannot be proved. It is not a quality of substance, since it abides in it is perceptible, unlike a movement. Nor is it a movement, since it is perceptible, unlike a movement. Nor it is generality, since it is non-eternal. Hence number is a distinct category.

Similarity is not a substance, since it abides in qualities and motions. An odour is perceived as similar to another odour, and a motion is inferred as similar to another motion. So it is not the cause of the experience of being common to many entities. It subsits in generalities, but a generality does not exist in gernalities. We know similarity between the genus of a cow and that of a buffalo. So similarity is different from the generality.

Inherence is a kind of relation between a substance and its quality or motion, the genus and the individual and a material cause and its effect. So similarity is not inherence. It is a distinct category which is perceived in perceptible things through the perception of the qualities, actions, and parts as common to two or more things. It is inferred in imperceptible things from many common features.

Prabhakara rejects the Vaisesika category of particularity, which is said to abide in an eternal substance that distinguishes it from another eternal substance possessing common qualities and actions. But distinctness can distinguish an eternal substance from another eternal substance having similar qualities and actions. So particuality is not different from distinctness, and so not a distinct category.

Both kumarila and Prabhkara recognize the reality of the external world independent of our cognitions. The Mimamsa does not believe in the periodic creation and dissolution of the world by God. Production and destruction of things are constant. The parts of the world have an origin and an end, but the world, as a whole has no origin and an end in time. There is no creator or destroyer of the world.

Kumarila: The Nature And Knowledge Of The Self

Kumarila regards the self as different from the body, the sense-organs, and cognitions. It is ubiquitous, eternal, incorporeal, immaterial and transmigrating. It is a knower, enjoyer, and active agent. It is the substrate of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, impression, merit and demerit, which are its modes. It undergoes modifications, and is yet eternal. Its modal change do not compromise its eternal nature. Cognition is an action or a modal change of the self, which is not perceptible, but inferable from cognizedness (jnatata) or manifestness (prakatya) of the object. In deep sleep there is no cognition, but there is potency of cognition. There is no pleasure in deep sleep. The so-called recollection of pleasure during deep sleep on waking from it is due to the absence of pain. The self is of the nature of potency of cognition. Kumarila sometimes speaks of the self as self-illumined. It is cognixed by itself, and not by others. Sometimes he speaks of it as an object of I consciousness. When it is spoken of as imperceptible, it means that it is apprehended by itself, and cannot be perceived by others. Thus kumarila regards the self as both self-illumined and an object of I consciousness, which always points to the mere existence of the self, which is of the nature of pure consciousness. But Parthasarathi Misra a follower of kumarila, regards the self as a an object of 'I'-consciousness or mental perception. He denies its self-luminosity on the ground that it is not manifested in dreamless sleep. So it is an object of mental perception. I' consciousness is mental perception.

But how can the self be subject and object at the same time? The self, according to Kumarila, is a conscious substance; as conscious, it is the knower through the conscious part, and the object. It is the knower through the unconscious part, and the object of knowledge through the unconscious part. And the object of knowledge through the unconscious part. It is transformed into cognition, pleasure and the like through it.

The self is distinct from the body, which is its organ of experience. It is material and unconscious, and cannot act by itself. It can act only when it is supervised by the conscious self, and realizes its ends. The self is immaterial and devoid of physical motion. It assumes a particular body in accordance with its merits and demerits acquired in the past birth, and directs its actions. When the unseen potencies are exhausted, it ceases to have any body and directs its actions, and attains liberation. Though the self is devoid of physical motion, it can trasmigrate into another body, since it is ubiquitous. It can produce physical motion through its body.

Kumarila cites the Samkhya arguments for the distinction of the self from the body. The former is pure, simple, incorporeal, immaterial, and disembodied, while the latter is impure, complex, copreal, material and embodied. The body is an aggregate and an disembodied, while the latter is impure, complex, corporeal, material, and emnodied. The body is an aggregate and an arrangement of parts, which exits for conscious self, and realize its purpose. The self is a conscious knower, which has experience through its body with a particualar arrangement of parts to realize its ends. It is ubiquitous, eternal, conscious and active, while its body is limited, perishable, unconscious and inactive. The former is the knower, while the latter is a known object. The former is imperceptible to others, while the latter is perceptible to them. So the self is distinct from the body. Its identification with the body is due to false knowledge.

Pleasure is inferred from a beaming face, which may be said to be a quality of the body. But it is not its quality, since it is not perceivd inside the body when it is dissected. We can perceive the colour of its interior, but we cannot perceive pleasure. But pleasure is a quality, which must abide in a substance, and the substance in which it abides is the self. Similarily, cognition, desire, volition and the like are the qualification of the self, which is their substrate. Further, consciousness cannot be a quality of the material elements of the body either distributively or collectively. Earth, water, and the other elements separately do not posses consciousness, and consequently, cannot posses it collectively. If consciousness belonged to all the elements seperatly do not posssess consciousness, and consequently, cannot posses it collectively. If consciousness belonged to all the elements of the body, then all being equal could not be related to one another. If it belonged to one of them, the other elements would be subordinate to it, which is contradicted by experience. Hence consciousness cannot be a quality of the body, which cannot be a knower. Life is not a quality of the body, since it is destroyed when the body is not destroyed, or a contradictory quality is not produced in it. So life must be due to an effort of the self which guides the body. It has life so long as it is animated by the soul.

The self is distinct from the sense-organs. It is the conscious agent of them, which are its unconscious instruments. They cannot function without its guidance. Even on the destruction of a sense-organs, the self can remember objects perceived in the past through it. It can rememeber objects perceived in the past through the different sense-organs. It is eternal and all-pervading, while they are perishable and of limited magnitude. The mind (manas) cannot be the knower, since it is the internal organ by which the self can perceive its qualities. It is an unconscious instruments of the self can perceive its qualities. It is an unconscious instruments of the self which is its agent. So the self is distinct from the manas and the external sense-organs.

Prabhkara : The Nature And Knowledge Of The Self.

Prabhkara regards the self as distinct from the body, the sense-organs and cognitions. It is eternal, ubiquitous and manifold. There is a distinct self in each body. It is manifested in all cognition of objects. It is unconscious, since consciousness does not constiute its essence. It is known as the substrate of the cognition 'I know', but not as of the nature of consciousness. The self is a substance, which is not of the nature of consciousness, but a substrate of consciousness. Cognition is not a modification of the self, as kumarila maintains, but its quality. The self is manifested as the knower of all cognition of objects. It is knower or subject, and apprehended as such and never apprehended as an object.

The self has nine special qualities, viz., cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, merit, demerit, and impression, which are produced by its conjunction with manas, the internal organ. Cognition is self-aware. It is apprehension and recollection. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are apprehended by mental perception. Pleasure is a positive feeling, and not a mere negation of pain. Impression is a peculiar quality of the soul, which is the cause of recollection. Unseen power is merit and demerit, which are known from Vedic testimony. The self is the substrate of these nine specific qualities. Prabhkara's conception of the self resembles the Nyaya Vaisesika view.

Prabhakara regards the self as the inherent cause of cognitions, which depend upon the conjunction of the self with manas as the non-inherent cause. This mind-soul-contact is generated by a movement of the mind (manas) due to the effort of the soul or its merit and demerit produeced by its previous actions. These efforts and merits and demerits are the effects of previous mind-soul-contacts and so on without a beginning. The action of the mind is not the inherent cause of cognitions, since it will require another action of the mind as its non-inherent cause. The manas is the internal organ of the self, which is of atomic dimension. It is the organ of the perception of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition. It is eternal and capable of quick movements. It conjunction with a soul depends upon its begnningless merits and demerits.

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The self is the enjoyer; the body is the vehicle of enjoyment; the sense-organs are the instruments of experience; the external objects and pleasure, etc are the objects of experience; enjoyments is a feeling of pleasure, and suffering is a feeling of pain. These five kinds of entities exhausts the reality. The self is neither atomic nor coextensive with the body, but ubiquitous. It is the inherent cause of all its qualities, while the mind soul-contact is their non-inherent cuase. This conjunction subsits in the soul and the manas which is animated by it. The body is capable of movements, but the soul is motionless, and comes into contact with all thing without movements. So it is all-pervading. But though it is ubiquitious, it can experience its qualities in connection with its own body which it has acquired by its merits and demerits. The sense-organs are parts of the body. The soul can have experience through its own body and sense-organs only, which are the fit media of its experience. It cannot have experience through others' bodies and sense-organs. Though it is ubiquitous, it comes into contact with the atomic manas and produces cognitions. If the manas were ubiquitous like the soul, there would be no contact between them. Two ubiquitous substances devoid of parts cannot come into contact with each other. The atomic manas comes into contact with the different sense-organs by its quick sucession. They are never simultaneous, but appear to be so owing to the quick movements of the manas and its rapid contacts with the soul and different sense-organs. The mind soul contact are due to the soul's merits and demerits acquired by its past actions.

There are many souls. Their experiences are different. They acquire different merits and demerits by their different voluntary actions. Their different lots and pleasure and pains are due to the variety of their merits and demerits. If there were one soul only, there would be no variety of merits and demerits. If there were one soul only, there would be no varitety of merits and demerits. If there were no variety of them, there would be no variety of enjoyments and suffering, which is a fact of experience. So there are many souls, one in each body. Oneness of the souls would lead to oneness of experience, which is contradicted by experience. There is an irreducible plurality of souls with unique experiences. They are moral agents experiencing diverse objects in accordance with their moral deserts. The Advaita Vedanta doctrine of oneness of the soul flately contradicts the testimony of consciousness and undermines morality. Just as the actions of my body are due to the volitions of my soul, so the actions of other bodies are due to the volitions of my soul producing actions of my body. But I never experience the volition of my soul producing actions of other bodies. So I infer that they must be due to the volition of other bodies. So I infer that they must be due to the volitions of other souls. I have inferential knowledge of other souls. I infer them from the actions of their bodies produed by their volitions. One souls cannot be perceived by another souls.

The soul is neither produeced nor destroyed. It is devoid of origin and end. It is uncaused and indestructible. It is immotal and eternal. It achieves its non-empirical, pure and transcendental condition by exhausting its merits and demerits. This is the state of liberation.

The self is not self-luminous, and does not apprehended itself. But a cognition is self-luminous, and apprehends itself. The self is known as the subject or knower in all cognitions of objects. Objects are not apprehended, unless the self apprehending them is apprehended. It is not apprehended in the absence of cognition of objects. Cognitions manifest themselves, the objects which produce them, and the self in which they exist. The self is apprehended as the knower of objects and manifested as the subject in all cognitions of objects. It cannot be the subject as well as the object of a cognition, since it is self-contradictory. The self is always the agent of knowledge and never its objects.

The self cannot be an object of mental perception as kumarila maintains. It is self-contradictory to hold that the same self is the knowing subject and the known object. In the cognition. I know the jar' the self-luminious cognitions manifest the jar as an object, and the self as its substrates. The self is apprehended as the knower of objects; it is always manifested as the subject or knower of object-cognitions; it is never known as an object.

Kumarila's Theory of Knowledge or Inference Of Cognition From Cognizedness. Its Object (Jnatata)

Kumarila regards cognition as an act of the self, which is inferred from the cognizedness (jnatata) of its object. A cognitive act produces cognizedness or manifestness (prakatya) in its object. If there were no cognitions, then we could not, in its object. If there were no cognitions, then we could not, in any other way, account for the cognition, then we could not, in any other way, account for the cognizedness of an existing object; so after the object has been cognized, we know the existence of the cognition as a means of knowing the object. 1. The act of cognition is the cause; cognizedness is the effect. The object of knowledge are either perceptible or inferable from cognizedness. 2) A cognition is imperceptible but inferable from cognizedness as the effect. The objects of knowledge are either perceptible or inferable. Perceptibility and inferability are produced by sense-perception and inference respectively in their objcts. A cognitions is imperceptible but inferable from cognizedness . A cognition is inferred from the relation between the self and the object, which is apprehended by mental perception. The self is the knower, and the object is known. The self can know the object when it is related to it; and the relation between them is brought about by a cognition, which relates them to each other. From the specific relation between the self and the object brought about by the cognition which is an adventiotous condition we infer the existence of the cognition. The relation is known by mental perception. Hence a cognition is inferred from the specific relation between the self and an object. 3. A cognition is inferred from the peculiarity produced by it in its object. Manifestation is produced in the object by the cognition. It is cognizedness from which the cognitions is inferred. A perceptual cognition produces cognizedness is a present object. An inferential cognition produces cognition is inferred. A perceptual cognition produces cognizedness in a present object. An inferential cognitions produces manifestation of objects . hence a cognitions is inferred from the manifestation or cognizedness of its object, which is a peculiar property produced by it in its object, or the specific relation between the self and the object.

Prabhkara's Theory of Knowledge: Theory of Triple Perception (Triputupratyaksavada)

Prabhakara holds that perception apprehends the self, its object, and itself. Perception is direct apprhension, which cognizes these three factors. This view is called the doctrine of triple perception. Cognition is self-luminous, and manifests itself. It is not manifested by any other cognition. But the self and the object are not self-luminous, and manifests itself. It is not manifested by any other cognition. But the self and the object are not self-luminous, and do not manifest themselves. They are manifested by a cogniton. In walking condition both the self and the object are manifested. But in dreamless sleep both are unmanifest, though they continue to exist during the period, since they are recognized on walking from sleep. If they were self-luminous, they could be manifested during the period, since they are recognized on walking from sleep. If they were self-luminous, they would be manifested during deep sleep. They arenot manifested at the time, because there is no cognition to manifest them. So they are not self-luminous, but they are manifested at the time, because there is no cognition to manifest them. So they are not self-luminous, but they are manifested by a cognition which is self-luminous. The self is directly manifested by every cognition presentative or represntative. There can be no cognition of an object apart from that of the self. In every cognition of an object there are a consciousness of the self, a consciousness of an object, and a consciousness of the cognition. In the cognition 'I know the jar' there is a triple consciousness, cognition of the jar, a cognition of 'I' or the self, and a self-conscious cognition.

According to prabhkara, the self is always cognized as the knower, a cognition, as a cognition, and an object, as a known object. The self is a knower, and can never be known as an object. A cognition can never be known as an object, but as a cognition. It is the self-manifest or self-aware. If it were cognized as an object of another cognition, it would require another cognition, it would not be self-luminous. If it were cognized as an object of another cognition, it would require another cognition to cognizes it, and so on to infinity. So a cognition is self-conscious awareness and apprehends an object. But, though a cognition is apprehended by itself, its existence is inferred from the apprehended by itself, its existence is inferred from the apprehension of its object. We infer the existence of the cognition from the apprehension of its object.

Prabhkara refutes Kumarila's doctrine of inferability of a cognition. There is no reason or mark which it may be inferred. The existence of an object cannot serve as the mark of inference, since it is not invariably accompanied by a cognition. The cognition of an object cannot be mark of inference. It cannot be a mark as soon as it is produced; but it can be so only when it is manifested to consciousness. If it is not manifested, it cannot be distinguished from an object cognition which has not yet come into existence. A cognitive act cannot be inferred from non-manifestation of the object cognition. The manifestation of the object-cognition does not depend upon any other cognition, since it is not cognition can be inferred. Hence the cognition of an object is self-illumined. The so-called cognizedness or manifestness of an object is nothing but the cognition of the object, which is self-luminous. A self-cognized cognition manifests an object.

Dharma

Jaimini defines Dharma as a good which is of the nature of a command. Savra defines it as an utterance which prompts the self to act and carry it out. It is a command which leads it to the attainment of the highest good. It is a prescription of the Vedas, which indicates the nature of good and evil, and impels the self to realize the highest good. Dharma can be releaved by the Vedic prescription only; it is not apprehended by perception, inference, comparison or any other means of knowledge. Dharma is non-temporal and supresenuous Duty or Moral Law, which is revealed by the Vedas, and impels the self to obey it. Kumarila regards the Moral Law as a Vedic prescription or command which impels the self to act. What leads to the attainment of the good is dharma. The good is the happiness of the self. The performance of sacrifies and other rites and ceremonies prescribed by the Vedas is conducieve to its happiness. Certain substances, qualities and actions are the material of these rites. So kumarila regards the acts enjoined by the Vedas and all the ingredients necessary for them as dharma. External acts prescribed by the Vedas and the substance, qualities, and actions which are required for them constitute dharma. The latter are regareded as dharma, because they are means to the performance of duties, though they are perceptible. The conducieveness of the acts and the auxiliary substances, qualities and actions to the highest good is always known from the Vedas. Kumarila regards the external acts prescribed by the Vedic injunctions and prohibitions as dharma. He propounds an external and legalistic view of morality. The Moral Law is of the nature of an impersonal commad, and not the command kumarila recognizes two kinds of duties, secular and scriptural or non-temporal. The secular duties fulfil perceptible secular ends. The scriptural duties fulfill imperceptible supersensuous ends. They are of two kinds, viz., conditional duties and unconditional duties. The former are empirical duties for the realization of desired ends. The latter are obligatory daily duties e.g. morning and evening prayers, and obligatory occasional duties e.g. bath in the Gange on the ocassion of the solar eclipse and the lunar eclipse. The performance of conditional duties leads to happiness; the performance of Jyotistoma sacrifies produces happiness in heaven. The non-performance of unconditional duties produces sins of omission and consequent suffering. But te performance of them does not produces merits and consequent suffering. It purifies the mind, generates the knowledge of the self, wipes off past sins, and prevents sins which would accrue to the self from the omission of unconditional duties are unconditionally obligatory. The scriptural duties are positive or negative; they are either injunctions or prohibitions. The former enjoin the performance of right actions, while the latter prohibit the commission of wrong actions.

Prabhkara holds that Apurva or the supersensible Moral Imperative is conducieve to the highest good, which is indicated by the Vedic injunctions. A moral law is of the nature of duty. A duty is apurva because it is incomprehensible by any other means of knowledge than Vedic testimony. It is a command or Imperative because it impels a person to accomplish it: it is realizable by an action, which is its means. The supersensible ought is the end of our moral actions: there is a permanent relation between Apurva and its accomplishment by a voluntary action. When there is a volition, there is the accomplishment of ought; and when there is no volition, there is the absence of its accomplishment. Volition is an effort of the self, which aims at the realization of ought through a voluntary action. Thus Dharma is Apurva or supersensible ought reveal by the authoritative suggestion produced in the self by the Moral Imperative. It is an objective category. But it is not an external act enjoined by the Vedas as Kumarila holds. A person who performs sacrifies enjoined by the Vedas is said to be Virtuous because he executes the Moral Imperative. He cannot be said to be virtouous, if he does not excute it. The accomplishment of the moral Imperative is inferred from the performance of the sacrifies enjoined by the Vedas. The ceremonial acts are the contens of duty in that they fulfill the Moral Imperative which is a transcendental verity revealed by the Vedic injunctions. They do not derive their authoritativeness from their intrinsic validity as self-revealing, transcendental Moral Imperative which is a transcendental verity revealed by the Vedic injunctions. They do not derive their authoritativeness from their conduciveness to any ulterior end or good, but from their intrinsic validity as self-revealing, transcenedental Moral Law. It is revelaed by moral obligation which is different from the physical compulsion and psychical impulsion. Moral obligation is self-revealing experience. The prescribed duties do not derive their authority from the Vedas, as Kumarila thinks, but from Apurva or the moral imperative which is indicated by the Vedic injunctions. It is an impersonal Law which has intrinsic validity- a transcendental verity of the moral has intrinsic validity-a transcendental verity of the moral order, which is self-revealing and self-authoritative.

Prabhkara recognizes two kinds of duties, viz., conditional duties for the fulfillment of ends, and unconditiona duties which are obligatory in themselves. Unconditional duties are obligatory daliy duties and obligatory occasional duties. Both of them ought to be done out of the sense of duty. They are authoritative because they embody Moral Imperative indicated by Vedic Injunctions. Their Authoritativeness is not due to their conduciveness to any ulterior end or consequences. They ought to be performed for their own sake.

The acts enjoned by the Vedas produce their fruits. The performance of the Jyotistoma sacrifies produces happiness in heaven. The enjoined action is performed at one time and the fruition of the act follows much latter. The performace of prescribed acts generates an unseen agency (apurva) which produces their fruition of the act follws much latter. The performance of prescribed acts generates an unseen agency (apurva) which produces their fruition at a later time. The deferred fruition of the performance of duties is due to the mediation of apurva. Kumarila posits Apurva as a third entily between the prescribed acts and their deffered fruition. It is an imperceptible potency in the principle action, or in the self, which do not exist before the performance of duties is due to the mediation of Apurva. Kumarila posits Apurva as a third entily between the prescribed acts and their deffered fruition. It is an imperceptible potency in the principle action, or the self, which do not exist before the performance of the action. Before the prescribed acts are performed, there is an incapability in them for producing happiness in heaven, and there is an incapability in the self for attining heaven. Both thses incapabilites are removed by the performance of sacrifies, which creates a positive power (apurva) by virtue of which heaven is attained. The imperceptible power called Apurva is known by presumption. The hypothesis of Apurva removes the apparent inconsistency between the performance of the prescribed sacrifies at one time and the attainment of heaven at a later time. The performance of the act produces directly certain potency in the agent, which persits in him, and produces happiness in heaven after the death of his body. The causal relation between the prescribed act and its fruition cannot be explained without such an interventing potency, which is generated by the act in the self, and is the immediate cause of the final result. Kumarila regards Apurva also as an objective potency of the prescribed act itself.

Prabhkara rejects Kumarila's view. A prescribed act, which is transient, cannot bring about its final result, the attainment of heaven, at a subsequent time. The Apurva, or ought, or Duty, which is different from the transient act, which is indicated by a Vedic prescription, and which is aimed at by a volition, generates the fruit. The volition is called bhavana, because it generates a voluntary action, which excutes the ought. The Moral Imperative (Niyoga) prompts the agent to put forth volition and exertion to accomplish the act. But it is difficult to explain how the Niyoga or Apurva can lead the self to attain the final result of the prescribed act done by it without producing a potency or disposition in the permanent self. Salikanatha, a Prabhakara, thinks that the Niyoga produces an effect in the self in the form of a disposition which inheres in it, and cannot be known by any other means of knowledge expect moral obligation. The act is not permanent, but the self's disposition is permanent, which can bring about the accomplishment of the final result.

Liberation (Moksa) And Its Means

Kumarila and Prabhkara the nature of liberaion and the means of its attainment. Kumarila regards liberation as negative in character, and consequently, eternal. If it be a state of positive happiness in heaven, it cannot be eternal. It is of the nature of negation, and therefore eternal. But negation cannot be the result of any action. Liberation is due to absolute extinction of merits and demerits. When they are completely destroyed, the body, which is the vehicle of experience, is destroyed. When no traces of them are left, no cause is left for the production of the body. The self attains liberation on the destruction of the present body and the non-production of any future body. The self attains liberation on the destruction of the present body and the non-production of any future body. It is a state of a absolute negation of all experience of cognition, plesure, pain, desire, aversion, impression, merit and demerit. It is the natural transcendental condition of the self free from empirical contents. It does not consits in enjoyment of happiness. If it did, it would be synonymous with heaven, and therefore perishable. Heavenly happiness is not eternal. When merit is worn off, it is succeeded by rebirth and bondage due to merits and demerits and connection with a body. Liberation is negation of this connection due to extinction of merits and demerits.

Kumarila regards action and knowledge both as necessary for the attainment of release. An aspirant for release should refrain from forbidden acts which produces suffering, and prescribed acts which generate happiness here and hereafter. But he should continue to perform daily obligatory and occasional duties in order to avoid sins which accrue from their non-performance. Prescribed acts for the realization of selfish ends generate sins and sufferings. They lead to transmigration and rebirth for the experience of the resulting enjoyments and sufferings. The knowledge of the self wipes off all traces of merits and demerits with the aid of the performance of obligation of them. But mere knowledge of the self is not adequate to effect final release. It impels the self to perform enjoined duties, and must be accompanied by the performance of obligatory duties. Thus action and knowledge both are necessary duties. Thus action and knowledge both are necessary for release.

Prabhkara describes heaven as unalloyed bliss free from pain. He defines release as the absolute cessation of merits and demerits and the consequent total destruction of the body. It is absolute cessation of the sufferings of empirical life consequent on the complete destruction of the self's contact with the body and the sense-organs, which are destroyed by the complete disappearnce of merits and demerits. Consciousness is an accidental quality of the self, due its conjunction with the manas and a body. When manas, the body and the sense-organs are completely destroyed on the destruction of merits and demrits, the self is divested of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, and impression, and become unconscious. Release is absoulute cessation of merits and demrits and the consequent pleasure and pain. It is neagative in character, and consits in the complete destruction of the specific qualities of the self. It is the natural transcendental condition of the self free from empirical contents as an eternal and ubiquitous substance; it is not a state of positive bliss, but a negative state of absolute extinceiton of pain. The nature of release is the same according to prabhkara and Kumairla.

Prabhakra, like Kumarila, regards action and knowledge both as necessary for release. Abstention from all prescribe acts for the avoidence of sins, and the performance of obligatory duties together with rigid moral discipline are the means to release. But action alone is not suffceint for the attainment of release. It must be supplemented by the knowledge of the self, which stops further accumulation of merits and demerits, and completely destroyes the body, which is the vehicle of experience. Knowledge of the self is not subservient to action. Aided by the sense-restraint, control of mind, sex-restraint, and other auxiliaries, it leads to release.

Atheism

The Mimamsa teaches ritualistic morality and religion, and enjoins the performance of sacrifies to gods. But they are not objects of worship, and donot give the rewards of the offerings. The deities are only beings to whom offering are to be made, and who have existence beyond the spatiotemporal world. At the time of making an offering to a deity, a person has to think of his form. So the Mimamsa believes in polytheism. But its belief in many gods is not serious, since they have no function. The latter mimamsa denies their existence except in the manras, and regards the references to them as mere praises of sacrifies. The performance of sacrifies generates an unseen potency (apurva) in the self, which generates their fruits without the intervention of gods. The Apurva is the intermediate agency between the performance of sacrifies and the attainment of heaven. Heaven is unalloyed happiness for a long duration, which is terminated by the exhaustion of merits.

Prabhkara believes in polytheism deny the existence of God. The Mimamsa belives in polytheism but not in theism. It does not belive in the existence of God as creator, preserver, and destroyer of the world, or the appotioner of rewards and punishment or the author or the Vedas. Its belief in many gods does not serve any useful purpose. They have no relation to the world ans the finite souls. They are not organically connected with the Mimamsa system. Hence this system is as atheistic.

Kumarila and Prabhkara have a realistic and naturalistic view of the world, and regards it as composed of atoms which are perceptible. External objects are real and permanent substances, which are not mere aggregates of qualities. A substance is permanent, though its qualities change. Kumarila rejects the notion of a substance as a self-identical unit devoid of differnce. He advocates the doctrine of parinmavda or satkaryavda, which regards an effect as a real modification of a cause. He regards the relation between cause and effect as identity-in-differnce. He rejects the relation of inherence between them. Kumarila and Prabhkara deny the periodical creation and destruction of the world, the supervisor of merits and demerits of the indivdual souls, the apportioner of rewards and punishment, and the author of the Vedas and moral laws.

Kumarila offers the following arguments against the reality of God. If God is the creator of the world, he must have a body. He cannot have desire to create without a body, since desire is produced by the contact of the souls with its manas and sense organs. If God had a body before creation, it could not be created by Him, but by another God, whose body was created by another, and so on to infinity. If the body of God were eternal, it could not be material, since there were no earth and the like prior to creation. Again, if His body were material, it could not be eternal. If it were eternal, our bodies also must be eternal, since both are material. His body must have been produeced by a cause, since it was composed of parts like our bodies. If God were the creator of His own body, then he created it without a body. But bodiless God, like a released soul, could not excerise any control over his body. Just as a jar is found to be made by an intelligent potter, who is perishable, so the body of God was made by an intelligent maker, who was perishable. If God has no body, he could not exert his will on the atoms. If God has no body, he could not exert his will on the atoms. If he did not act on the unconscious atoms, they could not follow his will. The insentient atoms, they could not follow his will. The insentient atoms could not combine with one another, and from various substances under the guidance of the will of God. Similarity, they cannot separate from one another, and bring about destruction of the world under the guidance of the divine will.

The Nyaya holds that God creates the world out of the atoms with the aid of the individual souls' merits and demerits, keeps them in abeyance during dissolution, activities them again at the time of creation, and creates the world in accordance with them for the souls' enjoyments and sufferings. Kumarila criticize this view. All actions are destroyed with their effects, merits and demerits, when the world is destroyed. God cannot activate the souls' merits and demerits at the time of the next creation. If he is omniscient and omnipotent, he can create the world by His will without the aid of their merits and demerits. If he depends upon them for creation, he is not independent and omnipotent. If they are subject to the will of God, they are needless. Kumarila does not deny that the diversity of the world is due to the diversity of the souls' merits and demerits. If he depends upon them for creation, he is not independent and omnipotent. If they are subject to the will of God, they are needless. Kumarila does not deny that the diversity of the world is due to the diversity of the souls' merits and demerits. But he denies the reality of God as the creator of the world.

Kumarila argues that there is no evidence for God's creative activity. No one can testify to the creation of the world by God. The first creatures could not know how they were born. Nor could they know the state of things prior to the creation of the world by God. If they relied on the assertion of the creator, they might be deceived. God might not create the world and yet tell them that he did not so in order to show off His powers. So God cannot be regarded as the creator of the world. Similarity, there is no evidence to prove that God is the destroyer of the world. There is none to testify to the fact that he destroys the world. So God is neither the creator nor the destroyer of the world.

Further, God has no motive for crating the world. Compassion for living creatures could not be His motive, since there were no living creatures before creation, for whom he could feel compassion. Moreover, if he were moved by compassion to create the world is full of suffering and misery. God, who is benevolent, cannot create so much suffering in the world. If he cannot creates a world free from evil, he is not omnipotent. If he is omnipotent, he can certainly create a world free from evil. If he depended on moral laws and natural laws and instruments, His independence would be compromised. If he created the world without a motive, then he is not intelligent. Even a fool does not act without a motive. If God created the world for amusement, he would not be perfectly happy and contented, and creation would involve him in wearisome toil. God is completely fulfilled and cannot, therefore, realize any end in creation. If compassion in the motive for creation and destruction. Hence God is not the creator or destroyer of the world.

God is not the author of the Vedas. Even if they were created by Him, they are doubtful. They are not a sure proof for his existence. If they are doubtful. They are not a sure proof for his existence. If they existed before creation, they could not be connected with the objects created. If they speak of creation as made by God, they are mere praises of certain injunctions about sacrifices. The Vedas are self-revealing, authoritative and eternal. They contain injunctions and prohibitions which embody positive and negative duties. God is not the author of the Vedas and the permulgator of moral laws. We can know dharma from the Vedas. Both prabhkara and kumarila regard the Vedas as eternal and self-revealing.

Prabhkara argues that there is no evidence for the creation and destruction of the whole world at the same moment, though its parts are produced by the conjunctions of their constituent atoms, and destroyed by their disjunction. All animals and men are born of their parents, and do not owe their existence to the intervention of God. Similarity, all things in the world are produced by their causes, and do not owe their existence to God. All effects are produced by their natural existence to God. All effects are produced by their natural causes, and no supernatural causes are necessary for them.

The Nyaya argues that God is the supervisor of the individual souls' merits and demerits. They are unconscious and so cannot produce their results without the guidance of a Being possessed of supreme intelligence. Omniscient God is the supervisor of the souls' merits and demerits. They are unconscious and so cannot produce their results without the guidance of a Being possessed of supreme intelligence. Omniscient God is the supervisor of the souls' merits and demrits. Prabhkara urges that the finite souls may supervise their own merits and demerits. If they cannot supervise them because they have no knowledge of them, then God also cannot supervise them because he has no knowledge of them. He has no sense-organs through which he can perceive them. He cannot perceive them through which he can perceive them. He cannot perceive them through manas, since it cannot perceive external objects without the aid of the external sense-organs. He has no merit and demerit which are the cause of a body, the sense-organs through which he can perceive them. He cannot perceive them through which he can perceive them. He cannot perceive them through manas, since it cannot perceive external objects without the aid of the external sense-organs. He has no merit and demerit which are cause of a body, the sense-organs, and the contact of manas with the sense-organs. So he can not perceive the souls' merits and demerits through the sense-mind-contact, and consequently, cannot supervise them. His knowledge is not uncaused and eternal, since knowledge is always found to be caused and trasient. So God's supervision of the souls' merits and demerits is unintelligible. He cannot supervise them without being related to them. His relation to them is either conjunctions or inherence. It is not conjunction, since it holds between two substance only. God is a substance it holds between two substance only. God is a substance; but merits and demerits are the souls' qualities. There can be no conjunction between a substance and a quality. So there can be no conjunction between God and merits and demerits. Nor can there be inhernce between them, Merits and demerits inhere in the individual souls, and cannot inhere in God, who is distinct from them. A carpenter's supervision of his tools consits in his contact with them. He cannot act upon their merits and demerits, because they are qualities, and so cannot supervise them. Hence God cannot create the world out of the atoms with the aid of the souls' merits and demerits.

It cannot be argued that God act upon the atoms, even as the souls acts upon its own body by virtue of merits and demrits, because the atoms are not the body of God, on which he may act create the world out of them. Even if God is supposed to have a body, His action on the body is due to volition. But there is no cause of His volition. If the divine volition. But there no cause of His volition. If the divine volition were eternal, creation would be unceasing. Further, God cannot supervise the unconscious atoms, because he has no motive in doing so. There is no need of a supramundance creator of the world. The existence of God is an unwarranted hypothesis.

The earlier Mimamsaka did not believe in the reality of God, and regarded the world as self-existent and self-evolving. They looked upon effects as modifications of their causes under the influence of the souls' merits and demerits, which are the supernatural agents in their production. They are otherwise due to purely natural cause. But the later Mimamsakas smuggled the concept of God into the Mimamsa system, and conceived Him as the supervisor of the Law of Karma, the appointer of rewards and punishments, and the Moral Governor of the world. Laugaksi Bhaskara recognized the reality of God as the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world, the inner guide of the souls, and the Moral Governor. Vedanta Desika brought the theistic tendency to the fullest development.

Hippism

2010-01-25T20:16:00.001-08:00

Hippism has grown as a cult among both young men and women. These people dress, eat, and live as they like. They feel they have the right to defy the established social order. The fact that most of them Ads by Google

Foreign Policy 101

belong ot the upper class of society. Some of them are will educated and want to see the world.

Since they have enough money to spend as they like, one cannot imagine the life they lead. Hippism is a revolt against the established way of life and according to them, against the hypocrisy of the older generation. Whether hippism is the answer, one is never sure.

These hippies wear atttered clothes. They appear to be unkempt and unwashed and are unashamed to show their untidy beards. They are like poor people on the streets. Hippies resorts to all sorts of drinks. They are a menace to low and order. Both men and women mixed easily with no sex inhibitions. They believe in free sexual relationships. Though they life strangely they are careful not to rub the law on the wrong side. For people belonging to the last generation and having been brought up under strict discipline the very sight of hippies is disgusting.

These people find nothing worthwhile in their lives. They find that education is shallow and meaningless. They find normal learning which classes are conducted by half baked preofessors and lecturers disgusting. Most hippies are of high IQ but they find nothing to contemplate or discover in the educational institutions. Again modern homes especially in the west are not conducive for the moral growth of the youngsters. Parents are not an influence in building their characters. Broken homes may be one of the reasons which drives away the youngsters from home to seel pleasure outside. They develop wrong notions about sex and marriage. The influence of the church and religion has weakened such that the youngsters cannot turn to the church. The sermons sound shallow since those who deliver them do not follow what they preach. In short the basic influences to help youngsters keep their mental, physical and moral values in tight reign has crumbled.

Hippism is not prevalent in countries where the family units not shaken. Parental example is very important. Children who are neglected in their childhood tend to pick up bad habits, neglecting household responsibilities and encourage hippism among their teenage children. Educational institution can play in structuring the character of youth. If teachers are really what they profess to be and practice what they preach, they can guide and mould the character of the children under them.

The youth today need direction and who else but parents and teachers can wean children from taking to bad habits.

SCIENCE OF PHILOSOPHY

2010-01-21T22:04:00.000-08:00

The great thing however is, in the show of the temporal and the transient to recognize the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present. For the work of Reason (which is synonymous with the Idea) when considered in its own actuality, is to simultaneously enter external existence and emerge with an infinite wealth of forms, phenomena and phases - a multiplicity that envelops its essential rational kernel with a motley outer rind with which our ordinary consciousness is earliest at home. It is this rind that the Concept must penetrate before Reason can find its own inward pulse and feel it still beating even in the outward phases. But this infinite variety of circumstances which is formed in this element of externality by the light of the rational essence shining in it - all this infinite material, with its regulatory laws - is not the object of philosophy....To comprehend what is, is the task of philosophy: and what is is Reason." Hegel, Werke, vii, 17.

This web site is devoted to the study of Hegel as he presents himself in the context of his own writings. In this way we allow Hegel to teach us what the Science of Philosophy is, and how, through such Science, the Absolute Truth reveals or rationally unfolds itself, although this may challenge, in a radical and transformative way, the accepted ideas and methods we may currently have of philosophy and science. By taking the approach of simply following Hegel's thought in its own development, we discover in the process that we have actually re-invented Philosophy and Science in a such a totally comprehensive and systematic way that we are finally able to integrate Mind and Matter into an Absolute Whole that transcends and encompasses both while yet maintaining a clear differentiation and distinction between them - a genuine unity in diversity that has been the cynosure of philosophical inquiry from time immemorial.

The task is to scientifically comprehend the ability of Reason to simultaneously hold contradictory sides, such as identity and difference or unity and diversity, within a higher unity, the Absolute or Spirit, without reductionistically collapsing the differentiation. The explicit process involves three stages: (1) the abstract understanding of the separated sides of the contradiction, (2) the dialectical relation of the sides, which dissolves their abstract independent separate existence (negative reason), and (3) the raising of this dialectical relationship into a dynamic unity - a process Hegel calls aufheben or sublimation, and in his later writings - positive reason. The ability to rationally think through this process provides us with an insight into the essence of the Concept (Begriff), whose intrinsic dynamic is constitued by the dialectical and sublimational activity that is self-evoked by the very nature of the various aspects or moments of the Concept itself. To understand this requires a rigorously scientific mind and sound philosophical training in order to be able to follow the dialectical and sublimational movement consistently throughout the whole development of the Phenomenology, Logic, Nature and Spirit until the entire scope of Reality is taken up into a rational, systematic Whole - the Absolute Idea or Divine Personality.

This is not to be misunderstood as a spirit monism - it is not a monotonous, static result, but a living multi-dimensional Reality - a result that is ever producing itself through the process of expressing or externalizing itself in otherness, then returning to itself by finding itself in this otherness. This process is the unending pulse beat of the Absolute where each beat may be considered a particular, while the pulse is the universal whole. And this is not to be misunderstood as pantheism since otherness means exactly what is 'other' to God, this pure opposition being an essential moment, the overcoming of which is the very life of Spirit.

Why is personality ultimately involved here? One may gain an intuitive grasp of this simply by becoming conscious of the fact that every scientist, philosopher, etc. is fundamentally a thinking being - a specific personality. Whatever conceptions they may have of their own origins - be it from atoms, molecules, angels, space-time warps, strings, worms, etc. - the fundamental fact remains that there is a thinking being at the bottom of all such conceptions. The idea that the world consists of atoms, molecules, etc. is ultimately concieved of and developed by scientific or philosophic personalities. We may come to learn about these theories as if they are the given facts of nature, and accept them in that way. But the truth is that they are preceeded by a lengthy historical development of thought before they are ever assumed as given facts of nature and, most importantly, they all have their ultimate origination in a thinking being - or personality, which exists pari passu along with any and all kinds of experience.

Then what comes first? Is it the thinking persons or the atoms that such persons think they are originated from? It is in scientfically comprehending the answer to this question that the whole of Hegelian philosophy can be understood.

Although it seems to have been well-known shortly after Hegel's death (see for example Cunningham's "Thought and Reality" or Caird's "Hegel"), for scholars of our own time, with a few exceptions, it has not been widely recognized that Hegel's philosophy is the essential affirmation of the personal nature of the Absolute Truth, although he clearly affirms this throughout his writings. I think there are a few major reasons for this.

(1) Hegel, himself, directly explains that his purpose is to present philosophy in a strictly scientific form, and that this must be done in terms of concepts. Thus 'Subject' is preferred to 'God' which is more a name of the Absolute than a concept, (Phenomenology §23). Personality is such a concrete concept that it is really only to be invoked at the conclusion of Science, for, as we have indicated, it is also where the whole of Science comes from - therefore it is both the origin and conclusion. Consequently Hegel claims that genuine philosophy is a circle or as we shall discover - a circle of circles.

(2) Another reason is that in our modern age there is a persistent prejudice toward impersonalism when it comes to understanding truth that is objective to us, i.e. the prejudice that the Absolute must be Substance rather than Subject. If Spinoza shocked the age in which he proclaimed that the Absolute was Substance, it has now become common place in our time, and it is Hegel who now shocks the world with the scientific conlusion that the Absolute is Personality.

Even when we hear the word "subject" we are unwilling to think in terms of personality and would rather think of it in some abstract way. This is correct as far as abstract Science is concerned with concepts, but we must understand that there is also a Reality or Actuality invovled. There is certainly a logical difference in meaning between Subject and Personality, in keeping with these terms as Hegel develops them, but just as Subject does not exclude its Substantial Reality, so too does the concept of Personality necessarily, and perhpas in a way more easily conceived, include its reality. Thus, for example, we call a person 'brave' only if they have manifested an act of, say, saving someone's life, so that personality is not only something subjective but is integrally combined with its manifestion or reality. In this way it is only with the inclusion of Nature and Logic in the wholesome consideration of the Absolute in its Spiritual Reality that leads us to the comprehension of Truth as Divine Personality or God.

(3) We have not known or been taught how to scientifically deal with a Reality that is personal. Modern science, especially, has been developed only in terms of a merely physical nature, the attempt having been made to reduce even life to purely chemical and molecular factors via objective evolutionary theories. Everything from the origin of the universe to the origin of human society has been based on such evolutionary thinking from some primitive state or substance to the presently observed world. Recent scientific revolutions of the twentieth century, however, have called all of that into question. The organismic conception of life turns the table around and has the organism as a whole determining the parts, and this is becoming the ruling paradigm in the physics of field theory as much as biology and certainly ecology.

(4) The Judeo-Christian heritage from which modern science arose in the West seems to put the Personal feature of the Absolute Truth outside the system of Nature and the world in general. This may certainly be correct as regards material nature but the situation is more complex than that. In order to fully comprehend the relation between God and World requires a carefull understanding of the Concept in its integral and differential moments, where separated difference and unity both play a role. This is the domain of scientific philosophy as Hegel developed it. The principle of identity in difference or identity of identity and difference that forms the basis of rational thought, distinct from abstract understanding, requires a comprehension of God as both transcendent and immanent with respect to His creation and creatures.

Thus, for instance, Hegel shows that Thought as Absolute Objectivity in and for itself, overarches sujective thought and its opposing objective matter, which are dialectically connected in a process of dynamically cancelling and producing one another. It is this dialectical movement of thought at the subjective-objective oppositional level of reality that, when concieved as a unitary organic whole, rises to the level of an overarching Concept that is intimately and dynamically tied up with its various moments or parts yet distinct from them. This same organic structure, according to its contents, is found throughout the whole of Reality, be it God, Idea, Concept, or the relation of Spirit to Logic and Nature.

(5) The idea of a majestic unity overarching a servile mulitplicity brings the fear of a bygone era of authoritarian hierarchies, a concept that springs from an abstract, static understanding of unity as opposed to multiplicity. The rational principle of the identity of unity and multiplicity dispels that fear as irrational for a society that has risen to the platform of Science. As Hegel says, "...in the Idea infinity is genuine; individuality as such is nothing and simply one with absolute ethical majesty - for which genuine, living, non-servile oneness is the only true ethical life of the individual" (Natural Law, tr. Knox, p.67). Here "individuality as such" means individuality conceived as an independently subsisting unit held in abstract opposition to the universal. It is this abstraction of individuality that is dissolved or nothing, whereas genuine individuality has a "true ethical life".

When we think in this way it seems rationally unavoidable that personality must be the conclusion of any science or philosophy because, as we have mentioned above, the rational thinking of a person is already involved at the root of all science and philosophy. To ignore thinking being that originates science is to fail to comprehend what the original object of scientific philosophical endeavor was in the first place - to understand the origin of one's self. This insight proves to be of essential importance in grasping the standpoint from which Hegels system is developed. In other words, the knower is the essential unity of knowledge and the known. In this sense it is similar to the Kantian unity of apperception of the "I" but Hegel presents it all in a more consistent and scientifically developed form.

If we try to comprehend Hegel without taking this basic persepctive into consideration we will have missed the most important contribution of his whole philosophy to the modern world. For it is a perspective that does not ask us to abandon any of the great achievements of science that we have already gained, but to expand upon them and integrate them in dimensions that a merely substantial or physically based science could never deal with.

For a more in depth study of this subject please see our article entitled, "Hegel and Personalism".

marxism

2010-01-21T22:00:00.000-08:00

Why have a Philosophy?

"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is, however, to change it." (Marx:‘Theses on Feuerbach’)

AT THE dawn of the 21^st century, one-fifth of the world’s population lives in absolute poverty on one US dollar a day or less, while the assets of the 200 richest people are larger than the combined income of the poorest 2.4 billion on the planet.

Yet material prosperity has increased by more in the past 100 years than in all the rest of human history. Thus the basis already exists potentially for undreamed-of progress of human society, provided the contradictions created by capitalism itself can be swept away by the world’s working class.

The capitalists through their control of the judiciary, the military, education and the media are always seeking to prevent workers and youth from drawing the conclusion that capitalism can be changed.

In the popular press, commentators occasionally rail against this or that symptom of the system’s sickness while drumming home the mantra that market economics represents the only show in town.

At the same time more serious justifications for capitalism are produced. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-1992 gave a massive boost to this branch of literary lies, allowing bourgeois philosophers to claim that capitalism had emerged triumphant in its historic struggle with socialism.

Every ruling class throughout history has sought to give its regime the stamp of permanence. Never mind that there have been many forms of class rule including slavery and feudalism, today’s smug apologists for capitalism believe their way of running society is best and represents the Everest of achievement.

Tony Blair has sneeringly denounced Marxism as "an outmoded sectarian dogma." His sole contribution to philosophy has been to bestow credit on Anthony Gidden’s Third Way theory – the very old and discredited idea that there can be a middle way between the market and a planned economy. Most capitalist leaders believe they don’t require a philosophy. Making money is all that matters and they embrace the idea that if it works, it’s good. They are largely empirical in their approach, responding pragmatically to new challenges and rarely bothering to understand the relationship and connections between policies and events, cause and effect. In the spheres of politics and economics, theirs is the complacent philosophy of thinking that what has gone on before will continue largely unchanged into the future.

In the 1990s they were sure the dotcom boom would just keep on growing. When it crashed they were astonished, but learning nothing, scratched their heads, said they’d predicted it all along, then went back to the comfort-blanket of believing capitalism would get better again.

This pamphlet will show that having a philosophy that correctly interprets the world and provides a compass for changing it is indispensable.

Dialectical materialism, the basis of Marxist philosophy is still the most modern method of thought that exists.

As Leon Trotsky observed in Marxism in our Time: "…if the theory correctly estimates the course of development and foresees the future better than other theories, it remains the most advanced theory of our time, be it even scores of years old."

Marxism is the science of perspectives - looking forward to anticipate how society will develop - using its method of dialectical materialism to unravel the complex processes of historical development.

It endeavors to teach the working class to know itself and be conscious of itself as a class. Dialectical Materialism – the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought – was and remains a revolutionary philosophy, challenging capitalism in every sphere and substituting science for dreams and prejudice.

Materialism versus Idealism.

"It is not consciousness that determines existence, but social existence that determines consciousness." (Marx & Engels: ‘The German ideology.’)

People have always sought to understand the world they lived in through observing nature and generalising their day-to-day experiences. The history of philosophy shows a division into two camps – Idealism and Materialism. The Idealists argue that thought (consciousness) is paramount and that people’s actions stem from abstract thought, devoid of history and material conditions.

It was Marx and Engels who first fully challenged this conception, explaining that an understanding of the world has to start not from the ideas which exist in people’s heads in any particular historical period, but from the real, material conditions in which these ideas arise.

Nature is historical at every level. No aspect of nature simply exists; it has a history, comes into being, changes and develops, is transformed, and, finally ceases to exist. Aspects of nature may appear to be fixed, stable, in a state of equilibrium for a shorter or longer time, but none is permanently so. For Trotsky: "Consciousness grew out of the unconscious, psychology out of physiology, the organic world out of the inorganic, the solar system out of the nebulae."

Marx and Engels based their materialism upon the ideas and practice of the great materialist philosophers of the 18^th century. The ‘renaissance’ in the 16^th century with its spread of cultural and scientific enquiry was both a cause of and an effect of the early growth of capitalism. In Engels’ words: "Science rebelled against the Church; the bourgeoisie could not do without science, and therefore had to join the rebellion."

Astronomy, mechanics, physics, anatomy and physiology were feverishly developed as separate disciplines, with the consequence that age-old beliefs in an inviolable god were rocked. Galileo for instance began to discover some of the physical properties of the universe and revealed that the planets revolved around the sun. Later, Newton’s theories of gravity and laws of physical motion uncovered the mysteries of movement and mechanics.

The philosopher Hobbes declared that it was impossible to separate thought from matter that thinks. Marx observed that this ‘enlightenment’ had "cleared men’s minds" for the great French revolution and the age of reason.

But Engels added that "The specific limitation of this materialism lay in its inability to comprehend the universe as a process, as matter undergoing uninterrupted development."

He and Marx were to fuse the brilliant scientific advances of materialism with dialectical thought, creating the most revolutionary and far-reaching theory for explaining and changing our world.

The German philosopher Hegel, who resurrected dialectics from ancient Greek learning in the early 19^th century, was a proponent of the Idealist approach. To him the thoughts within his brain were not the more or less abstract images of actual things and processes, but on the contrary, things and their development were only the realised images of the Idea/God existing somewhere from eternity before the world existed.

Marx turned this confusion on its head. "To me the idea is nothing else than the material world reflected in the human mind."

Marxism therefore bases itself upon a materialist view of history. The material world is real and develops through its own natural laws. Thought is a product of matter, without which there are no separate ideas.

Flowing from this it is clear that Marxism must reject universal truths, religions and spirits. All theories are relative, grasping one side of reality. Initially they are assumed to possess universal validity and application. But at a certain point, deficiencies in the theory are found. These have to be explained and at a certain point new theories are developed which can account for the exceptions. But the new theories not only supercede the old, but also incorporate them in a new form.

For example, in the field of biological evolution, Marxists are neither biological nor cultural determinists. There is a dialectical interaction between our genes and our environment.

Recently the ‘human genome project’ has enabled the complete mapping out of the structure of the genes which are passed on from one human generation to the next. Some biologists have asserted that this would reveal individual genes shaping behaviour patterns ranging from sexual preference to criminality and even political preference!

A consequence would be that a person’s position in society would be largely pre-determined and unalterable.

However, any attempt to ‘tag’ individual genes for ‘intelligence’ has failed and the attempt to define social position as genetically determined has been exposed as a pure consequence of the ideology of the biologists involved.

A breakthrough that has revolutionised our understanding of human behaviour, scientists recently discovered we possess far fewer genes than previously thought, revealing that environmental influences must be vastly more powerful in shaping the way humans act.

What is dialectical thinking?

" Men thought dialectically long before they knew what dialectics was, just as they spoke prose long before the term prose existed." (Engels: ‘Anti-Duhring’.)

Dialectics is the philosophy of motion. The dialectical method of analysis enables us to study natural phenomena, the evolution of society and thought itself, as processes of development based upon motion and contradiction.

Everything is in a constant state of flux and change; all reality is matter in motion.

The roots of dialectical thought can be traced back to the ancient Greeks who, just because their civilisation was not yet advanced enough to dissect and analyse nature in its separate parts, viewed nature as a whole, in its connections, dialectically. Nothing in life is static. In the words of the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus: "All things flow, all change."

Around us in the natural world are illustrations of the dialectical development of our Earth and space itself. Astronomers are transfixed as super-telescopes allow us to witness the birth and death of distant stars, while no geologist or vulcanologist can function without having an understanding of the basic and interlinked laws of the dialectic – the law of quantity into quality, the interpenetration of opposites and the negation of the negation.

In mathematics a dialectical approach is indispensable. In everyday life we often need to distinguish between curved and straight lines. But mathematically a straight line is merely a special sort of curve. Both can be treated using a single general mathematical equation.

We also learn how at a specific temperature, solid ice changes to liquid water then at a higher temperature to steam – a gas – and that the three apparently different substances are actually different manifestations of the motion of the same water molecules.

But though capitalist or bourgeois society uses the dialectical method in its pursuit of scientific advance, in the fields of philosophy and economy it stubbornly seeks to refute dialectics, clothing itself in the straightjacket of metaphysics (formal logic). Metaphysics translated into politics becomes a justification for the status quo, the idea that evolution proceeds unchangingly at a snail’s pace.

It is not hard to see why. Explained in a Marxist manner, the development of all past and present forms of society would show that at certain periods in history when the mode of production has come into acute conflict with the mode of exchange, wars and revolutionary movements have followed. The forms of class struggle have changed through different historical epochs, but the fundamental struggle over the division of the surplus value between exploiter and exploited forms a continuous line from the early slave societies to the present day.

The capitalist class or bourgeoisie (as Marx described it) must therefore hide the materialist conception of history from us, extolling instead the acts of great men (and occasionally women!) who it is claimed have changed history. Great social revolutions are attributed not to the struggle between classes, but to the mistakes of tyrant kings and tsars and the bloodthirsty ambitions of ruthless men like Cromwell, Robespierre and Lenin to name three of their special bete noirs.

Metaphysical thought is often described as the science of things, not of motion. Basing itself upon rigid classification techniques and seeing things as static entities, it is a useful tool in our day to day lives, but does not let us see things in their connections.

The formal logician operates within the limitation of three laws:

The Law of Identity – where A is equal to A

The Law of Contradiction – where A cannot be equal to non-A

The Law of Excluded Middle – where A must be equal to A, or must not be equal to A.

Formal logic sees cause and effect as opposites, but for Marxists the two categories merge, mix and melt into each other all the time.

Trotsky compared formal logic to dialectics using the analogy of a photograph and a moving film. The former has its uses, but as soon as we go into complex questions formal logic proves inadequate.

For instance we can say ours is a capitalist society and all will agree.

But viewing it dialectically as a bourgeois society in an advanced stage of development, we have to add that it still possesses remnants of feudalism, while more importantly it contains in its technological potential, the seeds for a Socialist planned economy. This example is not abstract.

Marxists use the dialectical method in order to clarify perspectives. All realities have more than one side to them.

What stage has British capitalism reached, what character will the recession have, how powerful is the working class, what is the role of New Labour, where and when do we expect big industrial struggles to break out… all these questions and many more can only be answered by analysing society dialectically.

The laws of the dialectic

"Dialectics is nothing more than the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought." (Engels: ‘Anti-Duhring.’)

BASED UPON the laws of motion, dialectics enables us to see things in their connection. Our bodies and our thoughts are continually changing. From conception to death there is never a moment when our physical development is still. Neither are our thoughts and mental growth. We are always evolving our ideas.

But how specifically do dialectics apply in relation to a study of society? What are the general laws of dialectical materialism beyond the primary idea that everything changes? If dialectics is the theoretical toolkit of Marxists, what do the tools look like and how do they assist us in challenging capitalism and changing society?

Marx and Engels elaborated three broad and interconnected laws of dialectics, each of which is continually at work and give us the insight into how society develops and what theoretical and practical tasks confront us as revolutionaries seeking to build the forces to overthrow capitalism.

The law of quantity and quality

Just as a scientist is familiar with the concept of things altering their quality at certain quantitative points (water into steam at boiling point), so too an observation of the evolution of class societies illustrates the same law.

Society does not develop in a slow, evolutionary manner. The friction between the classes can and does create episodic periods of sharpened struggle leading to political and social crises, wars and revolutions. For a whole period the class struggle may appear to be at a low-ebb, low levels of industrial action, apparent disinterest in political struggle, etc.

Marxists however view events in an all-sided manner. On the surface there can be apparent stability, but a quantitative build-up of frustration and antagonism towards capitalism can break out suddenly, creating entirely new conditions for struggle and catching the bosses and their New Labour echoes completely by surprise. This law is vulgarly recognised by even some bourgeois philosophers who, usually after the event, refer sadly to "the straw that broke the camel’s back."

It has enormous consequences for Marxists. We analyse the build-up of class conflict and at all times intervene in the workers’ movement to build the ideas of Socialism to take advantage of these sudden changes and sharp turns.

The law does not always denote a progression of course. For many years we characterised the Stalinist bureaucracy in the former Soviet Union as a relative fetter upon the growth of the planned economy. By this we meant that despite the waste and corruption of the bureaucrats, there was still a potential for the planned economy to grow, albeit less efficiently than had the working class been in charge. By the 1960s command-style rule from the Kremlin was struggling to cope with the fresh challenges of a more technically advanced form of economy. Trotsky’s maxim that a planned economy needs workers’ control as a body needs oxygen became more relevant than ever. We observed this change and concluded that the bureaucracy had gone from being a relative fetter to an absolute fetter. Quantity had turned into quality.

From a study of all the declining economic statistics coming out of the USSR we began to draw theoretical rounded-out conclusions.

A society in economic, political and social crisis where the bureaucratic caste has become absolutely incapable of further playing any progressive role cannot stay in absolute stasis. A point was being rapidly reached where either the working class would have to overthrow the incubus of bureaucracy and carry through a political revolution, or there would occur a social counter-revolution leading to the restoration of capitalism; this possibility was predicted by Trotsky over 50 years earlier. The triumph of the latter with Yeltsin undoing all the remaining gains of the 1917 revolution marked a qualitative defeat for the working class in Russia and everywhere else.

The Interpenetration of Opposites

Dialectics applied to the class struggle does not have the same degree of precision as it does in the science laboratory. The role of individuals, political parties and social movements is not scientifically pre-ordained. A trade union leader might be a repected left-winger, but may capitulate when faced with a determined onslaught from the bosses. A moderate trade union leader may surprise himself or herself however and become much more "militant" than intended, when faced with mass pressure from below.

There are no absolutes in the class struggle! We often stress for instance that boom and slump are not antithetical categories as crude GCSE textbooks proclaim. Within every economic growth of capitalism are the seeds of future recession and vice versa. It is not slump alone, which causes workers to rebel against the class system. The very opposite may be the case, with workers feeling intimidated by the threat of widespread unemployment.

In a boom, workers can go on the offensive not only in order to recapture past gains that have been lost, but to win new victories around pay and conditions.

Trotsky illustrated this law in his analysis of the forces which made the Russian Revolution in 1917: "In order to realise the Soviet State, there was required a drawing together and mutual penetration of two factors belonging to completely different economic species; a peasant war – that is, a movement characteristic of the dawn of bourgeois development – and a proletarian insurrection, the movement signaling its decline. That is the essence of 1917". (History of the Russian Revolution.)

This "combined and uneven development" illustrates the complex manner in which societies develop. Application of the law of interpenetrating opposites is crucial in our clarification of the stage at which capitalism has reached, its future direction and our responses.

The Negation of the Negation

Described by Engels as "an extremely general, and for this very reason extremely far-reaching and important, law of development of nature, history and thought", the negation of the negation deals with development through contradictions which appear to annul, or negate a previous fact, theory, or form of existence, only to later become negated in its turn.

Capitalism’s economic cycle illustrates this law. Great wealth is created in the boom, only to become partially destroyed by episodic crises of over-production. These in turn create afresh the conditions for new booms, which assimilate and build upon previously acquired methods of production, before once again coming into contact and being partially negated by the limits of the market economy.

Everything, which exists, does so out of necessity. But everything perishes, only to be transformed into something else. Thus what is ‘necessary’ in one time and place becomes ‘unnecessary’ in another. Everything creates its opposite, which is destined to overcome and negate it.

The first human societies were classless societies based on the co-operation of the tribe. These were negated by the emergence of class societies basing themselves upon the developing material levels of wealth. Modern private ownership of the means of production and the nation state, which are the basic features of class society and originally marked a great step forward, now serve only to fetter and undermine the productive forces and threaten all the previous gains of human development.

The material basis exists now to replace the bosses’ system with socialism, the embryo of which is already contained in class society, but can never be realised until the working class negates capitalism.

Dialectical Materialism as a revolutionary theory

"Dialectics, so-called objective dialectics, prevails throughout nature.." (Engels: ‘Dialectics of Nature.’)

In the realm of science, explicitly or implicitly, the dialectical method continues to vindicate itself as a vital tool for progress. Apparently unrelated scientific disciplines have come to share visions and methodologies reflecting the real connectedness of our living universe.

Even the idealist philosopher Kant, writing before the time of Marx and Engels and who believed in a supreme being, was forced by experience to arrive unconsciously at a dialectical position. He argued that if the earth was something that had come into being, then its present geological, geographical and climatic states, its plants and animals too, must be something that had come into being. If this was the case, then earth must have had a history not only of co-existence in space but also a succession in time.

In particular, Darwin’s theory of evolution, the revolutionary significance of which was immediately understood by Marx and Engels, has itself become enriched and a more profound confirmation of dialectics of nature as a result of further study and practice.

Darwin demonstrated how evolution develops through natural selection, creating outrage among those for whom "God" determined all. But while he argued that "nature does not make a leap", the debates now raging among neo-Darwinists are about whether or not leaps take place and the nature of them.

Incorporating the science of genetics, new concepts such as MUTATION (the spontaneous formation of new variations in genetic make-up), GENE FLOW (the introduction of new genes into a population by immigration of breeding individuals) and GENETIC DRIFT (random gene changes in a population due to its limited size) as well as natural selection, have begun to be studied.

In a brilliant endorsement of dialectics as the science of sharp turns and sudden changes as opposed to gradualist development, it is now widely accepted that rate of evolutionary change can vary enormously. The theory of PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIA takes this idea a stage forward, maintaining that the development or appearance of a new species can be, in terms of geological time, instantaneous breaking an apprarently stable equilibrium.

This theory deals with rapid and sudden speciation and mass extinction of species, in the same way as Darwin spoke of the struggle for existence of individual varieties within a single species.

Modern scientific theories rest on a dialectic view of nature. Quantum mechanics, the theory on which all modern technology is based, rests on a unification of the two classical (apparently contradictory) concepts of wave motion and particle motion to produce a new deeper understanding of the nature of reality.

Theories of fundamental particles find themselves working on concepts which bridge the contradiction between matter and the space-time in which matter moves.

Towards a Socialist World.

" …the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men’s brains, not in man’s better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange.

They are to be sought not in the philosophy, but in the economics of each particular epoch." (Engels: ‘Socialism: Utopian & Scientific.’)

DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM is not a dull theory to be pondered over by erudite academics in their studies. It is a guide to action. For young workers and students seeking to understand capitalism and more importantly change it, it is an indispensable tool.

The so-called New World Order is daily proving to be less harmonious than the old one. Of the six billion people on Earth, almost 3.6 billion have neither cash nor credit to buy much of anything. A majority of people on the planet remain, at best, window shoppers. Although the development of giant corporations straddling continents and the existence of computer technologies underline the potential for the world planning of production and trade, capitalism remains a system based on wasteful competition between nation states where rival multinationals fight to improve market share, productivity and profit at our expense.

Great social revolutions in the past have been carried out by emerging minorities who best articulated the new economic and political needs of the rising class. History is made by conscious men and women, each driven by definite motives and desires. The struggle for Socialism is qualitatively different as it involves the conscious participation of the majority – the world’s working class and oppressed masses. Standing in our way is diseased capitalism.

Our task is to harness the indefatigable energy of the workers worldwide to throw off our exploitation, through the building of a mighty Socialist force. The dialectical method applied to every stage of the class struggle, illuminates our path, assists us in turning our ideas into a material force and brings closer the day when men and women can pass over from the realm of necessity into the realm of human freedom.

Hellinism

2010-01-21T21:52:00.003-08:00

Alexander's great conquests led to the end of the independence of most of the small city-states and the founding of huge empires ruled by dynasties of monarchs, with arbitrary powers and a massive bureaucracy; there was also a great deal of mixing of Greeks and non-Greeks because of the settlements of Greek armies and the founding of new cities, such as Alexandria and Antioch. So there were no longer small communities of self-governing citizens, but great administrative organizations controlling taxes, the judiciary, water and corn supplies, etc. In a time of universalism and individualism the world expanded, linked by a common language (Greek). Cults of the Olympian gods yielded to worship of the ruler; educated men turned to philosophy, others to the mystery-cults and private religious associations. Cults of Isis, Dionysus, Serapis became important; there was a tendency towards syncretism, fusing deities from several traditions to produce One God. Astrology, magic, and Fortune (or Chance: tyché ) grew in importance. There was little or no independent political life, but there was in general freedom of thought and religion. The centers of life were no longer assemblies and councils, but gymnasia (schools) and shrines of the mystery cults.

   The great monarchs built mighty libraries; the greatest was at Alexandria, founded in 308, which became a center for research in lit erature and science with a library of perhaps 700,000 scrolls. There were others at Antioch, Pergamum, and Rhodes. Athens became a university city, especially for the study of philosophy; Rhodes specialized in rhetoric. In Athens, Plato founded the Academy in 385; after the death of Aristotle, his pupil Theophrastus founded the Peripatetic school in 317 to continue Aristotelean philosophy; around 307 Epicurus began to teach in his Garden; Zeno of Citium, the founder of Stoicism, came to the city in 313 and by 302 was teaching in the Stoa. These four great philosophical schools, and others, continued study and teaching until dissolved by the emperor Justinian in 529 A.D.

Epicureanism
       Both Epicureanism and Stoicism sought to give ataraxia , or peace of mind. For Epicurus the aim of life was pleasure; the highest pleasure was absence of pain; pleasure of the mind was preferable to that of the body. The soul dies with the body, so we must not fear death or afterlife; the gods exist but do not concern themselves with humanity or natural phenomena (all of which can be explained scientifically); we should avoid public life and emotional commitments in order to escape the pains likely to be caused by them. The physical world was explained by the atomic theory adapted from Democritus.

Stoicism
       Stoicism. After the death of Zeno of Citium, the Stoic school was headed by Cleanthes and Chrysippus, and its teachings were carried to Rome in 155 by Diogenes of Babylon. There its tenets were made popu lar by Panaetius, friend of the great general Scipio Aemilianus, and by Posidonius, who was a friend of Pompey (see your textbook if you don't recognize these names); Cicero drew heavily on the works of both.

Roman Reader Epictetus, The Enchiridion
   Stoic ideas appear in the greatest work of Roman literature, Vergil's Aeneid , and later the philosophy was adopted by Seneca (c. 1-65 A.D.), Lucan (39-65; poet and associate of the Emperor Nero), Epictetus (c. 55-135; see passages from the Enchiridion ), and the Emperor Marcus Aurelius (born 121, Emperor 161-180; author of the Meditations ). Stoicism is perhaps the most significant philosophical school in the Roman Empire, and much of our contemporary views and popular mythologies about Romans are derived from Stoic principles.

Scepticism
       This is actually not a philosophical school, but one could generally group a number of Hellenistic schools under this rubric, including the Second Academy (Hellenistic Platonists), the Second Sophistic, the Cynics, the Skeptics, and so on, and, for the most part, the Stoics as well. What is important for our purposes is that all these schools to some degree or another espoused the idea that human beings cannot arrive at certain truth about anything (not all denied certainty was impossible, only that human beings could never be certain). Basically, life became this great guessing game: the lot of humanity is to be cast into a twilight world in which all that we know and think is either false or occupies some middle position between the false and the true (which was called the "probable," "readily believable," or the "verisimilar"). This comes to dominate thought in late antiquity; the first philosophical attacks Christianity levels against the thought of antiquity are refutations of sceptical principles. Of all the philosophies of antiquity, this is perhaps the most familiar to you: the skeptic principle of doubting everything became, in the modern era, the fundamental basis of the scientific method

Aristitle

2010-01-21T21:52:00.001-08:00

Aristotle represents for most of us an icon of difficult or abstruse philosophical thinking; to know Aristotle often provokes hushed whispers even from highly educated people. For all this reputation, though, Aristotle is actually quite an easy read, for the man thought with an incredible clarity and wrote with a superhuman precision. It really is not possible to talk about Western culture (or modern, global culture) without coming to terms with this often difficult and often inspiring philosopher who didn't get along with his famous teacher, Plato, and, in fact, didn't get along with just about everybody (no-one likes a know-it-all). We can say without exaggeration that we live in an Aristotelean world; wherever you see modern, Western science dominating a culture in any meaningful way (which is just about everywhere), Aristotle is there in some form.

   Aristotle was born at Stagira, in Thrace, in 384 B.C. His father was a physician to the king of Macedon, so science was in his background. At the age of seventeen, he went to Athens and joined Plato's school, where he stayed until Plato's death in 347. A few years later, he became the tutor to the young prince of Macedon, Alexander the Great. Although Alexander was a stellar pupil, Aristotle returned to Athens three years later, founded his own school, the Lyceum, and taught and studied there for twelve years. Because Alexander began conquering all of the known world, Macedonians became somewhat unwelcome in Athens and Aristotle was accordingly shown the door in 323. He died a year later.

   Although he studied under Plato, Aristotle fundamentally disagreed with his teacher on just about everything. He could not bring himself to think of the world in abstract terms the way Plato did; above all else, Aristotle believed that the world could be understood at a fundamental level through the detailed observation and cataloging of phenomenon. That is, knowledge (which is what the word science means) is fundamentally empirical. As a result of this belief, Aristotle literally wrote about everything: poetics, rhetoric, ethics, politics, meteorology, embryology, physics, mathematics, metaphysics, anatomy, physiology, logic, dreams, and so forth. We aren't certain if he wrote these works directly or if they represent his or somebody else's notes on his classes; what we can say for certain is that the words, "I don't know," never came out of his mouth. In addition to studying everything, Aristotle was the first person to really think out the problem of evidence. When he approached a problem, he would examine a.) what people had previously written or said on the subject, b.) the general consensus of opinion on the subject, c.) and a systematic study of everything else that is part of or related to the subject. In his treatise on animals, he studied over five hundred species; in studying government, he collected and read 158 individual constitutions of Greek states as his fundamental data. This is called inductive reasoning:observing as many examples as possible and then working out the underlying principles. Inductive reasoning is the foundation of the Western scientific method.

   Outside of the empirical method, three characteristics stand out in Aristotle's thought: the schematization of knowledge, the four causes, and the ethical doctrine of the mean.

   The Classification of Knowledge. Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of Aristoteleanism is the classification of knowledge according the objects of that knowledge. The Greeks for some time had been concerned about the nature of human knowledge; this concern is called epistemology, or the "study of knowledge." For a long time, Greek philosophy dealt with questions of certainty; how could one be certain of knowledge? Suppose everything was an illusion? Aristotle resolved the question by categorizing knowledge based on their objects and the relative certainty with which you could know those objects. For instance, certain objects (such as in mathematics or logic) permit you to have a knowledge that is true all the time (two plus two always equals four). These types of knowledge are characterized by certainty and precise explanations. Other objects (such as human behavior) don't permit certain knowledge (if you insult somebody you may not make them angry or you may make them angry). These types of knowledge are characterized by probability and imprecise explanations. Knowledge that would fall into this category would include ethics, psychology, or politics. Unlike Plato and Socrates, Aristotle did not demand certainty in everything. One cannot expect the same level of certainty in politics or ethics that one can demand in geometry or logic. In Ethics I.3, Aristotle defines the difference in the following way, "we must be satisfied to indicate the truth with a rough and general sketch: when the subject and the basis of a discussion consist of matters which hold good only as a general rule, but not always, the conclusions reached must be of the same order. . . . For a well-schooled man is one who searches for that degree of precision in each kind of study which the nature of the subject at hand admits: it is obviously just as foolish to accept arguments of probability from a mathematician as to demand strict demonstrations from an orator."

   The Four Causes. If you walk out of this class knowing anything really well, it should be this, for Aristotle's "four causes" stand at the heart of Western rationality and Western science. In order to know a thing, anything at all, Aristotle says that one must be able to answer four questions (Physics ).

   Plato looked at the world and saw nothing but change; he wondered how we can know anything at all when everything is in motion and change. Plato solved the problem by postulating an unchanging world of intelligible Forms or Ideas of which our world is but an imperfect copy. But Aristotle embraced the visible world of change and motion and sought all his life to describe the principles which bring about change and motion. 1 Therefore, the question that dominated his thought at all points was: what is the cause (in Greek, aitia , which also means "responsible factor" 2) of this particular change or motion that I'm observing? What causes this thing to come into existence? What causes it to pass out of existence? Aristotle was the first major thinker to base his thought and science entirely on the idea that everything that moves or changes is caused to move or change by some other thing.

   What causes motion and change in the universe? The four causes: a.) the material cause: the matter out of which a thing is made (clay is the material cause of a bowl); b.) the formal cause: the pattern, model, or structure upon which a thing is made (the formal cause of a bowl is "bowl-shaped"; the formal cause of a human is "human-shaped"); c.) the efficient cause: the means or agency by which a thing comes into existence (a potter is the efficient cause of a bowl); d.) the final (in Greek, telos ) cause: the goal or purpose of a thing, its function or potential (holding cereal and milk is the final cause of a bowl). The final cause is the most unscientific, but is far and away the most important "cause" of a thing as far as Aristotle was concerned. Aristotle's analysis of phenomenon and change, then, is fundamentally teleological.

   Aristotle's thought is consistently teleological: everything is always changing and moving, and has some aim, goal, or purpose (telos ). To borrow from a Newtonian physics, we might say that everything has potential which may be actualized (an acorn is potentially an oak tree; the process of change and motion which the acorn undertakes is directed at realizing this potential).

   The Doctrine of the Mean. The Four Causes are universally applicable. However, ethics is a science that admits of a high degree of uncertainty because of the infinite variety of human actions and motivations. Now, normally ethics seems to require absolute and unchanging principles ("Thou shalt not kill") which individuals depart from at their peril. The idea that ethics are "man-made" is a problematic idea (see the discussion of the Sophists in the Pre-Socratics chapter); the idea that it is the individual situation which dictates whether an action is right or wrong is, at least to early human society, downright revolutionary. But this is what Aristotle concluded and it fits in perfectly with his general empirical temperament. He works out an entire system of ethics based on the "mean" to serve as a guideline to human behavior.    There is no proper definition of any moral virtue, but rather every moral virtue stands in relationship to two opposing vices. Take courage. Courage is the opposite of cowardice. But, it is also the opposite of foolhardiness. Somewhere between foolhardiness and cowardice, that's where courage lies. What constitutes this "mean" between the two terms varies from situation to situation: what is courageous in one situation may be cowardly in another; what is foolhardy in one situation may be courageous in another. Therefore, every action needs to be judged according to all the relevant circumstances and situation. Aristotle called judging actions in this manner, "equity," and equity is the foundation of modern law and justice, and is absolutely critical in understanding foundational Christianity and its later permutations, such as the Protestant Reformation. But that's a story for another day.

Pluto

2010-01-21T21:51:00.002-08:00

   The most famous of Socrates's pupils was an aristocratic young man named Plato. After the death of Socrates, Plato carried on much of his former teacher's work and eventually founded his own school, the Academy, in 385. The Academy would become in its time the most famous school in the classical world, and its most famous pupil was Aristotle.

   We know much about Plato's teachings, because he wrote dialogues between Socrates and others that would explore philosophical issues. These dialogues would be used in his school as starting points for discussion; these discussions and Plato's final word on the dialogues have all been lost to us. The Platonic dialogues consist of Socrates asking questions of another and proving, through these questions, that the other person has the wrong idea on the subject. Initially, Plato seems to have carried on the philosophy of Socrates, concentrating on the dialectical examination of basic ethical issues: what is friendship? what is virtue? can virtue be taught? In these early Platonic dialogues, Socrates questions another person and proves, through these questions, that the other person has the wrong idea on the subject. These dialogues never answer the questions they begin with.

   However, Plato later began to develop his own philosophy and the Socrates of the later dialogues does more teaching than he does questioning. The fundamental aspect of Plato's thought is the theory of "ideas" or "forms." Plato, like so many other Greek philosphers, was stymied by the question of change in the physical world. Heraclitus had said that there is nothing certain or stable except the fact that things change, and Parmenides and the Eleatic philosophers claimed that all change, motion, and time was an illusion. Where was the truth? How can these two opposite positions be reconciled? Plato ingeniously combined the two; a discussion of Plato's theory of forms is below.

   The most famous of Plato's dialogues is an immense dialogue called The Republic , and, next to his account of Socrates's trial, The Apology , The Republic is one of the single most influential works in Western philosophy. Essentially, it deals with the central problem of how to live a good life; this inquiry is shaped into the parallel questions (a) what is justice in the State, or what would an ideal State be like, and (b) what is a just individual? Naturally these questions also encompass many others, such as how the citizens of a state should be educated, what kinds of arts should be encouraged, what form its government should take, who should do the governing and for what rewards, what is the nature of the soul, and finally what (if any) divine sanctions and afterlife should be thought to exist. The dialogue, then, covers just about every aspect of Plato's thought. There are several central aspects to the dialogue that sum up Platonic thought extremely well: a.) what the nature of justice is; b.) the nature of an ideal republic; and c.) the allegory of the cave and the divided line, both of which explain Plato's theory of forms.

   The Nature of Justice. The question which opens this immense dialogue is: what is justice? Several inadequate definitions are put forward, but the most emphatically presented definition is given by a young Sophist, Thrasymachus. He defines justice as whatever the strongest decide it is, and that the strong decide that whatever is in their best interest is just (review again the Athenian position in Melian Debate). Socrates dismisses this argument by proving that the strong rarely figure out what is in their best interest, and this can't be just since justice is a good thing.

   The Analogy of the Ideal Republic. After Thrasymachus leaves in a royal huff, Socrates starts the question all over again. If one could decide what a just state is like, one could use that as an analogy for a just person. Plato then embarks on a long exposition about how a state might embody the four great virtues: courage, wisdom, temperance, and justice. The remainder of the dialogue is a long exposition of what justice in a state is; this section is considered one of the first major, systematic expositions of abstract political theory . This type of thinking, that is, speculating about an ideal state or republic, is called "utopian" thinking (utopia is a Greek word which means "no-place").

   Plato (speaking through Socrates) divides human beings up based on their innate intelligence, strength, and courage. Those who are not overly bright, or strong, or brave, are suited to various productive professions: farming, smithing, building, etc. Those who are somewhat bright, strong, and especially courageous are suited to defensive and policing professions. Those who are extraordinarily intelligent, virtuous, and brave, are suited to run the state itself; that is, Plato's ideal state is an aristocracy, a Greek word which means "rule by the best." The lower end of human society, which, as far as Plato is concerned, consists of an overwhelming majority of people in a state, he calls the "producers," since they are most suited for productive work. The middle section of society, a smaller but still large number of people, make up the army and the police and are called "Auxiliaries." The best and the brightest, a very small and rarefied group, are those who are in complete control of the state permanently; Plato calls these people "Guardians." In the ideal state, "courage" characterizes the Auxiliaries; "wisdom" displays itself in the lives and government of the Guardians. A state may be said to have "temperance" if the Auxiliaries obey the Guardians in all things and the Producers obey the Auxiliaries and Guardians in all things. A state may be said to be intemperate if any of the lower groups do not obey one of the higher groups. A state may be said to be just if the Auxiliaries do not simply obey the Guardians, but enjoy doing so, that is, they don't grumble about the authority being exercised over them; a just state would require that the Producers not only obey the Auxiliaries and Guardians, but that they do so willingly.

   When the analogy is extended to the individual human being, Plato identifies the intellect with the Guardians, the spirit or emotions with the Auxiliaries, and the bodily appetites with the Producers. Therefore, an individual is courageous if his or her spirit is courageous and an individual is wise if his or her intellect is wise. Temperance occurs when the emotions are ruled over by the intellect, and the bodily appetites are ruled over by the emotions and especially the intellect. An individual may be said to be just when the bodily appetites and emotions are not only ruled over by the intellect, but do so willingly and without coercion.

   Does this arrangement satisfy you? Is this a fair division of the human soul? Is this a fair division of society? Before you even read Plato's critique of democracy, what do you think he would say about it? Would a democratic state be courageous, wise, temperate, and just based on the system Plato sets up here? What would Plato think of American democracy, which is based on elected representatives? What is the "democratic individual" and how does this creature come about? What happens to individuals in a democracy?

   The Allegory of the Cave and the Divided Line: Far and away the most influential passage in Western philosophy ever written is Plato's discussion of the prisoners of the cave and his abstract presentation of the divided line. For Plato, human beings live in a world of visible and intelligible things. The visible world is what surrounds us: what we see, what we hear, what we experience; this visible world is a world of change and uncertainty. The intelligible world is made up of the unchanging products of human reason: anything arising from reason alone, such as abstract definitions or mathematics, makes up this intelligible world, which is the world of reality. The intelligible world contains the eternal "Forms" (in Greek, idea ) of things; the visible world is the imperfect and changing manifestation in this world of these unchanging forms. For example, the "Form" or "Idea" of a horse is intelligible, abstract, and applies to all horses; this Form never changes, even though horses vary wildly among themselves—the Form of a horse would never change even if every horse in the world were to vanish. An individual horse is a physical, changing object that can easily cease to be a horse (if, for instance, it's dropped out of a fifty story building); the Form of a horse, or "horseness," never changes. As a physical object, a horse only makes sense in that it can be referred to the "Form" or "Idea" of horseness.

   Plato imagines these two worlds, the sensible world and the intelligible world, as existing on a line that can be divided in the middle: the lower part of the line consists of the visible world and the upper part of the line makes up the intelligible world. Each half of the line relates to a certain type of knowledge: of the visible world, we can only have opinion (in Greek: doxa); of the intelligible world we achieve "knowledge" (in Greek, epistemŽ). Each of these divisions can also be divided in two. The visible or changing world can be divided into a lower region, "illusion," which is made up of shadows, reflections, paintings, poetry, etc., and an upper region, "belief," which refers to any kind of knowledge of things that change, such as individual horses. "Belief" may be true some or most of the time but occasionally is wrong (since things in the visible world change); belief is practical and may serve as a relatively reliable guide to life but doesn't really involve thinking things out to the point of certainty. The upper region can be divided into, on the lower end, "reason," which is knowledge of things like mathematics but which require that some postulates be accepted without question, and "intelligence," which is the knowledge of the highest and most abstract categories of things, an understanding of the ultimate good.

Socretus

2010-01-21T21:51:00.000-08:00

History. The growing power of Athens had frightened other Greek states for years before the Peloponnesian War broke out in 431. During the war, Pericles died in the plague of Athens (429); fortunes of war varied until a truce was made in 421, but this was never very stable and in 415 Athens was persuaded by Alcibiades, a pupil of the Athenian teacher, Socrates, to send a huge force to Sicily in an attempt to take over some of the cities there. This expedition was destroyed in 413. Nevertheless Athens continued the war. In 411 an oligarchy ("rule by a few") was instituted in Athens in an attempt to secure financial support from Persia, but this did not work out and the democracy was soon restored. In 405 the last Athenian fleet was destroyed in the battle of Aegospotami by a Spartan commander, and the city was besieged and forced to surrender in 404. Sparta set up an oligarchy of Athenian nobles (among them Critias, a former associate of Socrates and a relative of Plato), which because of its brutality became known as the Thirty Tyrants. By 403 democracy was once again restored. Socrates was brought to trial and executed in 399.

Ancient Greece Plato
       Socrates (469-399), despite his foundational place in the history of ideas, actually wrote nothing. Most of our knowledge of him comes from the works of Plato (427-347), and since Plato had other concerns in mind than simple historical accuracy it is usually impossible to determine how much of his thinking actually derives from Socrates.

Ancient Greece Reader The Apology of Socrates
       The most accurate of Plato's writings on Socrates is probably the The Apology. It is Plato's account of Socrates's defense at his trial in 399 BC (the word "apology" comes from the Greek word for "defense-speech" and does not mean what we would think of as an apology). It is clear, however, that Plato dressed up Socrates's speech to turn it into a justification for Socrates's life and his death. In it, Plato outlines some of Socrates's most famous philosophical ideas: the necessity of doing what one thinks is right even in the face of universal opposition, and the need to pursue knowledge even when opposed.

       Socrates wrote nothing because he felt that knowledge was a living, interactive thing. Socrates' method of philosophical inquiry consisted in questioning people on the positions they asserted and working them through questions into a contradiction, thus proving to them that their original assertion was wrong. Socrates himself never takes a position; in The Apology he radically and skeptically claims to know nothing at all except that he knows nothing. Socrates and Plato refer to this method of questioning as elenchus , which means something like "cross-examination" The Socratic elenchus eventually gave rise to dialectic, the idea that truth needs to be pursued by modifying one's position through questioning and conflict with opposing ideas. It is this idea of the truth being pursued, rather than discovered, that characterizes Socratic thought and much of our world view today. The Western notion of dialectic is somewhat Socratic in nature in that it is conceived of as an ongoing process. Although Socrates in The Apology claims to have discovered no other truth than that he knows no truth, the Socrates of Plato's other earlier dialogues is of the opinion that truth is somehow attainable through this process of elenchus .

   The Athenians, with the exception of Plato, thought of Socrates as a Sophist, a designation he seems to have bitterly resented. He was, however, very similar in thought to the Sophists. Like the Sophists, he was unconcerned with physical or metaphysical questions; the issue of primary importance was ethics, living a good life. He appeared to be a sophist because he seems to tear down every ethical position he's confronted with; he never offers alternatives after he's torn down other people's ideas.

Ancient Greece Glossary Areté
       He doesn't seem to be a radical skeptic, though. Scholars generally believe that the Socratic paradox is actually Socratic rather than an invention of Plato. The one positive statement that Socrates seems to have made is a definition of virtue (areté): "virtue is knowledge." If one knows the good, one will always do the good. It follows, then, that anyone who does anything wrong doesn't really know what the good is. This, for Socrates, justifies tearing down people's moral positions, for if they have the wrong ideas about virtue, morality, love, or any other ethical idea, they can't be trusted to do the right thing.

Gita

2010-01-21T21:49:00.001-08:00

the Bhagavad Gita, more commonly known as the Gita, is part of the Itihaas scriputre Mahabharata. It is an extremely popular scripture.
If the Upanishads can be compared to the cow, the Gita is their milk. It is in the form of a dialogue between Lord Sri Krishna and the mighty Pandava warrior Arjuna.
The battlefield of Kurukshetra is its place of origin. Its central message is that one should discharge one's duty however hard and unpleasant it be - bravely and with selfless dedication.
Everyone of us has to perform his or her duty designated as Svadharma to please God, to serve the world and to repay one's debt to the society. Svadharma implies ambition commensurate with one's capacity and the necessary inclination as also the drive to achieve it. Our well being lies in performing our Svadharma. Paradharma, duty suitable for others but not for us, will positively harm us if chosen by us.

upanisads

2010-01-21T21:47:00.001-08:00

panishad means the inner or mystic teaching. The term Upanishad is derived from upa (near), ni (down) and s(h)ad (to sit), i.e., sitting down near. Groups of pupils sit near the teacher to learn from him the secret doctrine. In the quietude of the forest hermitages the Upanishad thinkers pondered on the problems of deepest concerns and communicated their knowledge to fit pupils near them. Samkara derives the word Upanishad as a substitute from the root sad, 'to loosen.,' 'to reach' or 'to destroy' with Upa and ni as prefixes and kvip as termination. If this determination is accepted, upanishad means brahma-knowledge by which ignorance is loosened or destroyed. The treatises that deal with brahma-knowledge are called the Upanishads and so pass for the Vedanta. The different derivations together make out that the Upanishads give us both spiritual vision and philosophical argument. There is a core of certainty which is essentially incommunicable except by a way of life. It is by a strictly personal effort that one can reach the truth.

The Upanishads more clearly set forth the prime Vedic doctrines like Self-realization, yoga and meditation, karma and reincarnation, which were hidden or kept veiled under the symbols of the older mystery religion. The older Upanishads are usually affixed to a particularly Veda, through a Brahmana or Aranyaka. The more recent ones are not. The Upanishads became prevalent some centuries before the time of Krishna and Buddha.

The main figure in the Upanishads, though not present in many of them, is the sage Yajnavalkya. Most of the great teachings of later Hindu and Buddhist philosophy derive from him. He taught the great doctrine of "neti-neti", the view that truth can be found only through the negation of all thoughts about it. Other important Upanishadic sages are Uddalaka Aruni, Shwetaketu, Shandilya, Aitareya, Pippalada, Sanat Kumara. Many earlier Vedic teachers like Manu, Brihaspati, Ayasya and Narada are also found in the Upanishads.

In the Upanishads the spiritual meanings of the Vedic texts are brought out and emphasized in their own right.

Vedas

2010-01-21T21:42:00.001-08:00

The Vedas are the ancient scriptures or revelation (Shruti) of the Hindu teachings. They manifest the Divine Word in human speech. They reflect into human language the language of the Gods, the Divine powers that have created us and which rule over us.

There are four Vedas, each consisting of four parts. The primary portion is the mantra or hymn section (samhita). To this are appended ritualistic teachings (brahmana) and theological sections (aranyaka). Finally philosophical sections (upanishads) are included. The hymn sections are the oldest. The others were added at a later date and each explains some aspect of the hymns or follows one line of interpreting them.

The Vedas were compiled around the time of Krishna (c. 3500 B.C.), and even at that time were hardly understood. Hence they are very ancient and only in recent times has their spiritual import, like that of the other mystery teachings of the ancient world, begun to be rediscovered or appreciated even in India. Like the Egyptian teachings they are veiled, symbolic and subtle and require a special vision to understand and use properly.

The great compiler of the Veda and Puranas was Vyasa Krishna Dwaipayana. He was said to be the twenty-eighth of the Vyasas or compilers of Vedic knowledge. He was somewhat older than the Avatar Krishna and his work continued after the death of Krishna. Perhaps he is symbolic of a whole Vedic school which flourished at that time, as many such Vedic schools were once prominent all over India and in some places beyond.

jainism

2010-01-21T21:40:00.000-08:00

Early History of Jain Dharma

Jainism traces its roots to a succession of 24 Jinas ("those who overcome", or conqueror) in ancient East India. The first Jina is traditionally believed to have been a giant who lived 8.4 million years ago. The most recent and last Jina was Vardhamana (a.k.a. Mahavira, "The Great Hero") He was born circa 550 BCE) and was the founder of the Jain community. He attained enlightenment after 13 years of deprivation. In 467 BCE, he committed the act of salekhana which is fasting to death. Each Jina has "conquered love and hate, pleasure and pain, attachment and aversion, and has thereby freed `his' soul from the karmas obscuring knowledge, perception, truth, and ability..."
Jainism contains many elements that are somewhat similar to parts of Hinduism and Buddhism. The world's almost 4 million Jains are almost entirely located in India. There are about 1,410 in Canada (1991 census).

Jainist beliefs and practices:

The universe exists as a series of layers, both heavens and hells. It had no beginning and will have no ending. It consists of:

	The supreme abode: This is located at the top of the universe and is where Siddha, the liberated souls, live.
	The upper world: 30 heavens where celestial beings live.
	Middle world: the earth and the rest of the universe.
	Nether world: 7 hells with various levels of misery and punishments
	The Nigoda, or base: where the lowest forms of life reside
	Universe space: layers of clouds which surround the upper world
	Space beyond: an infinite volume without soul, matter, time, medium of motion or medium of rest.

Everyone is bound within the universe by one's karma (the accumulated good and evil that one has done).

Moksha (liberation from an endless succession of lives through reincarnation) is achieved by enlightenment, which can be attained only through asceticism.

Jainism is based on three general principles called the three Ratnas (jewels). They are:

	Right faith.
	Right knowledge.
	Right action.

They are expected to follow five principles of living:

	Ahimsa: "non violence in all parts of a person -- mental, verbal and physical." ₃Committing an act of violence against a human, animal, or even vegetable generates negative karma which in turn adversely affects one's next life.
	Satya: speaking truth; avoiding falsehood
	Asteya: to not steal from others
	Brahma-charya: (soul conduct); remaining sexually monogamous to one's spouse only
	Aparigraha: detach from people, places and material things. Avoiding the collection of excessive material possessions, abstaining from over-indulgence, restricting one's needs, etc.

Jains follow a vegetarian diet. (At least one information source incorrectly states that they follow a frutarian diet -- the practice of only eating that which will not kill the plant or animal from which it is taken. e.g. milk, fruit, nuts.)

They often read their sacred texts daily.

Jains are recommended to pass through four stages during their lifetime:

	Brahmacharya-ashrama: the life of a student
	Gruhasth-ashrama: family life
	Vanaprasth-ashrama: family and social services
	Sanyast-ashrama: life as a monk; a period of renunciation

Divisions among Jains"

There are two groups of Jains:

	The Digambaras (literally "sky clad" or naked): Their monks carry asceticism to the point of rejecting even clothing (even when they appear in public).
	The Shvetambaras (literally "white clad"): their monks wear simple white robes. The laity are permitted to wear clothes of any color.

2010-01-21T21:37:00.003-08:00

History of Taoism:

Tao (pronounced "Dow") can be roughly translated into English as path, or the way. It is basically indefinable. It has to be experienced. It "refers to a power which envelops, surrounds and flows through all things, living and non-living. The Tao regulates natural processes and nourishes balance in the Universe. It embodies the harmony of opposites (i.e. there would be no love without hate, no light without dark, no male without female.)" ₂
The founder of Taoism is believed by many religious historians to be Lao-Tse (604-531 BCE), whose life overlapped that of Confucius (551-479 BCE). (Alternative spellings: Lao Tze, Lao Tsu, Lao Tzu, Laozi, Laotze, etc.). However other historians suggest that he is a synthesis of a number of historical figures. Others suggest that he was a mythical figure. Still others suggest that he lived in the 4th century BCE.
He was searching for a way that would avoid the constant feudal warfare and other conflicts that disrupted society during his lifetime. The result was his book: Tao-te-Ching (a.k.a. Daodejing). Others believe that he is a mythical character.
Taoism started as a combination of psychology and philosophy but evolved into a religious faith in 440 CE when it was adopted as a state religion. At that time Lao-Tse became popularly venerated as a deity. Taoism, along with Buddhism and Confucianism, became one of the three great religions of China. With the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1911, state support for Taoism ended. Much of the Taoist heritage was destroyed during the next period of warlordism. After the Communist victory in 1949, religious freedom was severely restricted. "The new government put monks to manual labor, confiscated temples, and plundered treasures. Several million monks were reduced to fewer than 50,000" by 1960. ₃ During the cultural revolution in China from 1966 to 1976, much of the remaining Taoist heritage was destroyed. Some religious tolerance has been restored under Deng Xiao-ping from 1982 to the present time.
Taoism currently has about 20 million followers, and is primarily centered in Taiwan. About 30,000 Taoists live in North America; 1,720 in Canada (1991 census). Taoism has had a significant impact on North American culture in areas of "acupuncture, herbalism, holistic medicine, meditation and martial arts..." ₃

Taoist concepts, beliefs and practices:

	Tao is the first-cause of the universe. It is a force that flows through all life.
	"The Tao surrounds everyone and therefore everyone must listen to find enlightenment." ₄
	Each believer's goal is to harmonize themselves with the Tao.
	Taoism has provided an alternative to the Confucian tradition in China. The two traditions have coexisted in the country, region, and generally within the same individual.
	The priesthood views the many gods as manifestations of the one Dao, "which could not be represented as an image or a particular thing." The concept of a personified deity is foreign to them, as is the concept of the creation of the universe. Thus, they do not pray as Christians do; there is no God to hear the prayers or to act upon them. They seek answers to life's problems through inner meditation and outer observation.
	In contrast with the beliefs and practices of the priesthood, most of the laity have "believed that spirits pervaded nature...The gods in heaven acted like and were treated like the officials in the world of men; worshipping the gods was a kind of rehearsal of attitudes toward secular authorities. On the other hand, the demons and ghosts of hell acted like and were treated like the bullies, outlaws, and threatening strangers in the real world; they were bribed by the people and were ritually arrested by the martial forces of the spirit officials." ₃
	Time is cyclical, not linear as in Western thinking.
	Taoists strongly promote health and vitality.
	Five main organs and orifices of the body correspond to the five parts of the sky: water, fire, wood, metal and earth.
	Each person must nurture the Ch'i (air, breath) that has been given to them.
	Development of virtue is one's chief task. The Three Jewels to be sought are compassion, moderation and humility.
	Taoists follow the art of "wu wei," which is to let nature take its course. For example, one should allow a river to flow towards the sea unimpeded; do not erect a dam which would interfere with its natural flow.
	One should plan in advance and consider carefully each action before making it.
	A Taoists is kind to other individuals, in part because such an action tends to be reciprocated.
	Taoists believe that "people are compassionate by nature...left to their own devices [they] will show this compassion without expecting a reward." ₅

The Yin Yang symbol:

This is a well known Taoist symbol. "It represents the balance of opposites in the universe. When they are equally present, all is calm. When one is outweighed by the other, there is confusion and disarray." ₄ One source explains that it was derived from astronomical observations which recorded the shadow of the sun throughout a full year. ₅ The two swirling shapes inside the symbol give the impression of change -- the only constant factor in the universe. One tradition states that Yin (the dark side) represents the breath that formed the earth. Yang (the light side) symbolizes the breath that formed the heavens.
One source states: "The most traditional view is that 'yin' represents aspects of the feminine: being soft, cool, calm, introspective, and healing... and "yang" the masculine: being hard, hot, energetic, moving, and sometimes aggressive. Another view has the 'yin' representing night and 'yang' day. ₅
Another source offers a different definition: A common misconception in the west is that "...yin is soft and passive and yang is hard and energetic. Really it is yang that is soft and yin that is hard, this is because yang is energetic and yin is passive. Yin is like a rock and yang is like water or air, rock is heavy and hard and air is soft and energetic." ₈
Allan Watts, describes the yin and yang as negative and positive energy poles: "The ideograms indicate the sunny and shady sides of a hill....They are associated with the masculine and the feminine, the firm and the yielding, the strong and the weak, the light and the dark, the rising and the falling, heaven and earth, and they are even recognized in such everyday matters as cooking as the spicy and the bland." _9,10
However, since nothing in nature is purely black or purely white, the symbol includes a small black spot in the white swirl, and a corresponding white spot in the black swirl.
Ultimately, the 'yin' and 'yang' can symbolize any two polarized forces in nature. Taosts believe that humans often intervene in nature and upset the balance of Yin and Yang.

About the name: Taoism or Daoism:

There are two commonly used systems for translating the Mandarin Chinese language into Roman letters:

	Wade-Giles: This system is commonly used in Taiwan and the U.S. The Chinese character for "Way" becomes "Tao," which leads to the English word "Taoism."
	Hanyu pinyin or Pinyin: This system was developed by the Chinese people and is now finding increased use worldwide. The "Way" becomes "Dao," which leads to the English word "Daoism." The "Dao" is pronounced like the "Dow" in "Dow-Jones Index."

We have chosen to emphasize the "Taoism" spelling. A Google search for "Taoism" returned 245,000 hits, whereas a search for "Daoism" returned only 35,000.

Tai Chi:

There is a long history of involvement by Taoists in various exercise and movement techniques. ₆ Tai chi in particular works on all parts of the body. It "stimulates the central nervous system, lowers blood pressure, relieves stress and gently tones muscles without strain. It also enhances digestion, elimination of wastes and the circulation of blood. Moreover, tai chi's rhythmic movements massage the internal organs and improve their functionality." Traditional Chinese medicine teaches that illness is caused by blockages or lack of balance in the body's "chi" (intrinsic energy). Tai Chi is believed to balance this energy flow

Quotations:

	"Be still like a mountain and flow like a great river." Lao Tse.
	"Without going out of your door, You can know the ways of the world. Without peeping through your window, you can see the Way of Heaven. The farther you go, The less you know. Thus, the Sage knows without traveling, Sees without looking, And achieves without struggle." Lao Tse.
	"Different Chinese philosophers, writing probably in 5-4 centuries B.C., presented some major ideas and a way of life that are nowadays known under the name of Taoism, the way of correspondence between man and the tendency or the course of natural world." Alan Watts, from his book: "Tao: The Watercourse Way."
	"We believe in the formless and eternal Tao, and we recognize all personified deities as being mere human constructs. We reject hatred, intolerance, and unnecessary violence, and embrace harmony, love and learning, as we are taught by Nature. We place our trust and our lives in the Tao, that we may live in peace and balance with the Universe, both in this mortal life and beyond." Creed of the Reform Taoist Congregation ₁
	"For more than two thousand years, Daoism has evolved in close interaction with the other major traditions of China--Confucianism, Buddhism, ethnic creeds, and popular religion--and adapted many of their features. To the present day, Daoism consists of a multiplicity of beliefs and practices, and continues to develop, as it has for the past millennia, through the interaction between differentiation and integration--the move to change in accordance with political, cultural, and economic developments versus the urge to create stability through belief systems, lineage lines, rituals, and myths." From the Amazon.com review of the book "Daoist Identity: History, lineage and ritual.

Buddism

2010-01-21T21:34:00.001-08:00

Buddhism is a philosophy of life expounded by Gautama Buddha ("Buddha" means "enlightened one"), who lived and taught in northern Inda in the 6th Century B.C. The Buddha was not a god and the philosophy of Buddhism does not entail any theistic world-view. The teachings of the Buddha are aimed solely to liberate sentient beings from suffering.
Gautama Buddha taught the four noble truths: that there is suffering, that suffering has a cause, that suffering has an end and that there is a path that leads to the end of suffering. He saw that all phenomena in life are impermanent and that our attachment to the idea of substantial and enduring self is an illusion which is the principle cause of suffering.
Freedom from self liberates the heart from greed hatred and delusion and opens the mind to wisdom and the heart to kindness and compassion.

hinduism

2010-01-21T21:29:00.003-08:00

The compound “Hindu philosophy” is ambiguous. Minimally it stands for a tradition of Indian philosophical thinking. However, it could be interpreted as designating one comprehensive philosophical doctrine, shared by all Hindu thinkers. The term “Hindu philosophy” is often used loosely in this philosophical or doctrinal sense, but this usage is misleading. There is no single, comprehensive philosophical doctrine shared by all Hindus that distinguishes their view from contrary philosophical views associated with other Indian religious movements such as Buddhism or Jainism on issues of epistemology, metaphysics, logic, ethics or cosmology. Hence, historians of Indian philosophy typically understand the term “Hindu philosophy” as standing for the collection of philosophical views that share a textual connection to certain core Hindu religious texts (the Vedas), and they do not identify “Hindu philosophy” with a particular comprehensive philosophical doctrine.
Hindu philosophy, thus understood, not only includes the philosophical doctrines present in Hindu texts of primary and secondary religious importance, but also the systematic philosophies of the Hindu schools: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta. In total, Hindu philosophy has made a sizable contribution to the history of Indian philosophy and its role has been far from static: Hindu philosophy was influenced by Buddhist and Jain philosophies, and in turn Hindu philosophy influenced Buddhist philosophy in India in its later stages. In recent times, Hindu philosophy evolved into what some scholars call “Neo-Hinduism,” which can be understood as an Indian response to the perceived sectarianism and scientism of the West. Hindu philosophy thus has a long history, stretching back from the second millennia B.C.E. to the present.

1. Introduction

“Hinduism” is a term used to designate a body of religious and philosophical beliefs indigenous to the Indian subcontinent. Hinduism is one of the world’s oldest religious traditions, and it is founded upon what is often regarded as the oldest surviving text of humanity: the Vedas. It is a religion practiced the world over. Countries with Hindu majorities include Bali, India, Mauritius and Nepal, though countries in Asia, Africa, Europe and the Americas have sizable minorities of practicing Hindus.
For historical and doctrinal reasons, some modern Indologists have adopted the convention of distinguishing between traditional Hinduism and “Neo-Hinduism” (cf. Hacker; Halbfass, India and Europe). Against this distinction, “Hinduism” is often reserved for some traditional philosophical and religious beliefs indigenous to the Indian subcontinent, and “Neo-Hinduism” is reserved for a modern set of religious and philosophical beliefs articulated by Indians who defined their religious views in contrast to a perceived Western preoccupation with scientism and sectarianism. For many Western educated individuals in the world today (particularly those who count themselves as “Hindus”), the philosophy captured under the term “Neo-Hinduism” designates their religious and philosophical belief set. While Neo-Hinduism is no doubt a part of the Hindu philosophical tradition, it constitutes a distinct development within the tradition. Here the terms “Neo-Hindu” and “Neo-Hinduism” will be used to single out this recent development of Hindu thought. “Hindu” and “Hinduism” will be used to designate any portion of the tradition. The label “Hindu philosophy” will be reserved for the philosophical elements of Hinduism.
The history of Hindu philosophy can be divided roughly into three, largely overlapping stages:

Hindu philosophy is difficult to narrow down to a definite doctrine because Hinduism itself, as a religion, resists identification with any well worked out doctrine. This may not be so surprising when we consider that the term “Hinduism” itself is not in traditional, pre-colonial Hindu literature. Prior to the modern period of history, authors that we think of as Hindus did not identify themselves by that title. The term itself is not rooted in any Indian language, but likely derives from the Persian term “sindhu,” cognate with the Latin “Indus,” used to refer to inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent (cf. Monier-Williams p.1298). Its historical usage is thus an umbrella term that identifies many related religious and philosophical traditions that are not clearly part of another Indian tradition, such as Buddhism and Jainism.
Owing to the geographical proximity of the views grouped under the term “Hinduism” we might expect that such views have some comprehensive doctrinal similarities. However, many of the ideas and practices commonly associated with Hinduism can be found in adjacent Indian religio-philosophical traditions, such as Buddhism and Jainism. Moreover, some of them are not common to all Hindu thinkers. The rich diversity of views within the Hindu tradition that overlap with non-Hindu views makes identifying “Hinduism” on the basis of a shared, comprehensive doctrine difficult if not impossible.

a. Defining Hinduism: Salient Features and False Starts

i. Karma

A common thesis associated with Hinduism is the view that events in a person’s life are determined by karma. The term literally means “action,” but in this context it denotes the moral, psychological spiritual and physical causal consequences of morally significant past choices. If it were the case that a belief in karma is common to all Hindu philosophies, and only Hindu philosophies, then we would have a clear doctrinal criterion for identifying Hinduism. This approach is unsuccessful because a belief in karma is common to many of India’s religious traditions—including Buddhism and Jainism. Moreover, it is not evident that it is embraced by all sources that we consider Hindu. For instance, the doctrine of karma seems to be absent from much of the Vedas. Karma is not a sufficient criterion of Hinduism, and it likely is not a necessary condition either.

ii. Polytheism

Polytheism, or the worship of many deities, is often identified as a distinctive feature of Hinduism. However, it is not true that all Hindus are polytheists. Indeed, many Hindus belong to sectarian traditions (such as Vaiṣṇavism, or Śaivism) that specify that only one deity (Viṣṇu, in the first case, or Śiva, in the second), or a very small set of deities, are genuine Gods, and subordinate the rest of the pantheon associated with Hinduism to the status of exalted beings. We could identify Hinduism as the set of religious views that recognize the divinity or exalted status of a core set of Indic deities, but this too would not provide a way to separate Hinduism from Buddhism and Jainism. Many “Hindu” deities, such as Brahmā (the Creator God), are recognized and treated as exalted beings and deities in the Buddhist Pāli Canon (cf. Majjhima Nikāya II.130; Saṃyutta Nikāya I.421-23). Likewise, the popular Hindu deity Kṛṣṇa is treated in the early Jain tradition as a Jain Ford Maker, and a tradition of worshiping the Goddess Lakṣmī (a goddess revered by Hindus as the consort of Viṣṇu) continues amongst Jains today (see Dundas pp. 98, 183). Belief in certain deities might constitute a necessary condition of Hinduism, but it is not a sufficient criterion.

iii. Puruṣārthas : dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa

Hinduism might be identified with a core set of values, commonly known in Hindu literature as the puruṣārthas , or ends of persons. The puruṣārthas are a set of four values: dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. “Dharma” in the Puruṣārtha scheme and throughout much of Hindu literature stands for the ethical or moral (in action, or in character, hence it is often translated as “duty”), “artha” for economic wealth, “kāma” for pleasure, and “mokṣa” for soteriological liberation from rebirth and imperfection. Hinduism, one might argue, is any religious view from the Indian subcontinent that recognizes that human beings ought to maximize the puruṣārthas at the appropriate time and in the appropriate ways. This approach will not do, for not all views that we consider Hindu recognize the validity of all of these values. While many of the systematic Hindu philosophical schools seem to be critical of kāma, understood as sensual pleasure, the early stage of one Hindu philosophical school—Pūrvamīmāṃsā—does not recognize the idea that there is anything like liberation as a possible end for individuals.
The puruṣārthas are important for any study of Indian thought, however, for they constitute the value-theoretic backdrop against which Indian thinkers articulated their views: typically, most all Indian philosophers recognized the validity of all four values, though some, like the Materialists (Cārvāka) are on record as holding that kāma or sensual pleasure is the only dharma or morality (Guṇaratna p.276), and that there is no such thing as liberation. Others such as the early Pūrvamīmāṃsā ignore the idea of personal liberation but emphasizes the importance of dharma. As all Hindu philosophical schools appear to recognize something that might count as “dharma” or morality, we might attempt to understand Hinduism in terms of its allegiance to a particular moral theory. This attempt to define Hinduism in terms of a simple doctrine fails, for some of what passes for dharma (ethics, morality or duty) in the context of particular schools of Hindu philosophical thought share much with non-Hindu, but Indian schools of thought. This is particularly apparent with in the case of the Hindu philosophical school of , whose moral theory shares much with Jainism, and with Buddhist Mahāyāna thought. Also, there is sufficient variation amongst the schools of Hindu philosophy on moral matters that makes defining Hindu philosophy solely on the basis of a shared moral doctrine impossible. If there is a core moral theory common to all Hindu schools, it is likely to be so thin that it will also be found as a component of other Indian religions. Thus, an ethical theory might be a necessary criterion of Hinduism, but it is insufficient.

iv. Varna (Caste)

Finally, one might attempt to identify Hinduism with the institution of a caste system that carves society into a specified set of classes whose natures dispose them and obligate them to certain occupations in life. More specifically, one might argue that Hinduism is any belief system wedded to the idea that any well ordered society is composed of four castes: Brahmins (priestly or scholarly caste), Kṣatriya (marshal or royal caste), Vaiśyas (merchant caste) and Sūdras (labor caste).
This approach to defining Hinduism is essentially a rehabilitation of the idea that some core moral doctrine cements Hinduism together. There are two problems with this approach that renders it unhelpful to identifying Hinduism. First, anyone familiar with Indian society will know that caste (“varna,” or more commonly “jāti”) is an Indian phenomenon that is not restricted to Hindu sections of society. One might argue that the approving use of the term “Brahmin” in Buddhist and Jain texts shows that even these socially critical movements were comfortable with a caste structured society provided that obligations and privileges accorded to the various castes were justly distributed (cf. Dhammapada ch. XXVI; cf. Sūtrakṛtānga I.xii.11-21). Secondly, and more importantly, it is not clear that caste is philosophically important to many schools that are conventionally understood under the heading of “Hindu philosophy.” Some schools, such as Yoga, appear to be implicitly critical of life in conventional society guided by the values of social and ecological domination, while some schools, such as Advaita Vedānta, are openly critical of the idea that caste morality has any relevance to a spiritually serious aspirant.

b. A Textual Definition of Hinduism and Hindu Philosophy

Because the term “Hinduism” has no roots in the self-conceptualization of people that we in retrospect label as “Hindus,” we are unlikely to find anything very significant in the way of philosophical doctrine that is essential to Hinduism. Yet, the term continues to be useful because it centers on a stance that separates Hindu thinkers from Buddhist, Jain, or Sikh thinkers. The stance in question is openness to the provisional validity of a core set of Hindu texts. At the center of the canon of Hindu texts is the Vedas, followed by a large body of literature of secondary religious importance, which largely derive their legitimacy from Vedic thought. Non-systematic Hindu philosophy is comprised of the philosophical elements of the primary and secondary bodies of canonical Hindu texts, while the systematic Hindu philosophies, which also adopt the congenial disposition towards the Vedas, find their definitive expressions in formal philosophical texts authored by professional philosophers. Finally, Neo-Hindu philosophy of late likewise adopts a positive disposition to the Vedas, and hence constitutes the latest offering in the history of Hindu philosophy.

2. Stage One: Non-Systematic Hindu Philosophy: The Religious Texts

a. The Four Vedas

The Vedas are a large corpus, originally committed to memory and transmitted orally from teacher to student. The term “veda” means “knowledge” or “wisdom” and embodies what was likely regarded by its original attendants as the sum-total of the knowledge of their people. On the basis of linguistic variations in the corpus, contemporary scholars are of the opinion that the Vedas were composed at various points during approximately a 900 year span that can be no later than 1500 B.C.E. to 600 B.C.E.. The Vedas are composed in an Indo-European language that is loosely referred to as Sanskrit, but much of it is in an ancient precursor to Sanskrit, more properly called Vedic.
The Vedic corpus is comprised of four works each called “Vedas.” The four Vedas are Ṛg Veda, Sāma Veda, Yajur Veda and Atharva Veda, respectively. Each of the four Vedas is edited into four distinct sections: Mantras, Brāhmanas, Āraṇyakas, and Upaniṣads.

i. Karma Khaṇḍa or Action Section of the Vedas

The main portion of the Veda (which the term “Veda” most properly refers to) consists of mantras, or sacred chants and incantations. A section called the Brāhmanas, which contains ritual instruction, and speculative discussions on the meaning of Vedic rituals, follows this. These first two portions comprise what is often called the karma khaṇḍa or “action portion” of the Vedas, or alternatively, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā (“former inquiry”). (The philosophical school of Pūrvamīmāṃsā takes its name from its focus on the early part of the Vedas.)
Many of the hymns of the karma khaṇḍa ask for special favors from deities, and emphasize the worldly rewards of artha (economic prosperity) and kāma (sensual pleasure) that come from propitiating gods through prescribed sacrifices. However, the earlier portion of the Vedas is not entirely devoid of lofty or philosophical significance. Many of the mantras resurface in the latter portion of the Vedas as dense expressions of metaphysical theses. Moreover, many portions of the karma khaṇḍa elaborate the significance of the various Vedic deities, which surpass the role that could be attributed to them in a polytheistic context. Instead, what one finds frequently is the elevation of a single deity to the level of the cosmic soul (for example, see the Śrī Rudra).
A recurrent cosmological and ethical vision appears to emerge in the karma khaṇḍa. This is the idea that the universe is a closed ethical system, supported by a system of reciprocal sacrifice and obligation. In this context, the karma khaṇḍa promotes the practice of animal sacrifices to the gods, to ensure that conditions on earth are livable and fruitful for all of its inhabitants. A related doctrine that begins to emerge in portions of the karma khaṇḍa is the four-fold caste system that sets out strict obligations for all to fulfill, along with the idea that the caste-social order is divinely ordained. This is most clearly related in the Puruṣa Sūkta, a section of mantras from the Ṛg Veda. According to the Puruṣa Sūkta, the universe, as we know it, is a result of the self-sacrifice of a Cosmic Person (an ultimate God, later identified with Viṣṇu or Śiva, depending upon sectarian contexts). Upon being bound and sacrificed by the gods, the various portions of the Cosmic Person become the various castes: the head becomes the Brahmins, the arms become the Ksatriya caste, the thighs become the Vaiśya caste, and the feet become the Sūdra caste. While the caste system may be a pervasively Indian phenomenon, the idea that the caste system is divinely ordained appears to be found in Hindu philosophies in proportion to the weight they give to the authority of the karma khaṇḍa.

ii. Jñana Khaṇḍa or Knowledge Section of the Vedas

The karma khaṇḍa is followed by the Āraṇyakas, or forest books, which for the most part eschew rituals, and are far more speculative. After the Āraṇyakas come the section of the Vedas known as the “ Upaniṣads,” which consist of a dialogue between a teacher and student on metaphysical, axiological and cosmological issues. Whereas the goal of the early portion of the Vedas is action, the goal of the latter portion of the Vedas is jñāna (knowledge) of Brahman (a neuter term for the Ultimate, depicted in the Upaniṣads as the ultimate God). Further, the Upaniṣads identify Brahman with Ātma (Self) and suggest that knowing this entity will save one from all sorrow (cf. Muṇdaka Upaniṣad 7) and result in liberation. Brahman or Ātma is additionally presented as the omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent entity hidden from plain view, but known through philosophical speculation that is driven by dissatisfaction with earthly rewards. This latter part of the Vedas is often referred to as the uttara mīmāṃsā (“higher inquiry”), or the vedānta, which means “end of the Vedas.” Alternatively, it is known as the jñāna khaṇḍa, or “knowledge portion” of the Vedas. (The Hindu schools known as Vedānta take their name from their focus on this portion of the Vedas). The sustained theme of the uttara mīmāṃsā is that the cosmos as we know it is the result of the causal efficacy of Brahman, or Ātma, that the results of works are ephemeral, and that knowledge of reality brings everlasting reward. The uttara mīmāṃsā is characterized by a pervasive dissatisfaction with ritual (cf. Muṇdaka Upaniṣad I.ii.10).
The specific relationship between the individual and Brahman, or Ātma, is a matter of controversy amongst commentators on the latter portions of the Vedas. Four major commentarial schools evolved to interpret the import of the later portions of the Vedas. This confirms the suspicion that the actual position of the Upaniṣads is less than clear, or at least debatable. (See Vedānta.)

b. Secondary Texts: Smṛti Literature

On many traditional Hindu accounts (specifically the account found in the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta schools), the Vedas are regarded as “śruti”, “heard” or revealed texts, and are contrasted with smṛti or remembered texts. The smṛti texts are far more numerous, but purport to be based upon the learning of the Vedas. Unlike the Vedas, the smṛtis were traditionally regarded as appropriate for general consumption, while the Vedas were regarded as the sole preserve of the high castes. The smṛti literature, as a rule, was originally authored in Sanskrit. Over time, however, translations into vernacular languages became popular, and additional texts were authored in vernaculars.
The tradition of smṛti literature stretches back to the end of the Vedic period, and in some ways is still very much alive today. The smṛti texts can all be read as attempting to unify the seemingly divergent goals of the action section of the Vedas (being morality, or dharma) and the knowledge section of the Vedas (being liberation or mokṣa). The overall strategy offered in the various smṛti texts is to affirm a moral scheme known traditionally as varna āśrama dharma, or the morality of caste (varna) and station in life (āśrama). This scheme reconciles the demands of dharma and mokṣa, as well as artha and kāma, by apportioning different stages of life to the pursuit of different ends. At the end of childhood, and before the beginning of adolescence, an individual is typically expected to be a celibate student (brahmacarya), and learn one caste’s ways. Then at an appropriate age they are to marry and become a householder (gṛhastha). During this stage an individual is permitted and expected to pursue the ends of kāma or sensual pleasure through married life and artha or economic prosperity through caste occupations. After raising a family, a couple is to retire to the forest and become forest dwellers (vānaprastha), to facilitate their transition from a life focused on kāma and artha to a life geared towards liberation. Finally, individuals give up all possessions, renounce society and become a ascetic (sannyāsa) at which point they are to focus solely on mokṣa or spiritual liberation.
There are three prominent varieties of smṛti literature that are important to the study of Hindu philosophy. Though they for the most part express and extol the doctrine of varna āśrama dharma, they are composed in different styles, and with different audiences in mind.

i. Itihāsas

The best known of the smṛti literature are the great Hindu epics, such as the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyana. The focal plot of the Mahābhārata is a fratricidal war between the children of two princes. The deity Kṛṣṇa figures prominently in this epic, as a mutual cousin of both warring factions, though he is not the protagonist. The Rāmāyana is an account of the life story of the crown prince Rāma up until he vanquishes the tyrant King Rāvana and successfully rescues his wife and the crown princess Sītā from Rāvana’s grips. Both Kṛṣṇa and Rāma are traditionally regarded as human incarnations of Viṣṇu. Both the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyana are grouped under the heading of itihāsa (‘thus spoken’) literature. The focal events of the two epics likely occurred between 1000 B.C.E. and 700 A.D. (Thapar p. 31) though the epics themselves appear to have gone through a long process of revision and evolution before their final Sanskrit versions appear on the scene in the first two centuries of the common era.
Itihāsas, though recorded in the form of a narrative, are littered with philosophical discussions on cosmology, and ethics. The most philosophically famous portion of the itihāsa literature is the Bhagavad Gītā. The Bhagavad Gītā forms a portion of the Mahābhārata, but owing to its importance in the tradition it is often regarded as a stand-alone text.

ii. Bhagavad Gītā

The Bhagavad Gītā consists of a discourse given by Kṛṣṇa on the eve of the battle of the fratricidal war of the Mahābhārata to his cousin Arjuna, who becomes despondent at the thought of engaging in a war whose main aim is resting control over the throne, at the expense of the destruction of his family. Kṛṣṇa exhorts Arjuna to do his duty as a Ksatriya and fight the war that he has been charged with (Bhagavad Gītā 2:31). For “[b]etter is one’s own duty, though ill done, than the duty of another well done….” (Bhagavad Gītā 18:47; cf. Manu X. 97). In keeping with the general theme of the smṛti literature, Kṛṣṇa focuses on reconciling the goal of mokṣa with that of dharma. Kṛṣṇa’s first solution to the problem of the conflict of dharma and mokṣa involves doing one’s duty with a strong deontological consciousness, which attends to duty for duty’s sake, and not for its rewards. This deontological attitude not only perfects moral action, on Kṛṣṇa’s account, but it also constitutes true renunciation, which is a prerequisite to mokṣa. Kṛṣṇa calls the deontological renunciation of rewards of dutiful action karma yoga, or the discipline (yoga) of action (karma) (Bhagavad Gītā ch.3). This is not the only type of yoga that Kṛṣṇa prescribes. He also propounds what he identifies as distinct yogas (Bhagavad Gītā chs. 4-11) that might be grouped under the heading of jñāna yoga, or the discipline (yoga) of knowledge (jñāna), whereby one develops a detached attitude towards the fruits of works through knowledge of the excellences and unchanging nature of the transcendent (sometimes spoken of as “Brahman” in this text), and the ephemeral and temporary nature of worldly accomplishments. To this end, Kṛṣṇa calls upon the philosophy of Sāṅkhya and Yoga, as well as the philosophical concepts of the Upaniṣads to explicate the nature of the changing and the transcendent. Finally, Kṛṣṇa also prescribes what he calls bhakti yoga or the “discipline (yoga) of devotion (bhakti)” (Bhagavad Gītā chs. 12-18). Whereas in karma yoga, one merely gives up fruits of actions, in bhakti yoga one offers the fruits of one’s actions to God. Whereas in jñāna yoga one pursues knowledge for its own sake, in bhakti yoga one pursues knowledge for the sake of a loving relationship with the Ultimate. Kṛṣṇa appears to hold that any of the ways that he prescribes will result in liberation for all three varieties of yogas will ensure that the obstacle to liberation—attachment to fruits of actions—is over come.

iii. Purāṇas

“Purāna” means history and is the term applied to a group of texts that share a few features: (a) they typically provide a detailed history of the origin of the various gods and the Universe, and (b) they are written in praise of the exploits of a particular deity. Unlike the itihāsas, the Purāṇas are not restricted to incarnations of deities, but describe the activities of the deities, including their incarnations. The Purāṇa literature comes down to us from a time that post dates the composition of the Vedas, though their precise dates of composition are not known (cf. Thapar p.29). There are many Purāṇas, though the most famous is likely the Bhāgavata Purāṇa.
The Bhāgavata Purāṇa is distinguished amongst Purāṇas for being regarded by Gaudiya Vaiṣṇavism, founded by the medieval Bengali saint Caitanya, as the ultimate revelation on all doctrinal matters. This tradition has come into prominence in recent times in the form of the International Society for Kṛṣṇa Consciousness, commonly known as the Hare Kṛṣṇa movement. According to the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Ultimate (Brahman) is both identical with and distinct from creation: on this account, Brahman converts itself into the universe but maintains a distinct identity all the same. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa also identifies Viṣṇu with Brahman, and holds that bhakti (devotion) is the chief means of attaining liberation, which consists in the personal absorption of the individual (jīva) in Brahman. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa thus presents one of the famous and enduring theistic expressions of the Bhedābheda philosophy. In the way of ethics, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa strays little from the Varna āśrama dharma found in most smṛti literature (Bhāgavata Purāṇa I.ii.9-12), though it advocates what it calls “bhāgavata dharma” (bhāgavata ethic) which is a combination of the karma yoga and bhakti yoga of the Gītā supplemented with an emphasis on living the life characteristic of a devotee of Kṛṣṇa as described in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa (XI.iii.23-31).

iv. Dharmaśāstra

The term “dharmaśāstra” literally means treaties or science (śāstra) of dharma. The term refers to a corpus of literature clearly authored by Brahmins with the aim of reinforcing a particular conception of Varna āśrama dharma: a moral theory that critics will note ensures that Brahmins are allotted a privileged or crowning position in the caste scheme. The dharmaśāstras contain many features of other smṛti literature that make them philosophically interesting.
Like the Purāṇa literature, many of the dharmaśāstras provide accounts of the origins of the universe, and sometimes they delve into the question of the means to liberation. Their dominant concern however is to prescribe the specific duties and privileges of each caste. After attending to the political question of the proper ordering of society, the dharmaśāstras typically focus on the matter of prayaścitta, or ritual expiation (see Kane vol.4 ch.1 pp. 1-40).
The idea of ritual expiation can be understood as a procedure concerned with alleviating ritual impurity. However, it also has clear moral implications: prayaścittas are prescribed for every manner of offence, and if an agent undertakes the appropriate prayaścitta, they can atone for their moral transgressions. A prayaścitta can take the form of a ritual, an act of charity, or corporal punishment. The idea that one can ritually atone for moral transgressions is unique to the dharmaśāstras, and related texts in the history of Hindu philosophy.

3. Stage Two: Systematic Hindu Philosophy: the Darśanas

Core Hindu canonical texts—the Vedas—form the textual backdrop against which many of the systematic Hindu philosophies are articulated. However, they do not exhaust the import of Hindu philosophy for two main reasons. First, the Vedas are not composed with the intention of being systematic treaties on philosophical issues. They leave many issues of philosophy relatively untouched. Secondly, the core Hindu canonical texts are not canonical in the same way for all Hindus. By and large, those we tend to regard as Hindu accord some type of provisional authority to both the Vedas, and the secondary Vedic literature. However, the authority accorded is something that Hindu thinkers have disagreed upon. Some of the foundational works in systematic Hindu philosophy do not explicitly mention the Vedas (for example, the Sāṅkhya Kārikā), leaving the impression that these schools were tolerant of the authority of the Vedas, but not philosophically wedded to it in any deep sense.
The term “darśana” in Sanskrit translates as “vision” and is conventionally regarded as designating what we are inclined to look upon as systematic philosophical views. The history of Indian philosophy is replete with darśanas. The number of darśanas to be found in the history of Indian philosophy depends largely on the organizational question of how one is to enumerate darśanas: how much difference between expressions of philosophical views can be tolerated before we are inclined to count texts as expressing distinct darśanas? The question seems particularly pertinent in cases like Buddhist and Jain philosophy, which have all had rich philosophical histories. The issue is relatively easier to settle in the context of Hindu philosophy, for a convention has developed over the centuries to count systematic Hindu philosophy as being comprised of six (āstika, or Veda recognizing) darśanas. The six darśanas are: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Pūrvamīmāṃsā, and Vedānta.
As a rule, systematic Indian philosophy (Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism) was recorded in Sanskrit, the pan-Indian language of scholarship, after the end of the Vedic period. While scholars are confident about the approximate dates that the texts of systematic Indian philosophy handed down to us were written (cf. Potter, “Bibliography,” Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies, vol.1) scholars are not in many cases as confident about the age of the schools themselves. Moreover, most of the schools of Hindu philosophy have existed side by side. Thus, the order of explication of the systematic schools of Hindu philosophy follows the conventional order of explication and not any particular historical order.

a. Nyāya

The term “nyāya” traditionally had the meaning “formal reasoning,” though in later times it also came to be used for reasoning in general, and by extension, the legal reasoning of traditional Indian law courts. Opponents of the Nyāya school of philosophy frequently reduce it to the status of an arm of Hindu philosophy devoted to questions of logic and rhetoric. While reasoning is very important to Nyāya, this school also had important things to say on the topic of epistemology, theology and metaphysics, rendering it a comprehensive and autonomous school of Indian philosophy.
The Nyāya school of Hindu philosophy has had a long and illustrious history. The founder of this school is the sage Gautama (2nd cent. C.E.)—not to be confused with the Buddha, who on many accounts had the name “Gautama” as well. Nyāya went through at least two stages in the history of Indian philosophy. At an earlier, purer stage, proponents of Nyāya sought to elaborate a philosophy that was distinct from contrary darśanas. At a later stage, some Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika authors (such as Śaṅkara-Misra, 15th cent. C.E.) became increasingly syncretistic and viewed their two schools as sister darśanas. As well, at the latter stages of the Nyāya tradition, the philosopher Gaṅgeśa (14th cent. C.E.) narrowed the focus to the epistemological issues discussed by the earlier authors, while leaving off metaphysical matters and so initiated a new school, which came to be known as Navya Nyāya, or “New” Nyāya. Our focus will be mainly on classical, non-syncretic, Nyāya.
According to the first verse of the Nyāya-Sūtra, the Nyāya school is concerned with shedding light on sixteen topics: pramāna (epistemology), prameya (ontology), saṃśaya (doubt), prayojana (axiology, or “purpose”), dṛṣṭānta(paradigm cases that establish a rule), Siddhānta (established doctrine), avayava (premise of a syllogism), tarka (reductio ad absurdum), nirnaya (certain beliefs gained through epistemically respectable means), vāda (appropriately conducted discussion), jalpa (sophistic debates aimed at beating the opponent, and not at establishing the truth), vitaṇḍa(a debate characterized by one party’s disinterest in establishing a positive view, and solely with refutation of the opponent’s view), hetvābhāsa (persuasive but fallacious arguments), chala (unfair attempt to contradict a statement by equivocating its meaning), jāti (an unfair reply to an argument based on a false analogy), and nigrahasthāna (ground for defeat in a debate) (Nyāya-Sūtra and Vātsyāyana’s Bhāṣya I.1.1-20).
With respect to the question of epistemology, the Nyāya-Sūtra recognizes four avenues of knowledge: these are perception, inference, analogy, and verbal testimony of reliable persons. Perception arises when the senses make contact with the object of perception. Inference comes in three varieties: pūrvavat (a priori), śeṣavat (a posteriori) and sāmanyatodṛṣṭa (common sense) (Nyāya-Sūtra I.1.3–7).
The Nyāya’s acceptance of both arguments from analogy and testimony as means of knowledge, allows it to accomplish two theological goals. First, it allows Nyāya to claim that the Veda’s are valid owing to the reliability of their transmitters (Nyāya-Sūtra II.1.68). Secondly, the acceptance of arguments from analogy allows the Nyāya philosophers to forward a natural theology based on analogical reasoning. Specifically, the Nyāya tradition is famous for the argument that God’s existence can be known for (a) all created things resemble artifacts, and (b) just as every artifact has a creator, so too must all of creation have a creator (Udayanācārya and Haridāsa Nyāyālaṃkāra I.3-4).
The metaphysics that pervades the Nyāya texts is both realistic and pluralistic. On the Nyāya view the plurality of reasonably believed things exist and have an identity independently of their contingent relationship with other objects. This applies as much to mundane objects, as it does to the self, and God. The ontological model that appears to pervade Nyāya metaphysical thinking is that of atomism, the view that reality is composed of indecomposable simples (cf. Nyāya-Sūtra IV.2.4.16).
Nyāya’s treatment of logical and rhetorical issues, particularly in the Nyāya Sūtra, consists in an extended inventory acceptable and unacceptable argumentation. Nyāya is often depicted as primarily concerned with logic, but it is more accurately thought of as being concerned with argumentation.

b. Vaiśeṣika

The Vaiśeṣika system was founded by the ascetic, Khaṇḍa (1st cent. C.E.). His name translates literally as “atom-eater.” On some accounts Khaṇḍa gained this name because of the pronounced ontological atomism of his philosophy (Vaiśeṣika Sūtra VII.1.8), or because he restricted his diet to grains picked from the field. If the Nyāya system can be characterized as being predominantly concerned with matters of argumentation, the Vaiśeṣika system can be characterized as overwhelmingly concerned with metaphysical questions. Like Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika in its later stages turned into a syncretic movement, wedded to the Nyāya system. Here the focus will be primarily on the early Vaiśeṣika system, with the help of some latter day commentaries.
Khaṇḍa’s Vaiśeṣika Sūtra’s opening verses are both dense and very revealing about the scope of the system. The opening verse states that the topic of the text is the elaboration of dharma (ethics or morality). According to the second verse, dharma is that which results not only in abhyudaya but also the Supreme Good (niḥreyasa), commonly known as mokṣa (liberation) in Indian philosophy (Vaiśeṣika Sūtra I.1.1-2). The term “abhyudaya” designates the values extolled in the early, action portion of the Vedas, such as artha (economic prosperity) and kāma (sensual pleasure). From the second verse it thus appears that the Vaiśeṣika system regards morality as providing the way for the remaining puruṣārthas . A reading of the obscure third verse provided by the latter day philosopher Śaṅkara-Misra (15th cent. C.E.) states that the validity of the Vedas rests on the fact that it is an explication of dharma. (Misra’s alternative explanation is that the phrase can be read as asserting that the validity of the Vedas derives from the authority of its author, God—this is a syncretistic reading of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, influenced by Nyāya philosophy.) (Śaṅkara-Misra’s Vaiśeṣika Sūtra Bhāṣya I.1.2, p.7).
From the densely worded fourth verse, it appears that the Vaiśeṣika system regards itself as an explication of dharma. The Vaiśeṣika system holds that the elaboration or knowledge of the particular expression of dharma (which is the Vaiśeṣika system) consists of knowledge of six categories: substance (dravya), attribute (guṇa), action (karma), genus (sāmānya), particularity (viśeṣa), and the relationship of inherence between attributes and their substances (samavāya) (Vaiśeṣika Sūtra I.1.4).
The dense fourth verse of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra gives expression to a thorough going metaphysical realism. On the Vaiśeṣika account, universals (sāmānya) as well as particularity (viśeṣa) are realities, and these have a distinct reality from substances, attributes, actions, and the relation of inherence, which all have their own irreducible reality.
The metaphysical import of the fourth verse potentially obscures the fact that the Vaiśeṣika system sets itself the task of elaborating dharma. Given the weight that the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra gives to ontological matters, it is inviting to treat its insistence that it seeks to elaborate dharma as quite irrelevant to its overall concern. However, subsequent authors in the Vaiśeṣika tradition have drawn attention to the significance of dharma to the overall system.
Śaṅkara-Misra suggests that dharma understood in its particular presentation in the Vaiśeṣika system is a kind of sagely forbearance or withdrawal from the world (Śaṅkara-Misra’s Vaiśeṣika Sūtra Bhāṣya I.1.4. p.12). In a similar vein, another commentator, Chandrakānta (19th cent. C.E.), states:

Dharma presents two aspects, that is under the characteristic of Pravṛitti or worldly activity, and the characteristic of Nivṛitti or withdrawal from worldly activity. Of these, Dharma characterized by Nivṛitti, brings forth tattva–jñana or knowledge of truths, by means of removal of sins and other blemishes. (Chandrakānta p.15.)

Thus the view of the commentators appears to be that the Vaiśeṣika system, which yields “knowledge of truths,” “knowledge of the categories,” or “knowledge of the essences” (cf. Śaṅkara-Misra, p.5) is a moral virtue of the person who is initiated into the system—that is, a “particular dharma” of that person. Hence, in elaborating the nature of reality, the Vaiśeṣika system seeks to extinguish the ignorance that obstructs the effects of dharma, and it thus also constitutes a moral virtue of the proponent of the Vaiśeṣika system. This virtue will not only yield the fruits of works, such as kāma and artha (which the Vaiśeṣika sage will know to appreciate at a distance) but it will also yield the highest good: mokṣa.

c. Sāṅkhya

The term “Sāṅkhya” means ‘enumeration’ and it suggests a methodology of philosophical analysis. On many accounts, Sāṅkhya is the oldest of the systematic schools of Indian philosophy. It is attributed to the legendary sage Kapila of antiquity, though we have no extant work left to us by him. His views are recounted in many smṛti texts, such as the Bhāgavata Purāṇa and the Bhagavad Gītā, but the Sāṅkhya system appears to stretch back to the end of the Vedic period itself. Key concepts of the Sāṅkhya system appear in the Upaniṣads (Kaṭha Upaniṣad I.3.10–11), suggesting that it is an indigenous Indian philosophical school that developed congenially in parallel with the Vedic tradition. Its relative antiquity appears to be confirmed by the references to the school in classical Jain writings (for instance, Sūtrakṛtānga I.i.1.13), which are known for their antiquity. Unlike many of the other systematic schools of Hindu philosophy, the Sāṅkhya system does not explicitly attempt to align itself with the authority of the Vedas (cf. Sāṅkhya Kārikā 2).
The oldest systematic writing on Sāṅkhya that we have is Īśvarakṛṣna’s Sāṅkhya Kārikā (4th cent. C.E.). In it we have the classic Sāṅkhya ontology and metaphysic set out, along with its theory of agency.
According to the Sāṅkhya system, the cosmos is the result of the mutual contact of two distinct metaphysical categories: Prakṛti (Nature), and Puruṣa (person). Prakṛti, or Nature, is the material principle of the cosmos and is comprised of three guṇas, or “qualities.” These are sattva, rajas, and tamas. Sattva is illuminating, buoyant and a source of pleasure; rajas is actuating, propelling and a source of pain; tamas is still, enveloping and a source of indifference (Sāṅkhya Kārikā 12-13).
Puruṣa, in contrast, has the quality of consciousness. It is the entity that the personal pronoun “I” actually refers to. It is eternally distinct from Nature, but it enters into complex configurations of Nature (biological bodies) in order to experience and to have knowledge. According to the Sāṅkhya tradition, mind, mentality, intellect or Mahat (the Great one) is not a part of the Puruṣa, but the result of the complex organization of matter, or the guṇas. Mentality is the closest thing in Nature to Puruṣa, but it is still a natural entity, rooted in materiality. Puruṣa, in contrast, is a pure witness. It lacks the ability to be an agent. Thus, on the Sāṅkhya account, when it seems as though we as persons are making decisions, we are mistaken: it is actually our natural constitution comprised by the guṇas that make the decision. The Puruṣa does nothing but lend consciousness to the situation (Sāṅkhya Kārikā 12-13, 19, 21).
The contact of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, on the Sāṅkhya account, is not a chance occurrence. Rather, the two principles make contact so that Puruṣa can come to have knowledge of its own nature. A Puruṣa comes to have such knowledge when sattva, the illuminating guṇa, assumes a governing position in a bodily constitution. The moment that this knowledge comes about, a Puruṣa becomes liberated. The Puruṣa is no longer bound by the actions and choices of its body’s constitution. However, liberation consists in the end of karma tying the Puruṣa to Prakṛti: it does not coincide with the complete annihilation of past karma, which would consist in the disentangling of a Puruṣa from Prakṛti. Hence, the Sāṅkhya Kārikā likens the self-realization of the Puruṣa to a potter’s wheel, which continues to spin down, after the potter has ceased putting energy to keep the wheel in motion (Sāṅkhya Kārikā 67).
Students of ancient Western philosophy are apt to note that the Sāṅkhya guṇas, and the dualistic theory of personhood, appear to have echos in Plato (4th cent. B.C.E.). Plato held that the body is the casing of the soul (though Plato, at Phaedo 81 and Phaedrus 250c suggests it is a prison, which the Sāṅkhya system does not), and that the embodied soul is composed of three characteristics: an earthy quality geared toward menial tasks that is appetitive (corresponding to bronze), a high-spirited quality geared towards accomplishment and competition (silver), and a reflective or rational portion that is in a position to put in order the constitution of the soul (gold) (Republic 3.415, 4.435–42). Prima facie, the bronze quality appears to correspond to tamas, silver to rajas, and sattva to gold. Owing to the antiquity of the Sāṅkhya system, it is historically implausible that it was influenced by Platonistic thought. This of course invites the contrary proposal, that Plato was influenced by the Sāṅkhya system. While Indian philosophers had an important impact on the course of ancient Greek philosophy (through Pyrrho of Elis, who traveled to India in the 3rd cent. B.C.E. and was impressed by a type of dialectic nihilism characteristic of some Buddhist philosophies, promoted by gymnosophists—naked wise people—who resemble Jain monks) (see Flintoff), there is no historical evidence to suggest that Sāṅkhya thought made its way to ancient Greece. This suggests that both Plato (4th cent. B.C.E.), and the Sāṅkhya system (dating back to the 6th cent. B.C.E. in the Vedas) articulate an ancient Indo-European philosophical perspective that predates both Plato and the Sāṅkhya system, if the similarities between the two are not purely coincidental.

d. Yoga

The Yoga tradition shares much with the Sāṅkhya darśana. Like the Sāṅkhya philosophy, traces of the Yoga tradition can be found in the Upaniṣads. While the systematic expression of the Yoga philosophy comes to us from Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtra, it comes relatively late in the history of philosophy (at the end of the epic period, roughly 3rd century C.E.), the Yoga philosophy is also expressed in the Bhagavad Gītā. The Yoga philosophy shares with Sāṅkhya its dualistic cosmology. Like Sāṅkhya, the Yoga philosophy does not attempt to explicitly derive its authority from the Vedas. However, Yoga departs from Sāṅkhya on an important metaphysical and moral point—the nature of agency—and from Sāṅkhya in its emphasis on practical means to achieve liberation.
Like the Sāṅkhya tradition, the Yoga darśana holds that the cosmos is the result of the interaction of two categories: Prakṛti (Nature) and Puruṣa (Person). Like the Sāṅkhya tradition, the Yoga tradition is of the opinion that Prakṛti, or Nature, is comprised of three guṇas, or qualities. These are the same three qualities extolled in the Sāṅkhya system—tamas, rajas, and sattva—though the Yoga Sūtra refers to many of these by different terms (cf. Yoga Sūtra II.18). As with the Sāṅkhya system, liberation in the Yoga system is facilitated by the ascendance of sattva in a person’s mind, which permits enlightenment on the nature of the self.
A relatively important point of cosmological difference is that the Yoga system does not consider the Mind or the Intellect (Mahat) to be the greatest creation of Nature. A major difference between the two schools concerns Yoga’s picture of how liberation is achieved. On the Sāṅkhya account, liberation comes about by Nature enlightening the Puruṣa, for Puruṣas are mere spectators (cf. Sāṅkhya Kārikā 62). In the contexts of the Yoga darśana, the Puruṣa is not a mere spectator, but an agent: Puruṣa is regarded as the “lord of the mind” (Yoga Sūtra IV.18): for Yoga it is the effort of the Puruṣa that brings about liberation. The empowered account of Puruṣa in the Yoga system is supplemented by a detail account of the practical means by which Puruṣa can bring about its own liberation.
The Yoga Sūtra tells us that the point of yoga is to still perturbations of the mind—the main obstacle to liberation (Yoga Sūtra I.2). The practice of the Yoga philosophy comes to those with energy (Yoga Sūtra I.21). In order to facilitate the calming of the mind, the Yoga system prescribes several moral and practical means. The core of the practical import of the Yoga philosophy is what it calls the Astāṅga yoga (not to be confused with a tradition of physical yoga also called Astāṅga Yoga, popular in many yoga centers in recent times). The Astāṅga yoga sets out the eight (aṣṭa) limbs (anga) of the practice of yoga (Yoga Sūtra II.29). The eight limbs include:

yama – abstention from evil-doing, which specifically consists of abstention from harming others (Ahiṃsā), abstention from telling falsehoods (asatya), abstention from acquisitiveness (asteya), abstention from greed/envy (aparigraha); and sexual restraint (brahmacarya)
niyamas – various observances, which include the cultivation of purity (sauca), contentment (santos) and austerities (tapas)
āsana – posture
prāṇāyāma – control of breath
pratyāhāra – withdrawal of the mind from sense objects
dhāranā– concentration
dhyāna – meditation
samādhi – absorption [in the self] (Yoga Sūtra II.29-32)

According to the Yoga Sūtra, the yama rules “are basic rules…. They must be practiced without any reservations as to time, place, purpose, or caste rules” (Yoga Sūtra II.31). The failure to live a morally pure life constitutes a major obstacle to the practice of Yoga (Yoga Sūtra II.34). On the plus side, by living the morally pure life, all of one’s needs and desires are fulfilled:

When [one] becomes steadfast in… abstention from harming others, then all living creatures will cease to feel enmity in [one’s] presence. When [one] becomes steadfast in… abstention from falsehood, [one] gets the power of obtaining for [oneself] and others the fruits of good deeds, without [others] having to perform the deeds themselves. When [one] becomes steadfast in… abstention from theft, all wealth comes.… Moreover, one achieves purification of the heart, cheerfulness of mind, the power of concentration, control of the passions and fitness for vision of the Ātma [self, or Puruṣa]. “(Yoga Sūtra II.35–41)

The steadfast practice of the Astāṅga yoga results in counteracting past karmas. This culminates in a milestone-liberating event: dharmameghasamādhi (or the absorption in the cloud of virtue). In this penultimate state, the aspirant has all their past sins washed away by a cloud of dharma (virtue, or morality). This leads to the ultimate state of liberation for the yogi, kaivalya (Yoga Sūtra IV.33). “Kaivalya” translates as “aloneness.”
Critics of the Yoga system charge that it cannot be accepted on moral grounds for it has as its ultimate goal a state of isolation. On this view, kaivalya is understood literally as a state of social isolation (see Bharadwaja). The defender of the Yoga Sūtra can point out that this reading of “kaivalya” takes the final event of liberation in the Yoga system out of context. The penultimate event that paves way for the state of kaivalya is a wholly moral event (dharmameghasamādhi) and the path that leads to this morally perfecting event is itself an intrinsically moral endeavor (Astāṅga yoga, and particularly the yamas). If the concept of ‘kaivalya’ is to be understood in the context of the Yoga system’s preoccupation with morality, it seems that it must be understood as a function of moral perfection. Given the uncommon journey that the yogi takes, it is also natural to conclude that the state of kaivalya is the state characterized by having no peers, owing to the radical shift in perspective that the yogi attains through yoga. The yogi, at the point of kaivalya, no longer sees things from the perspective of individuals in society, but from the perspective of the Puruṣa. This arguably is the yogi’s loneliness.

e. Pūrvamīmāṃsā

The Pūrvamīmāṃsā school of Hindu philosophy gains its name from the portion of the Vedas that it is primarily concerned with: the earlier (pūrva) inquiry (Mīmāṃsā), or the karma khaṇḍa. In the context of Hinduism, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā school is one of the most orthodox of the Hindu philosophical schools because of its concern to elaborate and defend the contents of the early, ritually oriented part of the Vedas. Like many other schools of Indian philosophy, Pūrvamīmāṃsā takes dharma (“duty” or “ethics”) as its primary focus (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra I.i.1). Unlike all other schools of Hindu philosophy, Pūrvamīmāṃsā did not take mokṣa, or liberation, as something to extol or elaborate upon. The very topic of liberation is nowhere discussed in the foundational text of this tradition, and is recognized for the first time by the medieval Pūrvamīmāṃsā author Kumārila (7th cent. C.E.) as a real objective worth pursuing in conjunction with dharma (Kumārila V.xvi.108–110).
The school of philosophy known as Pūrvamīmāṃsā has its roots in the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, written by Jaimini (1st cent. C.E.). The Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, like the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra, begins with the assertion that its main concern is the elaboration of dharma. The second verse tells us that dharma (or the ethical) is an injunction (codana) that has the distinction (lakṣaṇa) of bringing about welfare (artha) (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra I.i.1-2).
The Pūrvamīmāṃsā system is distinguished from other Hindu philosophical schools—but for the Vedānta systems—in its view that the Vedas are epistemically foundational. Foundationalism is the view that certain knowledge claims are independently valid (which means that no further justificatory reasons are either possible or necessary to justify these claims), and moreover, that these independently valid knowledge claims are able to serve as justifications for beliefs that are based upon them. Such independently valid knowledge claims are thought to be justificatory foundations of a system of beliefs. While all Hindu philosophical schools recognize the validity of the Vedas, only the Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta systems explicitly regard the Vedas as foundational, and being in no need of further justification: “… instruction [in the Vedas] is the means of knowing it (dharma)—infallible regarding all that is imperceptible; it is a valid means of knowledge, as it is independent…” (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra I.i.5). The justificatory capacity of the Vedas serves to ground the smṛti literature, for it is the sacred tradition based on the Vedas (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra I.iii.2). If a smṛti text conflicts with the Vedas, the Vedas are to be preferred. When there is no conflict, we are entitled to presume that the Vedas stand as support for the smṛti text (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra I.iii.3).
Pūrvamīmāṃsā perhaps more than any other school of Indian philosophy made a sizable contribution to Indian debates on the philosophy of language. Some of Pūrvamīmāṃsā’s distinctive linguistic theses impact on theological matters. One distinctive thesis of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā tradition is that the relationship between a word and its referent is “inborn” and not mediated by authorial intention (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra I.i.5). The second view is that words, or verbal units (śabda), are eternal existents. This view contrasts sharply with the view taken by the Nyāya philosophers, that words have a temporary existence, and are brought in and out of existence by utterance (Nyāya Sūtra II.ii.13, cf. Mīmāṃsā Sūtra I.i.6-11). The commentator Śabara (5th cent. C.E.) explains the Pūrvamīmāṃsā view thus:

…the word is manifested (not produced) by human effort; that is to say, if, before being pronounced, the word was not manifest, it becomes manifested by the effort (or pronouncing). Thus it is found that the fact of words being “seen after effort” is equally compatible with both views.… The Word must be eternal;—why?—because its utterance is for the purpose of another…. If the word ceased to exist as soon as uttered then no one could speak of any thing to others…. Whenever the word “go” (cow) is uttered, there is a notion of all cows simultaneously. From this it follows that the word denotes the Class. And it is not possible to create the relation of the Word to a Class; because in creating the relation, the creator would have to lay down the relation by pointing to the Class; and without actually using the word “go” (which he could not use before he has laid down its relation to its denotation) in what manner could he point to the distinct class denoted by the word “go”…. (Śabara Bhāṣya on Mīmāṃsā Sūtra I.i.12-19, pp. 33–38)

Hence, the only solution to the problem of how words have their meaning, on the Pūrvamīmāṃsā account, is that they have them eternally. If they do not have their meaning eternally and independent of subjective associations between referents and words, communication would be impossible. These strikingly Platonistic positions on the nature of meaning allows the Pūrvamīmāṃsā tradition to argue that the Vedas are an eternally existing, unauthored corpus, and that it’s validity is beyond reproach: “… if the Veda be eternal its denotation cannot but be eternal; and if it be non-eternal (caused), then it can have no validity…” (Kumārila XXVII–XXXII, cf. V.xi.1).
Views in the history of Hindu philosophy that contrast with the Pūrvamīmāṃsā view, on the question of the source and nature of the Vedas, is the view implicit in the Nyāya Sūtra, and stated more clearly by the later syncretic Vaiśeṣika (and Nyāya) author Śaṅkara-Misra (Vaiśeṣika Sūtra Bhāṣya, p.7): the Vedas is the testimony of a particular person (namely God). This is a view that also appears to be echoed in the theistic schools of Vedānta, such as Viśiṣṭādvaita, where God is alluded to as the author of the Vedas (cf. Rāmānuja’s Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya 18:58).

f. Vedānta

Like the Pūrvamīmāṃsā tradition, the Vedānta school is concerned with explicating the contents of a particular portion of the Vedas. While the Pūrvamīmāṃsā concerns itself with the former portion of the Vedas, the Vedānta school concerns the end (anta) of the Vedas. Whereas the principal concern of the earlier portion of the Vedas is action and dharma, the principal concern of the latter portion of the Vedas is knowledge and mokṣa.
Philosophies that count technically as expressions of the Vedānta philosophy find their classical expression in a commentary on a synopsis of the Upaniṣads. The synopsis of the contents of the Upaniṣads is called the Vedānta Sūtras, or the Brahma Sūtras, and its author is Bādarāyana (1st cent. C.E.). The latter portion of the Vedas is a vast corpus that does not elaborate a single doctrine in the manner of a monograph. Rather, it is a collection of speculative texts of the Vedas with overlapping themes and images. A common thread that runs through most of the Upaniṣads is a concern to elaborate the nature of the Ultimate, or Brahman, Ātma or the Self (often equated in these texts with Brahman) and what in the subsequent tradition is known as the jīva, or the individual psychological unity. The Upaniṣads are relatively clear that Brahman stands to creation as its source and support, but its unsystematic nature leaves much to be specified in the way of doctrine. While Bādarāyana’s Brahma Sūtra is the systematization of the teachings of the Upaniṣads, many of the verses of the Brahma Sūtra are obscure and unintelligible without a commentary.
Owing to the cryptic nature of the Brahma Sūtra itself, many commentarial subtraditions have evolved in Vedānta. As a result, it is possible to misleadingly use the term “Vedānta” as though it stood for one comprehensive doctrine. Rather, the term “Vedānta” is best understood as a term embracing within it divergent philosophical views that have a common textual connection: their classical expression as a commentary on Bādarāyana’s text.
There are three famous commentaries (Bhāṣyas) on the Brahma Sūtra that shine in the history of Hindu philosophy. These are the 8th century C.E. commentary of Śaṅkara (Advaita) the 12th century C.E. commentary of Rāmānuja (Viśiṣṭādvaita) and the 13th century C.E. commentary by Madhva (Dvaita). These three are not the only commentaries. There appears to have been no less than twenty-one commentators on the Brahma Sūtra prior to Madhva (Sharma, vol.1 p.15), and Madhva is by no means the last commentator on the Brahma Sūtra either. Important names in the history of Indian theology are amongst the latter day commentators: Nimbārka (13th cent. C.E.), Śrkaṇṭha(15th cent. C.E.), Vallabha (16th cent. C.E.), and Baladeva (18th cent. C.E.). However, the majority of the commentaries prior to Śaṅkara have been lost to history. The philosophical positions expressed in the various commentaries fall into four major camps of Vedānta: Bhedābheda, Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Dvaita. They principally differ on the metaphysics of individual selves and Brahman, though there are also some striking ethical differences between these schools as well.

i. Bhedābheda

According to the Bhedābheda view, Brahman converts itself into the created, but yet maintains a distinct identity. Thus, the school holds that Brahman is both different (bheda) and not different (abheda) from creation and the individual jīva.
The philosophical persuasion that has produced the most commentaries on the Brahma Sūtra is the Bhedābheda philosophy. Textual evidence suggests that all of the commentaries authored prior to Śaṅkara’s famous Advaita commentary on the Brahma Sūtra subscribed to a form of Bhedābheda, which one historian calls “Pantheistic Realism” (Sharma, pp. 15-7). And on natural readings, it appears that most of the remaining commentators (but for the three famous commentators) also promulgate an interpretation of the Brahma Sūtra that falls within the Bhedābheda camp.

ii. Commonalities of the Three Famous Commentaries

While the three major commentators on the Brahma Sūtra’s differ on important metaphysical questions like the nature and relationship of Brahman to creation and jīvas, or the important moral questions on the priority of Vedic morality, there are some common views that they all share.
All of the three major schools of Vedānta hold that the Vedas are the ultimate source of knowledge of Brahman, and that the Vedas have an independent validity, not reducible or contingent upon the validity of any other means of knowledge (Śaṅkara’s, Rāmānuja’s and Madhva’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣyas, I.i.1-3). This interpretation of the Brahma Sūtra pits the Vedānta tradition against the Nyāya optimism about natural theology. For the major schools of Vedānta, natural reason cannot, on its own, arrive at knowledge of the existence of God (Brahman). (For a detailed criticism of the Nyāya natural theology, see Rāmānuja’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya pp. 162-74.)
Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara both regard the individual jīva as being uncreated, and having no beginning (Śaṅkara’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya II.iii.16; Rāmānuja’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya II.iii.18). Madhva concurs that individual souls are eternal, but yet insists that it is correct to regard Brahman as the source of individual souls (Madhva’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya II.iii.19).
The three major commentators on the Brahma Sūtra see eye to eye on the nature of the individual as agent. According to Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva, the individual, or jīva, is an agent, with desires and goals. However, in and of itself, it has no power to make its will manifest. Brahman, on all three accounts, steps in and grants the fruits of the desires of an individual. Thus while on this account individuals are agents, they are really also quite impotent. (Śaṅkara’s and Rāmānuja’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣyas I.iii.41; Madhva’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya II.iii.42). All three authors are sensitive to the fact that Brahman’s help in bringing about the fruits of desires of individuals implicates Brahman in the evils of the world, and hence opens up the problem of evil. The theodicy of all three relies upon the doctrine of the eternality of the individual jīva. Since there is always some prior choice and action on the part of the individual according to which Brahman has to dispense consequences, at no point can Brahman be accused of partiality, cruelty, or making persons choose the things that they do (Śaṅkara’s and Rāmānuja’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣyas II.i.34; Madhva Bhāṣya II.i.35, iii.42).
Finally, Rāmānuja and Śaṅkara both appear to take a position on the propriety of animal sacrifices as prescribed in the Vedas that is reminiscent of the Pūrvamīmāṃsā deferral to the Vedas on all matters of morality. According to both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, animal sacrifices cannot be regarded as evils for they are enjoined in the Vedas, and the Vedas is the ultimate authority on such matters (Śaṅkara’s and Rāmānuja’s Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya III.i.25). Madhva in contrast is reputed to have been a staunch opponent of animal sacrifices, who held that such rituals are a result of a corruption of the Vedic tradition. He interprets the Brahma Sūtra in such a way that the question of animal sacrifices does not arise.

iii. Advaita

Combining the negative particle “a” with the term “dvaita” creates the term “advaita”. The term “dvaita” is often translated as “dualism” as the term “advaita” is often translated as “non-dualism.” In the case of Dvaita Vedānta, this convention of translation is misleading, for Dvaita Vedānta does not, like the Sāṅkhya system, propound a metaphysical dualism. Indeed, Dvaita Vedānta holds an explicitly pluralistic metaphysics. Rather, “dvaita” in the context of Vedānta nomenclature is an ordinal, meaning “secondness.” Dvaita Vedānta, thus, holds that there is such a thing as secondness—something extra, that comes after the first: Brahman. Advaita Vedānta, in contrast, holds that Brahman is one without a second. “Advaita” can thus be translated as “monism,” “non-duality” or most perspicuously as “non-secondness” (Hacker p.131n21).
The principal author in the Advaita tradition is Śaṅkara. In addition to writing several philosophical works, Śaṅkara the commentator on the Brahma Sūtra, set up four monasteries in the four corners of India. Successive heads of the monasteries, according to tradition, take Śaṅkara’s name. This has contributed to great confusion about the views that Śaṅkara, the commentator on the Brahma Sūtras held, for many of his successors also authored philosophical works with the same name. On the basis of comparing writing style, vocabulary, and the colophons of the various works attributed to “Śaṅkara,” the German philologist and scholar of Indian philosophy, Paul Hacker, has concluded that only a portion of the works attributed to Śaṅkara are by the author of the commentary on the Brahma Sūtras (Hacker pp. 41-56). These genuine works include commentaries on the Upaniṣads, and a commentary on the Bhagavad Gītā. The following explication will be restricted to such works.
It is commonly held that Śaṅkara argued that the common sense, empirical world as we know it is an illusion, or māyā. The term “māyā” does not figure prominently in the genuine writings of Śaṅkara. However, it is an accurate assessment that Śaṅkara holds that the majority of our beliefs about the reality of a plurality of objects and persons are ultimately false.
Śaṅkara’s philosophy and criticism of common sense rests on an argument unique to him in the history of Indian philosophy—an argument that Śaṅkara sets at the outset of his commentary on the Brahma Sūtra. From this argument from superimposition, the ordinary human psyche (which self identifies with a body, a unique personal history, and distinguishes itself from a plurality of other persons and objects) comes about by an erroneous superimposition of the characteristics of subjectivity (consciousness, or the sense of being a witness), with the category of objects (which includes the characteristics of having a body, existing at a certain time and place and being numerically distinct from other objects). According to Śaṅkara, these categories are opposed to each other as night and day. And hence, the conflation of the two categories is fallacious. However, it is also a creative mistake. As a result of this superimposition, the jīva (individual person) is constructed complete with psychological integrity, and a natural relationship with a body (Śaṅkara Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya, Preamble to I.i.1). All of this is brought about by beginningless nescience (avidyā)—a creative factor at play in the creation of the cosmos.
In reality, all there really is on Śaṅkara’s account is Brahman: objects of its awareness, such as the entire universe, exist within the realm of its consciousness. The liberation of the individual jīva occurs when it undoes the error of superimposition, and no longer identifies itself with a body, or a particular person with a natural history, but with Brahman.
It is worth stressing that Śaṅkara’s view is not a form of subjective idealism, or solipsism in any ordinary sense. For those sympathetic to Śaṅkara’s account, superimposition is an objective occurrence that happens most anywhere there is an ordinary organism with a living body. However, Śaṅkara’s system is properly characterized as a form of Absolute Idealism, for on its account only the undifferentiated Absolute is ultimately real, while affairs of the world are its thoughts.
Śaṅkara’s Advaita tradition is known for giving a nuanced, and two-part account of the ‘self’ and ‘Brahman.’ On Śaṅkara’s account, there is a lower and higher self. The lower self is the jīva, while the higher self (the real referent of the personal pronoun “I,” used by anyone) is the one real Self: Ātma, which on Śaṅkara’ s account is Brahman. Likewise, on Śaṅkara’s account, there is a lower and a higher Brahman (Śaṅkara Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya IV.3.16. pp. 403-4). The lower Brahman is the personal God that pious devotees pray to and meditate on, while the Higher Brahman is devoid of most all such qualities, is impersonal, and is characterized as being essentially bliss (ānanda) (Śaṅkara Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya III.3.14) truth (satyam) knowledge (jñānam) and infinite (anantam) (cf. Śaṅkara, Taittitrīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya II.i.1.). The lower Brahman, or the personal God that people pray to, can be afforded the title of “Brahman” owing to its proximity to the Highest Brahman: in the world of plurality, it is the closest thing to the Ultimate (Śaṅkara Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya IV.3.9). However, it too, like the concept of the individual person, is a result of the error of superimposing the qualities of objectivity and subjectivity on each other (Śaṅkara, Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya IV.3.10). In the Advaita tradition, the lower Brahman is known as the saguṇa Brahman (or Brahman with qualities) while the highest Brahman is known as the nirguṇa Brahman (or Brahman without qualities) (Śaṅkara Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya III.2.21).
Śaṅkara takes a skeptical attitude towards the importance of dharma, or morality. On Śaṅkara’s account, so long as one exists as a construction of necessience, operating under the erroneous assumption that one is a distinct object from Brahman and other objects, then one ought to follow the Vedas and its injunctions regarding dharma for it will help form tendencies to look within (Śaṅkara, Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya on 18:66). However, for the serious aspirant, Śaṅkara regards dharma as an impediment to liberation—it too must be abandoned, lest an individual reinforce their self-identification with a body in contradistinction to other bodies and persons (Śaṅkara, Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya on 4:21). Those sympathetic to Śaṅkara’s philosophy often regard Śaṅkara’s skepticism about dharma as a liberal and progressive aspect to his philosophy, for it devalues the importance of Vedic dharma, which contains within it caste morality. Critics of Śaṅkara are likely to regard Śaṅkara’s skepticism about the importance of dharma as troubling, not because it implies that we should forsake Vedic dharma, but because it suggests that we ought to give up moral concerns, altogether, for the sake of spiritual pursuits (lest we fall back into the fallacy of superimposition).

iv. Viśistādvaita

The term “Viśiṣṭādvaita” is often translated as “Qualified Non-Dualism.” An alternative, and more informative, translation is “Non-duality of the qualified whole,” or perhaps ‘Non-duality with qualifications.” The principal exponent of this school of Vedānta is Rāmānuja, who attempted to eschew the illusionist implications of Advaita Vedānta, and the perceived logical problems of the Bhedābheda view while attempting to reconcile the portions of the Upaniṣads that affirmed a substantial monism and those that affirmed substantial pluralism. Rāmānuja’s solution to his problematic is to argue for a theistic and organismic conception of Brahman.
The theism of Rāmānuja’s Viśiṣṭādvaita shows up in his insistence that Brahman is a specific deity (Viṣṇu, also known as “Nārāyana”) who is an abode of an infinite number of auspicious qualities. The organismic aspect of Rāmānuja’s model consists in his view that all things that we normally consider as distinct from Brahman (such as individual persons or jīvas, mundane objects, and other unexalted qualities) constitute the Body of Brahman, while the Ātman spoken of in the Upaniṣads is the non-body, or mental component of Brahman. The result is a metaphysic that regards Brahman as the only substance, but yet affirms the existence of a plurality of abstract and concrete objects as the qualities of Brahman’s Body and Soul (Vedārthasaṅgraha §2).
Rāmānuja holds that in the absence of stains of passed karma the jīva (individual person) resembles Brahman in being of the nature of consciousness and knowledge (Rāmānuja, Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya, I.i.1. “Great Siddhānta” pp. 99-102). Past actions cloud our true nature and force us to act out their consequences. On Rāmānuja’s account, the prime way of extricating ourselves from the beginningless effects of karma involves bhakti, or devotion to God. But bhakti on its own is not sufficient, or at least, bhakti if it is to bring about liberation must either be combined with the karma yoga mentioned in the Bhagavad Gītā, or it must turn into bhakti yoga. For attending to one’s dharma (duty) is the chief means by which one can propitiate God, on Rāmānuja’s account (Rāmānuja, Gītā Bhāṣya, XVIII.47 p.583). Moreover, in attending to one’s dharma in the deontological spirit characteristic of karma yoga and consonant with bhakti yoga one prevents the development of new karmic dispositions, and can allow the past stores of karma to be naturally extinguished. This will have the effect of unclouding the individual jīva’s omniscience, and bringing the jīva closer to a vision of God, which alone is an unending source of joy (Vedārthasaṅgraha §241). Unlike Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja insists that dharma is never to be abandoned (Rāmānuja, Bhagavad Gītā Bhāṣya XVIII.66, p.599).

v. Dvaita

Madhva is one of the principal theistic exponents of Vedānta. On his account, Brahman is a personal God, and specifically He is the Hindu deity Viṣṇu.
According to Madhva, reality is characterized by a five fold difference: (i) jīvas (individual persons) are different from God; (ii) jīvas are also different from each other; (iii) inanimate objects are different from God; (iv) inanimate objects are different from other inanimate objects; (v) inanimate objects are different from jīvas (Mahābhāratatātparnirnayaḥ, I. 70-71). The number of types of entities on Madhva’s account appears thus to be three: God, jīvas, and inanimate objects. However, the actual number of objects on Madhva’s account appears to be very high. This substantial pluralism sets Madhva apart from the other principle exponents of Vedānta.
A distinctive doctrine of Madhva’s Vedānta is his view that jīvas fall into a hierarchy, with the most exalted jīvas occupying a place below Viṣṇu (such as Viṣṇu’s companions in his eternal abode) to the lowest jīvas, who occupy dark hell regions. Moreover, on Madhva’s account, the ranking of jīvas is eternal, and hence those who occupy the lowest hells are eternally damned. Amongst the middle level jīvas, the Gods and the most virtuous of humans are eligible for liberation. The average amongst the middle rung jīvas transmigrate forever, while the lowest amongst the middle level jīvas find themselves in the upper hells (Mahābhāratatātparnirnayaḥ I.85-88).
Madhva holds that liberation comes to those who appreciate the five fold differences and the hierarchy of the jīvas (Mahābhāratatātparnirnayaḥ, 81-2). However, ultimately, whether one is liberated or not is completely at the discretion of Brahman, and Brahman is pleased by nothing more than bhakti, or devotion (Mahābhāratatātparnirnayaḥ I.117).

g. Classical Hindu Philosophy in the Context of Indian Philosophy

Hindu philosophy did not develop in a vacuum. Rather, it is an inextricable part of the history of Indian philosophy. Hence, other Indian philosophical movements did not only influence Hindu philosophy, but it also arguably had an influence on their development as well.
The most salient manner in which Hindu philosophy was influenced by other Indian philosophical developments is in the realm of ethics. In its infancy, Hindu philosophy as set out in the action portion of the Vedas was wedded to the practice of animal sacrifices (see Aitareya Brāhmana, book II.1-2). Buddhism and Jainism were both critical of the practice. Buddhism as a philosophy devoted to the alleviation of suffering is disposed to see animal sacrifices as involving unnecessary suffering. Jainism, in contrast, had made Ahiṃsā, or non-harmfulness, its chief moral virtue. Jainism might very well have been the first religio-philosophical movement in India staunchly wedded to vegetarianism. And while vegetarianism was alien to early Hindu practice, it has become an integral part of Hindu orthodoxy in many parts of India. Now, for many Hindus, the very idea of eating meat is the very archetype of immoral and irreligious behavior. This attitude can be found amongst the most orthodox followers of both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, who, as noted, defended the propriety of animal sacrifices. The shift in the general attitude of many Hindus arguably goes to the credit of Jainism, a once prevalent religion in India, which has been a source of tireless criticism of violence.
A case might also be made for the influence of Jainism on the Yoga darśana. Specifically, the yama rules found in the Yoga darśana, which include Ahiṃsā, are identical to the five Great vows of Jainism (Ācāraṅga Sūtra II.15.i.1–v.1). While it is possible that these precepts have a third common source, or that they are indigenous to the Yoga tradition, it is also highly probable that they were incorporated, early on, into the Yoga tradition by way of influence of Jain thought. The Yoga tradition also shows the mark of being influenced by Mahāyāna Buddhism in its account of “dharmameghasamādhi”—a term that shows up in many latter day Buddhist texts (see Klostermaier).
In the realm of metaphysics, a controversial argument can be made that Hindu philosophy, as found in the Upaniṣads, has exercised a profound effect on the development of latter day Indian Buddhist thought. Increasingly, in the context of latter Indian Buddhism, there is a movement away from a seeming agnosticism to an affirmation of the Ultimate in terms of a master concept, which designates both the grounding and the source of all. For Buddhist Idealism (Yogācāra, or Vijñānavāda) the master concept is that of Consciousness-Only, and in the context of Mādhyamika Buddhism of Nāgārjuna (2nd cent. C.E.) the master concept is that of Emptiness, or Śūnyatā. Such a move towards a master concept resembles the Upaniṣad’s employment of the concept “Brahman” and is arguably an adaptation of some elements of the metaphysical picture of the Upaniṣads into Buddhist philosophy.
Similarly, a case might also be made that the notion of “Two-Truths” (the doctrine that there is a distinction to be drawn between conventional truth that operates in ordinary, domestic discourse that recognizes diversity, and Truth from the perspective of the Ultimate which rejects diversity) operative in latter Buddhist thought is also a doctrine that can be found in the Upaniṣads (cf. Muṇdaka Upaniṣad, I.i. 5-6). While this doctrine gets its clearest explication in the context of latter day Buddhist thought in India, it seems that it has its precursor in Vedic speculation.

4. Stage Three: Neo-Hinduism

The term “Neo-Hinduism” refers to a conception of the Hindu religion formed by recent authors who were learned in traditional Indian philosophy, and English. Famous Neo-Hindus include Swami Vivekānanda (1863-1902) the famous disciple of the traditional Hindu saint Rāma-Kṛṣṇa, and India’s first president, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888-1975) a professional philosopher who held academic posts at various universities in India and Oxford, in the UK.
A famous formulation of the doctrine of Neo-Hinduism is the simile that likens religions to rivers, and the oceans to God: as all rivers lead to the ocean so do all religions lead to God. Similarly, Swami Nirvenananda in his book Hinduism at a Glance writes:

All true religions of the world lead us alike to the same goal, namely, to perfection if, of course, they are followed faithfully. Each of them is a correct path to Divinity. The Hindus have been taught to regard religion in this light. (Nivernananda, p.20.)

Frequently, Neo-Hindu authors identify Hinduism with Vedānta in their elaboration of Neo-Hindu doctrine, and in this formulation we find another tenet of Neo-Hinduism: Hinduism is not simply another religion, but a meta-religion, or the philosophy of religion. Hence, we find Vivekānanda writes:

Ours is the universal religion. It is inclusive enough, it is broad enough to include all the ideals. All the ideals of religion that already exist in the world can be immediately included, and we can patiently wait for all the ideals that are to come in the future to be taken in the same fashion, embraced in the infinite arms of the religion of Vedānta. (Vivekānanda, vol. III p.251-2.)

Similarly, Radhakrishnan holds “[t]he Vedānta is not a religion, but religion itself in its most universal and deepest significance” (Radhakrishnan, 35).
The view identified as Neo-Hinduism here might be understood as a form of Universalism or liberal theology that attempts to ground religion itself in Hindu philosophy. Neo-Hinduism must be distinguished from another theological view that has a long history in India, which we might call Inclusivist Theology. According to Inclusivist Theology, there are elements in any number of religious practices that are consonant with the one true religion, and if a practitioner of a contrary religion holds fast to those elements in their religion that are correct, they will eventually attain the Ultimate. Often, this view finds expression in the widespread Hindu view that all the various deities are really lower manifestations of one true deity (for example, a Vaiṣṇava who held an Inclusivist theology might interpret all deities, in so far as they are consonant with the qualities attributed to Viṣṇu, to be lower manifestations of Viṣṇu, and thus good first steps to conceptualizing the Ultimate). Neo-Hinduism, in contrast, makes no distinction between deities, religions, or elements within religions, for all religions operate at the level of the practical, while the Ultimate, ex hypothesi, is transcendent. There is no religion, or no portion of any religion, which is incorrect, on this view, for all are equally human efforts to strive for the Divine. Neo-Hindus do not typically regard themselves as forming a new philosophy or religion, though the doctrine expressed by Neo-Hinduism is characterized by theses and concerns not clearly expressed in classical Hindu philosophy. As a rule, Neo-Hinduism is a reformulation of Advaita Vedānta, which emphasizes the implicit liberal theological tendencies that follow from the two-fold account of Brahman.
Recall that on Śaṅkara’s account a distinction is to be drawn between a lower and higher Brahman. Higher Brahman (nirguṇa Brahman) is impersonal and lacks much of what is normally attributed to God. In contrast, lower Brahman (saguṇa Brahman) has personal characteristics attributed to deities. While the higher Brahman is the eternally existing reality, lower Brahman is a result of the same creative error that results in the construction of normal integrated egos in bodies: superimposition. Neo-Hinduism takes note of the fact that this account of lower Brahman’s nature implies that the deities normally worshiped in a religious context are really natural artefacts, or projections of aesthetic concerns on the Ultimate: they are images of the Ultimate formulated for the sake of religious progress. Neo-Hinduism thus reasons that no one’s personal God is any more the real God than another religion’s personal God: rather, all are equally approximations of the one real, impersonal Brahman that transcends the domestic qualities attributed to it. While personal deities are considerably devalued on this account, the result is a liberal theology that is closed to no religious tradition, in principle, for any religion that personalizes God will be approaching the highest Brahman through the lens of superimposed characteristics of object-qualities on Brahman.
Critics of Neo-Hinduism have noted that while Neo-Hinduism aspires to shun the sectarianism that characterises the history of religion in the West through a spirit of Universalism, Neo-Hinduism itself engages in a sectarianism, in so far as it identifies Hinduism with the true perspective that understands the quality-less nature of the Ultimate (cf. Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection pp. 51-86). In defense of Neo-Hinduism, it could be argued that it is a genuine, modern attempt to re-understand the philosophical implications of earlier Hindu thought, and not an attempt to reconcile the various religions of the world.
Critics might also argue that Neo-Hinduism is bad history: many philosophers that we today regard as Hindu (such as Rāmānuja or Madhva) would not accept the idea that all deities are equal, and that God is ultimately an impersonal entity. Moreover, Śaṅkara, the commentator on the Brahma Sūtras did not argue for the type of Universalism characteristic of Neo-Hinduism, which regards all religious observance as equally valid (though this arguably is an implication of his philosophy). Neo-Hinduism, the critic might argue, is historical revisionism. In response, Neo-Hinduism might defend itself by insisting that it is not in the business of providing an account of the history of all of Hindu philosophy, but only a certain strand that it regards as the most important.

5. Conclusion: the Status of Hindu Philosophy

Hindu philosophers have taken varied views on many important issues in philosophy. Hindu philosophers, for instance, are not in agreement as to whether God is a person. They have not all agreed upon the nature and scope of the epistemic validity of the Vedas, nor have they all agreed on basic questions of axiology, such as the content of morality. Some affirm the importance of Vedicly prescribed acts, such as animal sacrifices, while others, such as the Yoga philosopher Patañjali, appear to suggest that violence is always to be avoided. Likewise, some Hindu philosophers hold that the content of the Vedas as always binding, such as Rāmānuja. Others, such as Śaṅkara, regard it as constituting provisional obligations, subject to a person not being serious about liberation. All Hindu philosophers are not in agreement on whether there is anything like liberation. Most recognize the existence of liberation, while the early Pūrvamīmāṃsā does not. While all Hindu philosophers hold that there is something like an individual self, they differ radically in their account of the reality and nature of this individual. This difference in ontology reflects the rich metaphysical diversity amongst Hindu philosophers: some affirm the existence of a plurality of objects; qualities and relations (such as the Vaiśeṣika, Dvaita Vedānta) while others do not (Advaita Vedānta). Such differences have made Hindu philosophy into a sub-tradition of philosophy within Indian philosophy, and not simply one comprehensive philosophical view amongst many. Hindu philosophy is not a static doctrine, but a growing tradition rich in diverse philosophical perspectives. Contrary to some popular accounts, what is presented as Hindu philosophy in recent times is not simply an elaboration of ancient tradition, but a re-evaluation and dialectical evolution of Hindu philosophical thought. Far from detracting from the authority or authenticity of recent Hindu speculation, what this shows is that Hindu philosophy is a living and vibrant tradition that shows no sign of being fossilized into a curiosity from the past, any time soon.

6. References and Further Readings

a. Primary Sources

Ācāraṅga Sūtra. Trans. Harmann Georg Jacobi. Jaina Sūtras. Ed. Harmann Georg Jacobi. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Delhi: AVF Books, 1987.
Aiterya Brāhmana. Aiterya Brāhmana of the Ṛg Veda. Trans. Martin Haug. Sacred Books of the Hindus. Ed. B.D. Basu. Allahabad: Sudhindra Nath Vasu, 1922.
Bhāgavata Purāṇa. Śrīmad Bhāgavatam. Trans. Tapasyānanda. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1981.
Chandrakānta. Vaiśeṣika Sūtra (Gloss). Trans. Nandal Sinha. Allahabad: Sudhindra Nath Basu, 1923.
Dhammapada. A Source Book in Indian Philosophy. Eds. S. Radhakrishnan and Charles Alexander Moore. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967. 292-325.
Gautama. Nyāya Sūtra. Trans. Satisa Chandra Viyabhusana. Sacred Books of the Hindus. Ed. Nandalal Sinha. 2nd rev. and enl. ed. Vol. 8. Allahabad: Panini Office, 1930.
Gautama, Vātsyāyana, and Uddyotakara. The Nyāya-Sūtras of Gautama: with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana and the Vārtika of Uddyotakara. Trans. Ganganatha Jha. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.
Gītā. Śrīmad Bhagavad Gītā; the Scripture of Mankind. Trans. and Ed. Swāmi Tapasyānanda. Madras: Śrī Ramakrishna Math, 1986.
Guṇaratna. Tarkarahasyadīpika. Cārvāka/Lokāyata: an Anthology of Source Materials and Some Recent Studies. Ed. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research in association with Rddhi-India Calcutta, 1990.
Īśvarakrsna. Sāṅkhya Kārikā. Trans. S.S. Suryanārāyana-Sastri. Madras University Philosophical Series. no. 3. Ed. S.S. Suryanārāyana-Sastri. 2nd rev. ed. Madras: University of Madras, 1948.
Jaimini. Mīmāṃsā Sūtra. Trans. and Ed. Mohan Lal Sandal. Sacred Books of the Hindus. Vol. 27. Allahabad: Sudhindre Nath Basu, 1923.
Khaṇḍa. Vaiśeṣika Sūtra. Trans. and Ed. Nandalal Sinha. Sacred Books of the Hindus. Ed. Nandal Sinha. 2nd rev. and enl. ed. Vol. 6. Allahabad: Sudhindra Nath Basu, Panini Office, 1923.
Kaṭha Upaniṣad. Trans. and Ed. Swami Gambirananda. Eight Upaniṣads, With the Commentary of Śankarācārya. Ed. Swami Gambirananda. Vol. 2: Advaita Ashrama, 1977. 91-220.
Kumārila. Ślokavārtika. 1909 Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta: Asiatic Society. Trans. Ganganatha Jha. Śrī Garib Das Oriental Series. Vol. 8. Delhi: Śrī Satguru, 1983.
Madhva. Mahābhāratātparyanirnayah. Trans. and Ed. K.T. Pandurang. Vol. 1. Chirtanur: Sriman Madhva Siddhantonnanhini Sabha, 1993. Madhva. Vedānta Sūtras with the commentary of Śrī Madhwacharya (Madva Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya). Trans. S. Subba Rau. Madras: Thompson and Co., 1904.
Majjhima Nikāya. The Collection of the Middle Length Sayings. Trans. I. B. Horner. Pali Text Society Translation Series. Vol. 29–31. 3 vols. London: Published for the Pali Text Society by Luzac, 1957.
Manu. The Laws of Manu (Manavadharmaśāstra). Trans. G.Buhler. Sacred Books of the East. Ed. Max Müller. Vol. xxv. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1886.
Muṇdaka Upaniṣad. Trans. and Ed. Swami Gambirananda. Eight Upaniṣads, With the Commentary of Śankarācārya. Vol. 2: Advaita Ashrama, 1977. 77-172.
Patañjali. Yoga Sūtra. Trans. and Ed. Swāmi Prabhavananda. Madras: Ramakrishna Math., 1953.
Plato. Phaedo. Trans. Hugh Tredennick. The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters. Bollingen Series 71. Eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books, 1966. 40-99.
Plato. Phaedrus. Trans. R. Hackforth. The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters. Bollingen Series 71. Eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books, 1966. 475-525.
Plato. Republic. Trans. Paul Shorey. The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters. Bollingen Series 71. Eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. New York: Pantheon Books, 1966. 575-844.
Puruṣa Sūkta. Śrī Rudram and Puruṣasūktam. Trans. and Ed. Swami Amritananda. Ed. Swami Amritananda. Chennai: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1997.
Radhakrishnan, S. The Hindu View of Life. Books that matter. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1961.
Radhakrishnan, S., and Charles Alexander Moore, eds. A Source Book in Indian Philosophy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967.
Rāmānuja. Śrī Rāmānuja Gītā Bhāṣya. Trans. and Ed. Swāmi Ādidevānada. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1991.
Rāmānuja. Vedānta Sūtras with the commentary of Rāmānuja (Rāmānuja Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya; Śrī Bhāṣya). Trans. George Thibaut. Sacred Books of the East. Vol. 48. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1996.
Rāmānuja. Vedārthasaṅgraha. Trans. and Ed. S.S. Ragavachar. Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1968.
Ṛg Veda. Vedic hymns. Trans. Hermann Oldenberg. Sacred books of the East. Ed. F. Max Müller. Vol. 32, 46. 2 vols. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1891.
Śabara. Śabara Bhāṣya. Trans. Ganganatha Jha. Gaekwad’s Oriental Series. Vol. 66, 70, 73. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1933.
Saṃyutta Nikāya. The Connected Discourses of the Buddha : a New Translation of the Saṃyutta Nikāya; translated from the Pāli. Trans. Bhikkhu Bodhi. 2 vols. Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2000.
Śaṅkara (ācārya). Bhagavad Gītā with the commentary of Śankarācārya. Trans. Swāmi Gambhirānanda. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1991.
Śaṅkara (ācārya). “Taittitrīya Upaniṣad Bhāṣya.” Trans. Swami Gambirananda. Eight Upaniṣads, With the Commentary of Śankarācārya. Vol. 1: Advaita Ashrama, 1977. 3-29.
Śaṅkara (ācārya). The Vedānta Sūtras (Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya). Sacred books of the East, vol.38. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994.
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Tapasyānanda, Swāmi. Bhakti Schools of Vedānta. Madras: Ramakrishna Math, 1990.
Udayanācārya and Haridāsa Nyāyālamkāra. The Kusumāñjali: or, Hindu Proof of the Existence of a Supreme Being (10th Century). (Udayanācārya’s Nyāyausumāñjali with Haridāsa’s Nyāyālaṃkāra’s Vyākhyā). Trans. and Ed. E.B. Cowell. Varanasi: Bharat-Bharati, 1980.
Vivekānanda. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekānanda. Mayavati memorial ed. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1964.

b. Secondary Sources

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Halbfass, Wilhelm. India and Europe: an Essay in Understanding. Indien und Europa: Perspektiven ihrer geistigen Begegnung. Basel; Stuttgart: Schwabe, 1981. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988.
Halbfass, Wilhelm. Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1991.
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philosophy

2009-08-26T00:31:00.002-07:00

what is philosophy? why we need philosophy? this is main question asked by new students from philosophy.Philosophy studies the fundamental nature of existence, of man, and of man's relationship to existence. … In the realm of cognition, the special sciences are the trees, but philosophy is the soil which makes the forest possible.
—A philosophy is a comprehensive system of ideas about human nature and the nature of the reality we live in. It is a guide for living, because the issues it addresses are basic and pervasive, determining the course we take in life and how we treat other people.

The topics that philosophy addresses fall into several distinct fields. Among those of fundamental concern are:

Metaphysics (the theory of reality).
Epistemology (the theory of knowledge)
Ethics (the theory of moral values)
Politics (the theory of legal rights and government)
Aesthetics (the theory of the nature of art)
The most widespread systems of ideas that offer philosophical guidance are religions such as Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Religions differ from philosophies not in the subjects they address, but in the method they use to address them. Religions have their basis in mythic stories that pre-date the discovery of explicitly rational methods of inquiry. Many religions nowadays appeal to mystical faith and revelation—modes of belief that claim validity independent of logic and the scientific method, at least for the biggest questions. But most religions are in their origins pre-rational rather than anti-rational, a story-teller's account of philosophic issues rather than a scientist's.

In Greek, "philosophy" means "love of wisdom." Philosophy is based on rational argument and appeal to facts. The history of the modern sciences begins with philosophical inquiries, and the scientific method of experimentation and proof remains an instance of the general approach that a philosopher tries to bring to a question: one that is logical and rigorous. However, while today the sciences focus on specialized inquiries in restricted domains, the questions addressed by philosophy remain the most general and most basic, the issues that underlie the sciences and stand at the base of a world-view.

Philosophy raises some of the deepest and widest questions there are. Addressing the issues in each branch of philosophy requires integrating everything one knows about reality (metaphysics) or humanity (epistemology, ethics, politics, and aesthetics). Proposing reasonable positions in philosophy is therefore a difficult task. Honest philosophers have often disagreed about key issues, and dishonest ones have been able to slip their own positions into the mix as well. For this reason, there is not one philosophy worldwide, as there is one physics. Instead, there are many philosophies.

Over the course of history, philosophers have offered entire systems that pulled together positions in each of the branches of philosophy. Aristotle, the father of logic, authored such a system in ancient times, teaching that we could know reality and achieve happiness. In more modern times, philosophers such as John Locke and Immanuel Kant have written systematic accounts of their thought. Most modern philosophers, however, have specialized in one area or another within philosophy, although some schools of philosophy have emerged that are marked by the general positions of their members on a variety of issues and the members' shared admiration for a chain of historical figures. These schools have included Pragmatism, Logical Positivism, and Existentialism, but are little-known outside of university classes in modern philosophy.

Today philosophic issues often enter public life through political or social movements, some religious in inspiration, such as Christian conservatism, and others secular, such as left-wing environmentalism and socialism. The ideas of such movements are often called ideologies. That term, "ideology," is another name for the systems of ideas we have been talking about. Though the focus of ideological movements is political, their political beliefs tend to be rooted in shared conceptions of reality, human nature, and values.

Everyone has a philosophy, even if we cannot express it in words.

We either act as if our eternal salvation depends on following the mandates of scripture, or we don't. We feel the need to believe in something and search for understanding, or we adopt the cynical view that the search is useless. We all have some sense of what is right, and what is wrong. We can see ourselves as noble beings worthy of happiness or as guilty transgressors against the environment, social justice, or God. We will all decide often what it is that constitutes our duty. We think we know art when we see it. And we adopt political principles and support politicians and parties.

All of these are philosophical issues.

Philosophical convictions are often subconscious or inarticulate. We experience them emotionally in what Ayn Rand called a "sense of life." Your sense of life reflects the fundamental ways you relate to the world and other people; it is your intuitive feeling of how things are and how they ought to be. Each of us needs to understand his own convictions consciously, to be able to put his sense of life into words. Otherwise we don't really have a clear idea of what we believe or what is motivating us to make our biggest decisions—or whether it is true. We need to know what we think on philosophical questions, because our answers can affect the course of our lives. And the sense of life that dominates nations or cultures can determine their fates.

We need a metaphysics (a theory of reality) because we need to know whether the material world of daily life is the only one that exists—which makes a difference between living for this life or some heavenly hereafter. We need to know whether the universe is lawful, or chaotic—which makes a difference between trying to improve things or viewing life as absurd and meaningless.

You take your car to a mechanic because the engine misfires in damp weather. Wouldn't it be strange if he were to shrug and say "Well, cars just do that sometimes?" But what's wrong with that? Why shouldn't you take that attitude to your own problems at home or at work? You need a philosophy to know the answer.
An epistemology is a theory of knowledge. It may seem that if you know anything, then you know it, so what's the issue? To have a clear grasp of one's own life and context, one needs to be able to sort out the mass of information, claims, and ideas we receive from others: that skill is based in epistemology. After all, at root, we need to know whether what we believe is really true. How do you know when someone has proven a point? That can be terribly important when the truth of a scientific theory, a doctor's diagnosis, or the outcome of a trial is at stake. Some people say that words are arbitrary and mean whatever we like. Does that mean it doesn't matter if someone uses words he can't define in down-to-earth terms? Should we worry if we don't feel like we have mystic intuitions, or should we worry if we do?

A neighbor comes to your door with a petition: pesticides from nearby farms are appearing in trace quantities in the town's drinking water. The neighbor wants them removed at all costs. "Nobody has proven that these chemicals won't ever hurt anyone," he says. But the farmers send around a flyer saying the chemicals have been scientifically tested and are proven to be safe. Both are talking about proof, but they don't seem to mean the same thing by it. How could you tell who is right? You need a philosophy to know the answer.
Ethics is the science we use to judge good from evil. We don't want to do evil, and we would like to do good if we can. But to do that, we need to know what it means to be good, and what kind of actions tend to achieve it. People make demands on us: what do we owe to others and what do we deserve for ourselves? To organize our moral views and take the right course in life, we need to avoid being torn apart by contradictory goals and principles.

You are working for a company and rising up to positions of greater responsibility. You try to work efficiently and you hope to make a lot of money, both in bonuses for yourself and in profits for the company. But you feel a little uneasy, and you wonder: are you doing good there, or are you just playing the game of life and going with the flow? After all, your religion teaches you that the best people live simply and serve others. Should you feel guilty about trying to make money, or feel morally proud of your success? You need a philosophy to know the answer.
We all know about practical politics, because we have to choose whom to vote for, and in which causes to invest our time and money. But though we argue about it, few people take the time to sort out their fundamental convictions about political issues. Is there a conflict between the social good and what's good for individuals? Is society responsible for supporting the poor? For inculcating character and values? For regulating the economy? In part, our ideas will depend on our ethical beliefs, but we also need a clear idea of what government is for and what kinds of activities it should be engaged in, if any.

It's election time. One party promises to ensure that every person has a decent job by passing a law setting fair minimum wages and restricting layoffs. The other promises to make sure we are all free, and says we will all be better off in the end even if there are layoffs and wages are set in the labor market. Which one is best? What do political slogans like "fairness" and "freedom" really mean, anyway? You need a philosophy to know the answer.
We all spend time and money on art: reading books, attending films and shows, listening to music, and so on. But unless we reflect on aesthetics, we can't understand clearly why we have this need and what it is about art that fulfills it. What is the difference between good art and bad art? Art provides the spiritual fuel we all depend on, and trying to consume it without knowing anything about its basic purpose and the standards of judging it is like trying to run a car on any old liquid.

A new object has appeared in front of a prominent building in your city. It consists of slabs of metal arranged to make a large and angular shape. The newspaper says it is a great new piece of art, but you wonder, if that is art, what isn't? What is a piece of sculpture supposed to be like? You need a philosophy to know the answer.
People often think of philosophy as a highly abstract and technical field, full of conundrums of interest only to academics. But in fact all of us depend on philosophic conclusions, and identifying one's own philosophy is a highly practical activity. We don't all need to be philosophers, any more than we all need to be mathematicians. But we all learn to add in school, and we all need to be able to do some basic philosophizing as well. That's how we know where we stand in the world and what we ought to do in life.

Upanishads

2009-08-26T00:31:00.001-07:00

The Upanishads form a part of the Vedas and are essentially a set of ancient mystic teachings and imparting of knowledge. The term Upanishad has been derived from three words: "Upa" (near), Ni (down) and shad (to sit), i.e., sitting down near. During ancient times, pupils used to sit near the teacher in a circle to learn the holy teachings and sacred scriptures. The Upanishad philosophy basically indicates learning from a spiritual teacher. The exact number of classical Upanishads is not known. Scholars differ when it comes to estimating the number of Upanishads that exist. It is estimated that there are around 350 Upanishads that exist today.

The Upanishads provide us with spiritual knowledge and philosophical reasoning. Upanishads aim at attaining a level of understanding beyond ordinary knowledge about living. They aim at seeking a higher level of understanding about survival. They seek to create awareness about our purpose in life. They dwell on the psychology of the human mind. They speak about consciousness, sub-consciousness and dreams. They go beyond ordinary knowing and aim at a higher level of realization.

The Upanishads also contain information on the divine power of the word "Aum". This word is said to have cosmic vibrations and is said to underlie all forms of existence and trinity principles. For creating sound, one needs to have atleast two things that strike against each other. But Aum is one sound that is created without any help or friction. Thus, this is the sound of the Universe, the vibrations that you feel inside when you close your ears. The Upanishads aim at making our lives more meaningful by making us realize the importance of self-realization that goes a long way into shaping the kind of individual we become

Heisenberg Science and philosophy

2009-08-26T00:29:00.000-07:00

The History of Quantum Theory
THE origin of quantum theory is connected with a well-known phenomenon, which did not belong to the central parts of atomic physics. Any piece of matter when it is heated starts to glow, gets red hot and white hot at higher temperatures. The colour does not depend much on the surface of the material, and for a black body it depends solely on the temperature. Therefore, the radiation emitted by such a black body at high temperatures is a suitable object for physical research; it is a simple phenomenon that should find a simple explanation in terms of the known laws for radiation and heat. The attempt made at the end of the nineteenth century by Lord Rayleigh and Jeans failed, however, and revealed serious difficulties. It would not be possible to describe these difficulties here in simple terms. It must be sufficient to state that the application of the known laws did not lead to sensible results. When Planck, in 1895, entered this line of research he tried to turn the problem from radiation to the radiating atom. This turning did not remove any of the difficulties inherent in the problem, but it simplified the interpretation of the empirical facts. It was just at this time, during the summer of 1900, that Curlbaum and Rubens in Berlin had made very accurate new measurements of the spectrum of heat radiation. When Planck heard of these results he tried to represent them by simple mathematical formulas which looked plausible from his research on the general connection between heat and radiation. One day Planck and Rubens met for tea in Planck’s home and compared Rubens’ latest results with a new formula suggested by Planck. The comparison showed a complete agreement. This was the discovery of Planck’s law of heat radiation.

It was at the same time the beginning of intense theoretical work for Planck. What was the correct physical interpretation of the new formula? Since Planck could, from his earlier work, translate his formula easily into a statement about the radiating atom (the so-called oscillator), he must soon have found that his formula looked as if the oscillator could only contain discrete quanta of energy – a result that was so different from anything known in classical physics that he certainly must have refused to believe it in the beginning. But in a period of most intensive work during the summer of 1900 he finally convinced himself that there was no way of escaping from this conclusion. It was told by Planck’s son that his father spoke to him about his new ideas on a long walk through the Grunewald, the wood in the suburbs of Berlin. On this walk he explained that he felt he had possibly made a discovery of the first rank, comparable perhaps only to the discoveries of Newton. So Planck must have realised at this time that his formula had touched the foundations of our description of nature, and that these foundations would one day start to move from their traditional present location toward a new and as yet unknown position of stability. Planck, who was conservative in his whole outlook, did not like this consequence at all, but he published his quantum hypothesis in December of 1900.

The idea that energy could be emitted or absorbed only in discrete energy quanta was so new that it could not be fitted into the traditional framework of physics. An attempt by Planck to reconcile his new hypothesis with the older laws of radiation failed in the essential points. It took five years until the next step could be made in the new direction.

This time it was the young Albert Einstein, a revolutionary genius among the physicists, who was not afraid to go further away from the old concepts. There were two problems in which he could make use of the new ideas. One was the so-called photoelectric effect, the emission of electrons from metals under the influence of light. The experiments, especially those of Lenard, had shown that the energy of the emitted electrons did not depend on the intensity of the light, but only on its colour or, more precisely, on its frequency. This could not be understood on the basis of the traditional theory of radiation. Einstein could explain the observations by interpreting Planck’s hypothesis as saying that light consists of quanta of energy travelling through space. The energy of one light quantum should, in agreement with Planck’s assumptions, be equal to the frequency of the light multiplied by Planck’s constant.

The other problem was the specific heat of solid bodies. The traditional theory led to values for the specific heat which fitted the observations at higher temperatures but disagreed with them at low ones. Again Einstein was able to show that one could understand this behaviour by applying the quantum hypothesis to the elastic vibrations of the atoms in the solid body. These two results marked a very important advance, since they revealed the presence of Planck’s quantum of action – as his constant is called among the physicists – in several phenomena, which had nothing immediately to do with heat radiation. They revealed at the same time the deeply revolutionary character of the new hypothesis, since the first of them led to a description of light completely different from the traditional wave picture. Light could either be interpreted as consisting of electromagnetic waves, according to Maxwell’s theory, or as consisting of light quanta, energy packets travelling through space with high velocity. But could it be both? Einstein knew, of course, that the well-known phenomena of diffraction and interference can be explained only on the basis of the wave picture. He was not able to dispute the complete contradiction between this wave picture and the idea of the light quanta; nor did he even attempt to remove the inconsistency of this interpretation. He simply took the contradiction as something which would probably be understood only much later.

In the meantime the experiments of Becquerel, Curie and Rutherford had led to some clarification concerning the structure of the atom. In 1911 Rutherford’s observations on the interaction of a-rays penetrating through matter resulted in his famous atomic model. The atom is pictured as consisting of a nucleus, which is positively charged and contains nearly the total mass of the atom, and electrons, which circle around the nucleus like the planets circle around the sun. The chemical bond between atoms of different elements is explained as an interaction between the outer electrons of the neighbouring atoms; it has not directly to do with the atomic nucleus. The nucleus determines the chemical behaviour of the atom through its charge which in turn fixes the number of electrons in the neutral atom. Initially this model of the atom could not explain the most characteristic feature of the atom, its enormous stability. No planetary system following the laws of Newton’s mechanics would ever go back to its original configuration after a collision with another such system. But an atom of the element carbon, for instance, will still remain a carbon atom after any collision or interaction in chemical binding.

The explanation for this unusual stability was given by Bohr in 1913, through the application of Planck’s quantum hypothesis. If the atom can change its energy only by discrete energy quanta, this must mean that the atom can exist only in discrete stationary states, the lowest of which is the normal state of the atom. Therefore, after any kind of interaction the atom will finally always fall back into its normal state.

By this application of quantum theory to the atomic model, Bohr could not only explain the stability of the atom but also. in some simple cases, give a theoretical interpretation of the line spectra emitted by the atoms after the excitation through electric discharge or heat. His theory rested upon a combination of classical mechanics for the motion of the electrons with quantum conditions, which were imposed upon the classical motions for defining the discrete stationary states of the system. A consistent mathematical formulation for those conditions was later given by Sommerfeld. Bohr was well aware of the fact that the quantum conditions spoil in some way the consistency of Newtonian mechanics. In the simple case of the hydrogen atom one could calculate from Bohr’s theory the frequencies of the light emitted by the atom, and the agreement with the observations was perfect. Yet these frequencies were different from the orbital frequencies and their harmonies of the electrons circling around the nucleus, and this fact showed at once that the theory was still full of contradictions. But it contained an essential part of the truth. It did explain qualitatively the chemical behaviour of the atoms and their line spectra; the existence of the discrete stationary states was verified by the experiments of Franck and Hertz, Stern and Gerlach.

Bohr’s theory had opened up a new line of research. The great amount of experimental material collected by spectroscopy through several decades was now available for information about the strange quantum laws governing the motions of the electrons in the atom. The many experiments of chemistry could be used for the same purpose. It was from this time on that the physicists learned to ask the right questions; and asking the right question is frequently more than halfway to the solution of the problem.

What were these questions? Practically all of them had to do with the strange apparent contradictions between the results of different experiments. How could it be that the same radiation that produces interference patterns, and therefore must consist of waves, also produces the photoelectric effect, and therefore must consist of moving particles? How could it be that the frequency of the orbital motion of the electron in the atom does not show up in the frequency of the emitted radiation? Does this mean that there is no orbital motion? But if the idea of orbital motion should be incorrect, what happens to the electrons inside the atom? One can see the electrons move through a cloud chamber, and sometimes they are knocked out of an atom- why should they not also move within the atom? It is true that they might be at rest in the normal state of the atom, the state of lowest energy. But there are many states of higher energy, where the electronic shell has an angular momentum. There the electrons cannot possibly be at rest. One could add a number of similar examples. Again and again one found that the attempt to describe atomic events in the traditional terms of physics led to contradictions.

Gradually, during the early twenties, the physicists became accustomed to these difficulties, they acquired a certain vague knowledge about where trouble would occur, and they learned to avoid contradictions. They knew which description of an atomic event would be the correct one for the special experiment under discussion. This was not sufficient to form a consistent general picture of what happens in a quantum process, but it changed the minds of the physicists in such a way that they somehow got into the spirit of quantum theory. Therefore, even some time before one had a consistent formulation of quantum theory one knew more or less what would be the result of any experiment.

One frequently discussed what one called ideal experiments. Such experiments were designed to answer a very critical question irrespective of whether or not they could actually be carried out. Of course it was important that it should be possible in principle to carry out the experiment, but the technique might be extremely complicated. These ideal experiments could be very useful in clarifying certain problems. If there was no agreement among the physicists about the result of such an ideal experiment, it was frequently possible to find a similar but simpler experiment that could be carried out, so that the experimental answer contributed essentially to the clarification of quantum theory.

The strangest experience of those years was that the paradoxes of quantum theory did not disappear during this process of clarification; on the contrary, they became even more marked and more exciting. There was, for instance, the experiment of Compton on the scattering of X-rays. From earlier experiments on the interference of scattered light there could be no doubt that scattering takes place essentially in the following way: The incident light wave makes an electron in the beam vibrate in the frequency of the wave; the oscillating electron then emits a spherical wave with the same frequency and thereby produces the scattered light. However, Compton found in 1923 that the frequency of scattered X-rays was different from the frequency of the incident X-ray. This change of frequency could be formally understood by assuming that scattering is to be described as collision of a light quantum with an electron. The energy of the light quantum is changed during the collision; and since the frequency times Planck’s constant should be the energy of the light quantum, the frequency also should be changed. But what happens in this interpretation of the light wave? The two experiments – one on the interference of scattered light and the other on the change of frequency of the scattered light – seemed to contradict each other without any possibility of compromise.

By this time many physicists were convinced that these apparent contradictions belonged to the intrinsic structure of atomic physics. Therefore, in I924 de Broglie in France tried to extend the dualism between wave description and particle description to the elementary particles of matter, primarily to the electrons. He showed that a certain matter wave could ‘correspond’ to a moving electron, just as a light wave corresponds: to a moving light quantum. It was not clear at the time what the word ‘correspond’ meant in this connection. But de Broglie suggested that the quantum condition in Bohr’s theory should be interpreted as a statement about the matter waves. A wave circling around a nucleus can for geometrical reasons only be a stationary wave; and the perimeter of the orbit must be an integer multiple of the wave length. In this way de Broglie’s idea connected the quantum condition. which always had been a foreign element in the mechanics of the electrons, with the dualism between waves and particles.

In Bohr’s theory the discrepancy between the calculated orbital frequency of the electrons and the frequency of the emitted radiation had to be interpreted as a limitation to the concept of the electronic orbit. This concept had been somewhat doubtful from the beginning. For the higher orbits, however, the electrons should move at a large distance from the nucleus just as they do when one sees them moving through a cloud chamber. There one should speak about electronic orbits. It was therefore very satisfactory that for these higher orbits the frequencies of the emitted radiation approach the orbital frequency and its higher harmonics. Also Bohr had already suggested in his early papers that the intensities of the emitted spectral lines approach the intensities of the corresponding harmonics. This principle of correspondence had proved very useful for the approximative calculation of the intensities of spectral lines. In this way one had the impression that Bohr’s theory gave a qualitative but not a quantitative description of what happens inside the atom; that some new feature of the behaviour of matter was qualitatively expressed by the quantum conditions, which in turn were connected with the dualism between waves and particles.

The precise mathematical formulation of quantum theory finally emerged from two different developments. The one started from Bohr’s principle of correspondence. One had to give up the concept of the electronic orbit, but still had to maintain it in the limit of high quantum numbers, i.e., for the large orbits.

In this latter case the emitted radiation, by means of its frequencies and intensities, gives a picture of the electronic orbit; it represents what the mathematicians call a Fourier expansion of the orbit. The idea suggested itself that one should write down the mechanical laws not as equations for the positions and velocities of the electrons but as equations for the frequencies and amplitudes of their Fourier expansion. Starting from such equations and changing them very little one could hope to come to relations for those quantities which correspond to the frequencies and intensities of the emitted radiation, even for the small orbits and the ground state of the atom. This plan could actually be carried out; in the summer of 1925 it led to a mathematical formalism called matrix mechanics or, more generally, quantum mechanics. The equations of motion in Newtonian mechanics were replaced by similar equations between matrices; it was a strange experience to find that many of the old results of Newtonian mechanics, like conservation of energy, etc., could be derived also in the new scheme. Later the investigations of Born, Jordan and Dirac showed that the matrices representing position and momentum of the electron did not commute. This latter fact demonstrated clearly the essential difference between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics.

The other development followed de Broglie’s idea of matter waves. Schrödinger tried to set up a wave equation for de Broglie’s stationary waves around the nucleus. Early in 1926 he succeeded in deriving the energy values of the stationary states of the hydrogen atom as ‘Eigenvalues’ of his wave equation and could give a more general prescription for transforming a given set of classical equations of motion into a corresponding wave equation in a space of many dimensions. Later he was able to prove that his formalism of wave mechanics was mathematically equivalent to the earlier formalism of quantum mechanics.

Thus one finally had a consistent mathematical formalism, which could be defined in two equivalent ways starting either from relations between matrices or from wave equations. This formalism gave the correct energy values for the hydrogen atom: it took less than one year to show that it was also successful for the helium atom and the more complicated problems of the heavier atoms. But in what sense did the new formalism describe the atom? The paradoxes of the dualism between wave picture and particle picture were not solved; they were hidden somehow in the mathematical scheme.

A first and very interesting step toward a real understanding Of quantum theory was taken by Bohr, Kramers and Slater in 1924. These authors tried to solve the apparent contradiction between the wave picture and the particle picture by the concept of the probability wave. The electromagnetic waves were interpreted not as ‘real’ waves but as probability waves, the intensity of which determines in every point the probability for the absorption (or induced emission) of a light quantum by an atom at this point. This idea led to the conclusion that the laws of conservation of energy and momentum need not be true for the single event, that they are only statistical laws and are true only in the statistical average. This conclusion was not correct, however, and the connections between the wave aspect and the particle aspect of radiation were still more complicated.

But the paper of Bohr, Kramers and Slater revealed one essential feature of the correct interpretation of quantum theory. This concept of the probability wave was something entirely new in theoretical physics since Newton. Probability in mathematics or in statistical mechanics means a statement about our degree of knowledge of the actual situation. In throwing dice we do not know the fine details of the motion of our hands which determine the fall of the dice and therefore we say that the probability for throwing a special number is just one in six. The probability wave of Bohr, Kramers, Slater, however, meant more than that; it meant a tendency for something. It was a quantitative version of the old concept of ‘potentia’ in Aristotelian philosophy. It introduced something standing in the middle between the idea of an event and the actual event, a~~ strange kind of physical reality just in the middle between possibility and reality. r Later when the mathematical framework of quantum theory was fixed, Born took up this idea of the probability wave and gave a clear definition of the mathematical quantity in the formalism. which was to be interpreted as the probability wave. It X as not a three-dimensional wave like elastic or radio waves, but a wave in the many-dimensional configuration space, and therefore a rather abstract mathematical quantity.

Even at this time, in the summer of I926, it was not clear in every case how the mathematical formalism should be used to describe a given experimental situation. One knew how to describe the stationary states of an atom, but one did not know how to describe a much simpler event – as for instance an electron moving through a cloud chamber.

When Schrödinger in that summer had shown that his formalism of wave mechanics was mathematically equivalent to quantum mechanics he tried for some time to abandon the idea of quanta and ‘quantum jumps’ altogether and to replace the electrons in the atoms simply by his three-dimensional matter waves. He was inspired to this attempt by his result, that the energy levels of the hydrogen atom in his theory seemed to be simply the eigenfrequencies of the stationary matter waves. Therefore, he thought it was a mistake to call them energies: they were just frequencies. But in the discussions which took place in the autumn of I926 in Copenhagen between Bohr and Schrödinger and the Copenhagen group of physicists it soon became apparent that such an interpretation would not even be sufficient to explain Planck’s formula of heat radiation.

During the months following these discussions an intensive study of all questions concerning the interpretation of quantum theory in Copenhagen finally led to a complete and, as many physicists believe, satisfactory clarification of the situation. But it was not a solution which one could easily accept. I remember discussions with Bohr which went through many hours till very late at night and ended almost in despair; and when at the end of the discussion I went alone for a walk in the neighbouring park I repeated to myself again and again the question: Can nature possibly be as absurd as it seemed to us in these atomic experiments?

The final solution was approached in two different ways. The one was a turning around of the question. Instead of asking: How can one in the known mathematical scheme express a given experimental situation? the other question was put: Is it true, perhaps, that only such experimental situations can arise in nature as can be expressed in the mathematical formalism? The assumption that this was actually true led to limitations in the use of those concepts that had been the basis of classical physics since Newton. One could speak of the position and of the velocity of an electron as in Newtonian mechanics and one could observe and measure these quantities. But one could not fix both quantities simultaneously with an arbitrarily high accuracy. Actually the product of these two inaccuracies turned out to be not less than Planck’s constant divided by the mass of the particle. Similar relations could be formulated for other experimental situations. They are usually called relations of uncertainty or principle of indeterminacy. One had learned that the old concepts fit nature only inaccurately.

lie other way of approach was Bohr’s concept of complementarity. Schrödinger had described the atom as a system not of a nucleus and electrons but of a nucleus and matter waves. This picture of the matter waves certainly also contained an element of truth. Bohr considered the two pictures – particle picture and wave picture – as two complementary descriptions of the same reality. Any of these descriptions can be only partially true, there must be limitations to the use of the particle concept as well as of wave concept, else one could not avoid contradictions. If one takes into account those limitations which can be expressed by the uncertainty relations, the contradictions disappear.

In this way since the spring of I927 one has had a consistent interpretation of quantum theory, which is frequently called the ‘Copenhagen interpretation’. This interpretation received its crucial test in the autumn of 1927 at the Solvay conference in Brussels. Those experiments which had always led to the worst paradoxes were again and again discussed in all details, especially by Einstein. New ideal experiments were invented to trace any possible inconsistency of the theory, but the theory was shown to be consistent and seemed to fit the experiments as far as one could see.

The details of this Copenhagen interpretation will be the subject of the next chapter. It should be emphasised at this point that it has taken more than a quarter of a century to get from the first idea of the existence of energy quanta to a real understanding of the quantum theoretical laws. This indicates the great change that had to take place in the fundamental concepts concerning reality before one could understand the new situation.